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SUMMARY
This thesis develops methods to analyze and model covert/side chan-
nels and electromagnetic signals emitted during program execution, and
estimate their channel capacity to comprehend the severity of information
leakage that is a result of hardware and software activities, and provides
guidelines to minimize emanations to enable system designs more resilient
to side/covert channel attacks.
Side/Covert channels are asynchronous channels which are not de-
signed nor intended to transfer information. These channels are generated
as a byproduct of performing legitimate program activities on the hardware
of computer systems. Various approaches have been proposed in the liter-
ature to model such channels to analyze and estimate information leakage
capacity. Main drawbacks of current approaches are that they do not
consider 1) asynchronous nature of side/covert channels, 2) variability in
execution time of each instruction, and 3) interrupts due to other software
activities. Ignoring any of these features can result in underestimating the
severity of information leakage, and inaccurate models that can mislead
the analysis of these channels.
Likewise, having a tool to analyze the emanated electromagnetic sig-
nals in the design-stage can reduce the cost of production since designs
can be tested before they are manufactured. This tool also helps reducing
the flaws that causing information leakages through side/covert channels
and securing sensitive information of customers. To successfully evaluate
the severity of side/covert channels, our research has 1) defined a metric
that calculates the emanated signal power difference of two instructions
and modeled the covert/side channels as a discrete memoryless channel
xxi
with uneven symbol transmission length, 2) defined another metric to cal-
culate the emanated signal power for a single instruction and established
a connection with Markov Source Models to model side channels con-
sidering the dependency among instructions as a consequence of proces-
sor pipeline and program functionality, 3) modeled and analyzed a covert
channel, which is deliberately generated with electromagnetic (EM) ema-
nations due to computer activities, by adopting methodologies from con-
ventional communication systems, and proposed bounds for the capacity
of these channels, 4) introduced a generalized model for covert channels
with different sources (i.e. power, cache, EM, etc.) and an assessment
methodology that can be utilized by designers to analyze their systems
against attacks based on these channels, and 5) modeled side channel
signals emanated while executing instruction sequences on a processor,
which leverages design-stage investigation of new products. The work pro-
vides a deep understanding of side/covert channels generated by program
activities which can be utilized to secure devices by optimizing their de-





A side/covert channel is a communication channel that is neither designed
nor intended to transfer information [1]. Signals from these channels are
generated as a side effect of performing legitimate program activity on the
hardware of a device. Since program activity and the resulting hardware
activity are dependent on data processed by the program, the resulting
side/covert channel signals can (and usually do) carry information about
those data values. This allows attackers to obtain sensitive information
by analyzing side/covert channel signals that are produced by programs
which process this sensitive information.
Covert/side-channel attacks have been acknowledged as a serious se-
curity threat [2]. The severity of that threat dramatically increases as
computer systems are increasingly getting mobile and may be physically
controlled or placed close to potentially malicious entities. For example,
previous work [3, 4, 5] confirm that modulated EM emanations from lap-
top and desktop systems can be created by executing seemingly innocuous
code, and EM covert channel transmission of thousands of bits per second
has been demonstrated to distances of at least several meters and even
through a wall. Because the “transmitter” code for EM covert channel at-
tacks is innocuous-looking, and because reception of the emanations does
not require direct contact with the system under attack, numerous EM
side/covert channel attacks may be carried out completely undetected.
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In information theory, covert channels refer to low probability of de-
tection communications [6]. These communications are designed to pre-
vent the existence of transmission in the first place. In these channels,
secondary users communicate covertly over the existent communication
channels that are utilized by the primary users. Another description for
these channels is that users desire to transmit information in secret through
a known communication channel to maintain their privacy, etc. The gen-
eral practice for these channels is to exploit Gaussian channels, pure loss
quantum channels and thermal noise quantum channels [7]. Please keep
in mind that the covert communication in the information theory litera-
ture aims to embed the information into the existent synchronous chan-
nel so that the entropy between the transmitted bit sequence and zero se-
quence is almost zero. In other words, an adversary could not differentiate
whether the transmitted bit sequence is either zeros or any other non-zero
bit sequence [8]. However, in this thesis, covert channels refer to a means
of communication between two parties that are not permitted to commu-
nicate. Contrary to covert channels in the information theory, they do
not embed information into an already-existent channel. They are covert
in the sense that legitimate activities in computer systems can generate
them without being aware of doing it. In other words, the covert channels
due to software activities are totally separate and individual channels are
such that they do not exploit any synchronous channel that already exists.
The severity of a side/covert channel is often measured in terms of bit
rates, i.e. how rapidly it can transmit information. Millen was the first to
establish a connection between Shannon’s information theory and infor-
mation flow models in computer systems [9] to calculate the capacity of
such a covert channel. Considering instructions as the inputs of covert/-
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side channels, the proposed method in [9] ignores the variability in execu-
tion time of instructions. The model also assumes a synchronous channel
which is not a realistic assumption for side/covert channels. Moreover,
transmission through covert/side channels is often corrupted by insertion
and erroneous transfer of bits due to their unintentional nature.
In the conventional communication literature, there is a large num-
ber of papers discussing bounds on the capacity of channels corrupted
with synchronization errors [10]-[14]. Also, the work in [15, 16] discusses
bounds on the capacity of channels corrupted with synchronization and
substitution errors. The main drawbacks of these methods for side/covert
channels are ignoring the signaling time deviations due to computer activi-
ties, insertions or deletions due to stalls, interrupts, etc., and not having a
proper channel model that reflects the characteristics of side/covert chan-
nels.
These shortcomings demonstrate that new approaches are required to
quantify the actual information leakages through side/covert channels.
Having such a leakage quantification reveals the resiliency of a device
against attacks based on these unintended channels. Therefore, the ap-
proaches must be easily applied by system designers to test whether their
systems are resilient against side/covert channel attacks. Moreover, the
new approaches must consider the worst-case scenarios and motivate
minimizing leakages as much as possible to overcome any attacks in the
near future. Therefore, these approaches have to provide a detailed analy-
ses of covert/side channels, proper modeling of these channels to quantify
worst-case scenarios, a simulation tool to analyze emanated EM signals
in design-state and a design assessment methodology that guides systems
designers for more secure devices.
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1.2 Capacity of the EM Covert/Side-Channel Created by the Execu-
tion of Instructions in a Processor
Covert/Side channels are unintentional channels that are byproducts of
computer activities. These channels can be a source of security flaws be-
cause they can enable unauthorized transmission of secret information.
Here, the question is how to measure severity of these channels. In that
respect, Millen was the first to establish a connection between Shannon’s
information theory and information flow models in computer systems [9].
The covert channel is modeled as a synchronous channel and the chan-
nel capacity of the model is calculated by utilizing Shannon’s capacity
definition. In other words, the paper established a connection between
the channel capacity and the severity of the channel. However, the syn-
chronous channel assumption is not realistic for these channels. Although
most communication systems are designed to avoid symbol loss and/or
insertion with little or no overhead, the covert channel is not designed
to transfer information at all and its transmission is often corrupted by
insertion, deletion and erroneous transfer of bits.
In conventional communication literature, there are a large number
of papers discussing bounds on the capacity of channels corrupted with
synchronization errors. There are also some papers discussing the ca-
pacity bounds for channels that are corrupted with synchronization and
substitution errors. Likewise, in some work, the capacity bounds when
codewords have different lengths are derived. However, the main problems
with side channels are non-existence of codeword definition and an accu-
rate communication model between source and the attacker to quantify
information leakage. Moreover, previous research does not provide the an-
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swer to how much information is “transmitted” by execution of particular
sequence of instructions that do not have equal timing and are transmit-
ted through erroneous channel. In that respect, a measurement technique
is devised to quantify the emanated power that is a result of execution of a
pair of instructions. This chapter aims to calculate the information leak-
age by establishing a connection with Shannon’s capacity and properly
modeling the side channel with realistic assumptions that preserve the
characteristic of side channels. To achieve our goal, we first derive a mat-
hematical relationship between electromagnetic side channel energy (ESE)
of individual instructions and the measured pairwise side-channel signal
power. Then, we model the side channel communications as a discrete
memoryles channel where instructions are the codewords and transition
probabilities are calculated based on ESE. The leakage limit is defined as
the channel capacity of the proposed model where the codewords have
variable length. Finally, we provide leakage capacities of different devices
and demonstrate the severity of possible threats that these channels can
cause. We need to note here that the instructions behave as the code-
words of the side channel communication, and the goal is to investigate
how much information these instructions can convey for the worst-case
scenario. The increase in the leakage capacity means better ability to esti-
mate the instruction sequences, hence, predicting the computer activities
with higher accuracy.
1.3 Electromagnetic Side Channel Information Leakage Created by
Execution of Series of Instructions in a Computer Processor
Side channels are a consequence of program execution in a computer pro-
cessor. To estimate information leakage and its capacity limits, under-
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standing the relationship between code execution and information leakage
is a necessary step. The methodology given in the previous section is ap-
propriate for low complex devices where the pipeline has a simpler struc-
ture. However, as the systems evolve, the pipeline gets more complex to
prevent stalls due to branching operations, etc. One critical observation is
that each stage of a pipeline emits EM signals that can carry some informa-
tion about the executed instruction and we collect the mixture of signals
that are emanated from all stages. Moreover, the programs are written to
serve a purpose, therefore, the execution order of instructions shows de-
pendency to previously executed instructions. To consider the dependency
among instructions due to program functionality and pipeline effect, this
chapter proposes a Markov Source Model to relate program execution to
electromagnetic side channel emanations, and estimates side channel in-
formation capacity created by execution of series of instructions (e.g. a
function, a procedure, or a program) in a processor. Since the emanated
signals are a result of executed instructions, the sources of the model are
considered to be instructions. The signal emitted when these instructions
are executed is considered as the channel input of the model. Since ob-
taining the emanated signal of a single instruction is extremely difficult
especially in complex devices, we derive a mathematical relationship be-
tween the emanated instruction signal power (ESP) and total emanated
signal power while running a program. Then, we derive leakage capacity
of electromagnetic (EM) side channels created by execution of series of in-
structions in a processor. We provide experimental results to demonstrate
that leakages could be severe and that a dedicated attacker could obtain
important information. Finally, we provide an assessment approach that
can be utilized by system designers to make their devices more secure
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against EM based side channel attacks.
1.4 Communication Model and Capacity Limits of Covert Channels
Created by Software Activities
Digital and/or analog characteristics of electronic devices during executing
programs can create a side channel. This channel can be exploited by a
motivated attacker to extract sensitive information such as cryptographic
keys. If an attacker modifies the software application to deliberately exfil-
trate sensitive information through a side channel, this channel is called
a covert channel. Although covert channels are not designed to search for
secret information within a system, they can be used as a tool to trans-
mit information to outside world, Here, information is provided by another
mechanism that is not allowed to communicate with outside world. This
work first demonstrates a covert channel based on EM signals that are
generated by legitimate program activities. To show the severity of possi-
ble attacks with this covert channel, we model this channel to obtain the
maximum leakage capacity. Because the covert channels are not designed
to transmit information, they are exposed not only to the errors created by
the transmission, but also by varying the execution time of computer activ-
ities, and/or by insertions from other activities such as interrupts, stalls,
etc. Therefore, the model needs to include all the undesired characteristic
of the covert channels that is not observed in conventional communication
systems. Therefore, to consider insertions and variation in signaling time,
we propose to model the covert channel as an insertion channel with ran-
dom insertion and substitution due to the noise and jitter errors. Since the
goal is to transmit information in terms of zeros and ones, we model the
transmitted sequence as a pulse amplitude modulated signal with random
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pulse positions. We also propose a receiver design that can correctly detect
the computer-activity-created signals. Then, we derive capacity bounds of
this covert channel by utilizing the proposed model. Finally, we perform
experiments with high clock speed devices at some distance to illustrate
the severity of leakages. We observe that the theoretical derivations and
empirical results show good agreement.
1.5 Covert Channel Information Leakage Capacity: A Generalized
Approach
Foreseeing severity of leakages through covert channels is a necessity for
designers to minimize security flaws. These vulnerabilities occur because
of software activities and are a result of digital and/or analog character-
istics of computers. To make these designs more resilient to any covert
channel attacks, a judicious approach has to be followed. Having a tool to
unveil possible leakage sources of devices in design-state can circumvent
these attacks because it provides an opportunity for designers to modify
their systems to minimize leakages for worst-case scenarios.
In the previous section, a covert channel and its model are proposed to
demonstrate how covert channels can cause irreparable damages. How-
ever, attackers can exploit every possible source to achieve their goals,
hence, a generalized model that is not limited to EM signals, but compris-
ing other covert channels with various sources, i.e., backscattering, cache,
power, etc, is required. Having such a generalized model, a detailed anal-
ysis of systems can be performed to make them more resilient to covert
channel attacks. In that respect, this work proposes a methodology to
estimate the worst-case information leakage through various covert chan-
nels. The methodology can be adopted for both analog and digital covert
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channels. To model the channels, we first define and derive effective chan-
nel noise which is shown to be a combination of additive channel noise
and jitter noise. We also propose signal and receiver models to mimic the
use-cases of covert channels. The model also contains deletions and in-
sertions that are commonly observed for any covert channels. The model
helps to utilize Shannon’s capacity definition to calculate leakage capacity
of these chanels. Based on the model and observations, an assessment
technique which exploits the proposed model is presented to help design-
ing more secure systems. Finally, the assumptions to model the covert
channels are verified with experimental result.
1.6 A Microarchitecture-Level Modeling Electromagnetic Side-Channel
Signals
The concern for information leakage through side channels raises as the
chances of attackers to physically access computing systems increase. For
Internet-of-Things (IoT) systems, the ability of attackers to be in close prox-
imity becomes a threatening problem since these systems contain sensitive
data, such as sensor data, login information for over-the-network man-
agement of the system, etc. Therefore, these systems are required to be
designed carefully such that they are resilient to any side channel attacks.
In other words, these systems have to be quantitatively assessed in the
early design stage such that every weak aspect of the design is revealed.
This early stage assessment methodology not only secures systems against
side channels attacks, but also decreases the cost of production.
Existence of such an assessment methodology can change the per-
spectives of designers because they can also include information leakages
through side channels among their design considerations. Although there
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are some assessment methodologies to quantify EM side channel leakages,
they are mainly focus on the emanated signal after the system is manufac-
tured. Since the analysis is done after production of the system, previous
techniques could not help decreasing the cost of production, and prevent-
ing information leakages, but behave as an indicator of the vulnerability
level of the designs. In that respect, this work introduces a simulation
tool for emanated EM signals on the instruction granularity level to unveil
the vulnerable aspects of any given design. To achieve our goal, we first
propose a model for the emanated signal when an instruction is executed
in any stage of a processor pipeline. Since measuring devices capture
a mixture of signals emanated from each pipeline stages, we propose a
multiple-input-single-output (MISO) communication system to represent
the collected signals. Finally, we present our experiments which demon-
strate the accuracy of the proposed model. The experimental results and
the theoretical signals show good agreement, hence, the proposed signal
model can be used in the design-stage to analyze possible flaws in the
system.
1.7 Research Contributions
The research contributions of the thesis are
• Definition of ESE (Electromagnetic Side-channel Energy) to calculate
the relative signal power difference between two instructions [17],
• A discrete memoryless channel (DMC) model to quantify the informa-
tion leakages for side channels [18],
• ESP (EM Signal Power), a definition and methodology to calculate the
emanated EM signal power while an instruction is executed through
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pipeline stages of a processor,
• A Markov source channel model to quantify side channel capacity
which considers the dependency among instructions due to pipeline
and program functionality [19],
• Definition and derivation of jitter error that is a result of variations in
signaling time of transmitted bits in covert channels [20],
• An EM based covert channel and its model to demonstrate its severity
[21],
• A generalized model for various covert channels to quantify their
channel capacity [22],
• EMSim, a tool to simulate emanated EM signals to analyze systems
for information leakage at design-stage [23].
1.8 Thesis Outline
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides infor-
mation on covert/side channels, their use-cases, and previous attempts
on qualifying information leakage, definitions that are heavily exploited
in both conventional communication and information theory literature,
Chapter 3 defines ESE and proposes a DMC channel model to quantify the
worst-case information leakage that is available to an attacker. Chapter
4 defines ESP and models the side channel as a Markov Source Model to
consider the instruction dependency that is a result of processor pipeline
and program functionality. Chapter 5 introduces a covert channel based
on EM side channels, defines jitter error, models the communication be-
tween the source and sink as an insertion channel corrupted with noise,
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and provides capacity bounds for such channels. Chapter 6 proposes a
communication channel model that can be generalized to various covert
channels which employ on-off-keying modulation scheme. Chapter 7 in-
troduces EMSim which is a tool to simulate emanated EM signals while
executing a program. Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the contributions of




Understanding side/covert channels to model, analyze, and estimate leak-
age capacity requires an interdisciplinary research to accurately expose
the severity of these unintentional channels. In this chapter, we provide
some important concepts from information and communication theory lit-
erature as well as EM based side/covert channel signals that are heavily
exploited throughout the thesis.
2.1 Covert/Side Channels
Communication channels are designed carefully to interchange informa-
tion, resources, etc., between parties. Each party participating in this
process can control and limit the extent of shared data to protect company
secrets, plans etc. Also, both end-users are required to agree on some
standards and/or principles for legitimate transfer of information.
However, in 1967, Dr. Willis H. Wore demonstrated a computer network
vulnerability caused by radiations from processors, communication lines,
and output devices [24]. Existence of these undesired signals raised ques-
tion about the possibility of “side channels”, which are unintentionally
created as a consequence of hardware/software activities in a computer
system [25]. Detecting and processing these emanated signals can lead to
serious information leakages which could be a significant threat against
one of the basic human rights: privacy.
The threat became real when Lampson in [1] exploited a side channel
to send some information of customers to the owner of a program even
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though this transmission process is not permitted. He called these chan-
nels “covert” for the first time, defined them as not intended channels for
information transfer, and proposed countermeasures to prevent such at-
tacks. Later, Eck in [26] demonstrated the possibility of eavesdropping
on video display units to reconstruct the video content, and claimed the
possibility of picking up signals at a distance over 1 kilometer.
Another type of side channel attacks was introduced when Kocher in
[27] demonstrated timing attacks to break some cryptosystems, i.e. RSA,
DSS. His idea was to exploit slight differences on the amount of time to
process different inputs due to branching, conditional statements, etc.
Extension of this work was proposed by Schindler in [28] to compromise
secret keys of RSA with Chinese Remainder Theorem assuming that the
attacker can access to hardware device. The main drawbacks of these
timing attacks were that the attacks were performed on simple comput-
ing devices, and required a direct access. However, the severity of these
attacks gained more attention when practicality of remote timing attacks
was illustrated by Bonech in [29]. Bonech et al. broke secret keys of
OPENSSL, a cryptosystem commonly used in web servers and SSL appli-
cations, remotely.
Attacks based on power analysis made side channel attacks even more
menacing when Kocher in [30] demonstrated differential power analysis
(DPA) to break various cryptosystems’ secret keys on microcontrollers. He
collected thousands of power traces to build a high order statistical model
to estimate the intermediate secret bits of cryptosystems. He claimed
that unanticipated security faults can occur if hardware designers ignore
and/or underestimate the attacks based on “side effects” of computing de-
vices. Goubin et al. [31] compared DPA with simple power analysis (SPA),
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which aims to deduce parts of secret keys from power consumption val-
ues, and revealed that DPA can circumvent the countermeasures against
SPA attacks. Messerges et al. extended this work by extracting secret
exponent bits from tamper resistant hardware [32]. Comprehending the
severity of attacks based on power analysis, some methods have been pro-
posed as countermeasures for these attacks. Chari et al. added random-
ness while computing the key exponent to prevent the statistical attacks
(DPA) [33]. In [34], an application, which first identifies sensitive instruc-
tions and then transforms the code to make it more robust to attacks,
was proposed to automatically prevent information leakage. Motivated by
these approaches, many covert/side channels are investigated and named
based on the sources that generate such channels. These channels can
be classified into two broad categories of digital/micro-architectural and
analog/physical covert/side channels. These channels can be explained
in detail as follows:
i) Digital/Micro-architectural Covert/Side Channels: They typically rely
on shared hardware resources in the computer between a source and
a sink application. The source application (also called Trojan), has ac-
cess to sensitive information, however, its communication to outside
world (e.g. network or I/O ports) is well-protected by the operating
system (OS) and/or other security monitoring modules. Due to these
limitations, the source can not “extract” the sensitive information by
itself through conventional covert channels without being scrutinized,
and hence detected by the existing protection mechanisms in the sys-
tem. Alternatively, to successfully extract the data, the source ap-
plication can secretly communicate to another malicious application
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(called sink or spy), via a covert channel. The sink application is a
seemingly benign application that has access to the outside world
(e.g. through network, I/O ports, etc.) but is not likely to be scru-
tinized by the OS or other security enforcer modules since it does
not have access to any sensitive data in the system. Hence, by re-
ceiving the data from the source, the sink can successfully “extract”
the data and send it to the outside world. Examples of digital/micro-
architectural covert/side channels include caches [35, 36, 37, 38, 39,
40, 41], branch predictors [42, 43], micro-architectural units [44, 45],
DRAM and memory bus [46, 47], GPUs [48], etc. In all these cases,
the information can be transmitted by modulating certain (micro-
architectural) events (e.g. accessing a pre-defined line in cache).
ii) Analog/Physical Covert/Side Channels: These are the channels that
rely on physical characteristics of a system such as unintentional
electromagnetic emanations from different electronic circuits in a com-
puter [3, 49, 50, 51], variation in power consumption [27, 30, 29, 34,
33, 52, 31, 32, 53], sound/acoustic [53, 50], temperature [54, 55],
etc. Unlike digital covert/side channels which create a digital link
between two applications within the processor, physical covert/side
channels create an analog external link which acts as a wireless com-
munication link that can transmit sensitive data from the computer,
through the air or via a pin/cable, to nearby systems. For example,
it is shown that exfiltrating data from an air-gapped (physically and
logically separated from public networks) computer through covert
channels is possible [4, 56].
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2.1.1 EM Covert/Side Channels
Demonstrating the video content reconstruction from emanated signals
of a video display unit on BBC in 1985, Eck [26] opened a new era for
side channel attacks. The main result of his work was that unintentional
EM signals, emitted while a legitimate activity is running on a device,
can cause information leakage if a sophisticated attacker detects and pro-
cesses these signals. Khun [49] extended the work by reconstructing con-
fidential information displayed on a cathode-ray-tube via an unauthorized
access exploiting EM side channel. Moreover, [57] demonstrated attacks
based on EM analysis on CMOS chips and smart cards to reveal secret
bits of RSA and DES cryptosystems. They exploited the correlation be-
tween secret data and corresponding variations in EM field. The main
conclusion of their experiments was that EM measurements are as pow-
erful as power analysis. However, Agrawal et al. [25] first described EM
emanations as a consequence of current flows due to hardware/software
activities, then showed that existence of correlation between the processed
data and current flow causes information leakage, and finally made an
even stronger argument that EM side channel leakage is even more pow-
erful than the other side channels. Inspired by the information leakage
through EM emanations, Zajic et al. [3] generated a covert channel which
transmits the morse code of “All data is belong to us.” They exploited
program activity signals which are modulated by the clock frequency of
a device. The achievement with this experiment is that even under close
scrutiny, emanated EM signals can be achieved reliably at a distance over
2 meters without raising any suspicion. To measure the signal available
to an attacker for instruction-level events, Callan et al. [51] devised a
methodology called SAVAT. The method relies on the instruction-level dif-
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ferences while running the same code except one instruction. They first
tested the methodology in a device with weaker computing ability (FPGA
board), then expanded to more complex computer systems. The similar
results were obtained across various devices [58]. Later, Monjur et al. [59]
broke secret keys of OpenSSL’s blinded RSA without relying on the cache
organization or timing variations. They first identified the vulnerable part
of the program, collected hundreds of training EM traces during modu-
lar exponentiation calculations, and then exfiltrated the secret key bits by
only measuring one trace.
2.1.2 Applications of Covert/Side Channels
Although covert/side channels can provide an unauthorized access to con-
fidential information through legitimate activities, it is also possible to uti-
lize them to secure computer systems. An example for the use-case of
covert side channels is program profiling. Program profiling is an essential
tool for monitoring, compiler optimization, performance analysis, user pro-
filing, debugging, software maintenance and paralellization [60]. Although
there are many profiling methodologies, the most common approach is
to add instrumentation, i.e. logging considered events. These events are
generally the paths that are heavily executed and called hot paths of the
program [61]. Identifying these paths can be very advantageous for ef-
ficient code optimization and monitoring. However, instrumentation can
cause overhead and change the dynamic behavior of the profiled systems.
In that respect, covert/side-channels are utilized to handle the overhead
caused by instrumentation and protect the dynamic behavior of the pro-
filed systems. An instruction-level side-channel profiling is proposed in
[62], which exploits power side-channels on embedded devices. Similarly,
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a classification of hardware-based monitoring techniques and a power-
channel based disassembler are provided in [63]. In [64], a method is
proposed to detect and monitor a system by processing the power con-
sumption. A zero-overhead profiling method exploiting EM side-channels
is proposed in [65]. Although the methodology does not require any mod-
ifications to the software/hardware of the profiled device, it fails reporting
anomalies with zero false negative rate (it reports benign instead of mal-
ware for some cases). By improving these shortcomings, a new input gen-
eration technique, called progressive symbolic execution, and an advanced
execution-trace-prediction method are proposed in [66]. Likewise, an EM
signal model and simulator are proposed in [67, 23], which can be helpful
for obtaining signatures of a program even in the design-stage. In [68], a
profiling scheme that leverages EM side-channels is introduced. The pa-
per exploits the idea that whenever a loop is executed in a program, an RF
signal is generated with a so-called alternation frequency. This frequency
corresponds to reciprocal of the average time required to run an iteration of
a loop [69]. Since loops are an example of hot paths and the program run-
time is dominated by the loops, the scheme profiles the program based on
these emitted RF signals. Later, this profiling scheme is modified to detect
deviations in program execution without any characterization of malware
[70]. After creating a statistical model for the deviation of a benign pro-
gram in terms of loop-timing, a test signal is compared against the model
to determine whether the deviations belong to the same distribution.
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2.2 Measuring Pairwise Side Channel Signal Power from Processor
Instructions
In [51], it was assumed that an attacker has access to a program’s source
or executable code, and can observe EM emanations from the victim’s sys-
tem while this program is running. The attacker attempts to extract sen-
sitive information by recording EM emanations, using them to infer which
instructions are executed, and then infers sensitive data from knowledge
of the executed instructions.
The most direct approach to quantifying the EM emanations from side-
channel signal created by executing instruction X1 vs. executing instruc-
tion X2 is to measure the EM emanations while instruction X1 is active,
measure the EM emanations while instruction X2 is active, and then take
the difference between these two signals. This approach is impractical in
high performance systems for several reasons. First, equipment capable
of recording the x1(t) and x2(t) signals at greater than 10 Gsamples/sec (as
required to test a processor using a GHz clock) and with thermal, quantiza-
tion, etc. noise that is low enough to not obscure the (extremely small) dif-
ference between the two signals, is prohibitively expensive or non-existent.
Second, complex processors heavily optimize the scheduling and execution
of instructions, so determining the times where the test instructions X1 or
X2 are actually active would be problematic. Third, some other instruc-
tions must be present around X1 and X2 to make the measurement prac-
tical (to trigger the measurement, setup the registers and memory used
by instructions X1 and X2, etc.), and these unrelated components of the
received signal can easily obfuscate the signal components created by the
X1 and X2 instructions themselves.
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1 for(j=0;j< n_out; i++){
2 // Do some instances of the X1 instruction
3 for(i=0;i< n_inst; i++){
4 ptr1=(ptr1&~mask1)|((ptr1+offset)&mask1);
5 // The X1-instruction, e.g. a load
6 value=*ptr1;
7 }
8 // Do some instances of the X2 instruction
9 for(i=0;i< n_inst2; i++){
10 ptr2=(ptr2&~mask2)|((ptr2+offset)&mask2);





Figure 2.1: The X1/X2 alternation pseudo-code.
To overcome these problems, a program has been designed in [51] that
causes the system to execute X1 and X2 instructions in a controlled way
that minimizes the effect of all other unrelated system activities, while con-
centrating the side channel energy into a narrow spectral band to minimize
the impact of noise on the measurement. We produced these controlled
emanations by choosing a repetition period Talt and then create a small
test program (microbenchmark) containing a for loop such that the first
half of the loop does many repetitions of activity X1 and the second half
does many repetitions of activity X2. The microbenchmark in Figure 2.1
implements this idea by executing X1 and X2 instructions ninst times (de-
noted as ninst in Figure 2.1) in each iteration of the outer loop. Lines 2
through 7 execute ninst instances of the X1 instruction, and then lines 8
through 13 execute the same number of instances of the X2 instruction.
Thus lines 2 through 13 represent one X1/X2 alternation, and this alterna-
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tion is repeated (line 1) until the measurement of the side-channel signal
is complete. It is critical to note that the value of Talt is controlled directly
by varying ninst. For example, increasing ninst increases the time required
to execute one iteration of the outer loop (Talt). The value of Talt can be di-
rectly measured using counters available through processor instructions
(e.g. the x86 rdtsc instruction) or the operating system (e.g. the Windows
API QueryPerformanceCounter() function). We can then select the ninst value
that produces the desired alternation frequency (falt = 1/Talt).
Instruction Description
LDM mov eax,[esi] Load from main memory
STM mov [esi],0xFFFFFFFF Store to main memory
LDL2 mov eax,[esi] Load from L2 cache
STL2 mov [esi],0xFFFFFFFF Store to L2 cache
LDL1 mov eax,[esi] Load from L1 cache
STL1 mov [esi],0xFFFFFFFF Store to L1 cache
ADD add eax,173 Add imm to reg
SUB sub eax,173 Sub imm from reg
MUL imul eax,173 Integer multiplication
DIV idiv eax Integer division
NOP nop No operation
NOI No instruction
Table 2.1: x86 instructions for our X1/X2 ESE measurements.
Instructions refers to basic commands that a processor can execute.
Some examples of common x86 instructions are listed in Table 2.1, in-
cluding loads and stores that go to different levels of the cache hierarchy,
simple (ADD and SUB) and more complex (MUL and DIV) integer arith-
metic, and the “No Instruction” case where a specific line is simply left
empty.
Therefore, EM side channel energy available to the attacker is defined
as the total power around the alternation frequency which is equivalent to
following equation in time domain:
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where s1(t) and s2(t) are voltages measured across a resistance R (typically
instruments have R = 50Ω), t = (0, To) is the time interval while program
execution occurs and can be written as To = Talt × nout, and nout is the
number of repetition of the outer for loop. This difference can be an if-
then-else statement that causes one path or the other to be executed, a
memory access that either does or does not suffer a cache miss, etc.
2.3 Amplitude Modulated Signal Generation by Executing Programs
In this section, we first describe how carrier signals can be created by soft-
ware activities and then, describe a method to generate modulated signals.
To create a carrier, we use repetitive variations in a software activity as de-
scribed in [3], [17]. We choose T , the period (duration) of each repetition,
two types of activities (A and B), and write a small software code (i.e., a
microbenchmark) shown in Fig. 2.1 that in each period does activity A in
the first half and B in the second half. Please note that the intuition be-
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hind this is that if activity A and activity B result in non-identical EM fields
around the processor (or the system), repetition of this A-then-B pattern
will create oscillations (with period T ) in this EM field, i.e., it will result in
a “carrier” RF signal at frequency 1/T . The period T will be selected to cor-
respond to a specific frequency, e.g., to produce a radio signal at 1 MHz,
we should set T = 1µs. This carrier-generation approach is illustrated in
Fig. 2.3. 
 




 In-system signal due to A/B activity
 Period (T)
 Activity B Activity A
Figure 2.3: Illustration of how microbenchmark induces emanations at a
specific radio frequency by alternating half-periods of A and B activity.
Next, the symbols are amplitude modulated by inserting intervals dur-
ing which only activity B is performed in both half-periods which means
any carrier signal produced by the differences between A and B should be
absent when only B is used, resulting in the simplest form of AM modu-
lation (on-off keying). This approach is illustrated in Fig. 2.4. Note that
other modulations (e.g., frequency modulation or even some non-standard
modulation) can just as easily be used to create a truly covert transmis-
sion. Also note that the assumption here is that the code for generating
this software modulation and creating a covert channel is already injected
to the system through advanced-persistent threat scenarios [71], or man-




 A/B B/B A/B
 Silence (pause) Tone (dash/dot)
 B/B  A/B  B/B
Modulation using A/B (carrier) and B/B (no carrier) 
 Demodulated signal
Figure 2.4: Illustration of how microbenchmark modulates the signal into
the carrier using on-off keying (bottom).
rogue employee). Moreover, the transmission code itself is not responsible
to find the sensitive data, but it is only a mean of communication for send-
ing the sensitive data from trusted inside to the outside world. The sensitive
information (to this transmitter code) is supplied by an injected/created
malware in the system (e.g., a worm that infiltrated to the system and
found some sensitive documents in the system). Note that both of these
assumptions are realistic and commonly used in the existing literature.
2.4 Channel Capacity
Defining leakage capacity requires deep understanding of channel capac-
ity in conventional communication systems and information theory liter-
ature. In this section, we provide essential topics that will be extensively
exploited.
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2.4.1 Markov Model Capacity over Noisy Channels
Channel capacity provides the limit for a reliable information transmission
in a communication system. Assuming Y n1 and S
n
1 represent the channel
output and state sequences between t = 1 to t = n, the capacity of the











where I(•) is the mutual information, Pij is the transition probability from
state i to j, and T is a set of valid state transitions. To maximize the overall
mutual information between input and output sequences, we need to find
the probability distribution of state transitions under the constraint that
state transitions are only possible if T contains these paths. The equation
given in (2.2) can be simplified further by using chain rule, Markov, and
stationary properties of the model. In [72], it is shown that the capacity




























and where µi is the stationary probability of state i, which satisfies µi =∑
k∈S
µkPki,∀i ∈ S, and S is the set of states. In this equation, Pt(i|Y n1 ) is the
probability that the state at time t− 1 is i, and Pt(i, j|Y n1 ) is the probability
that the states at times t−1 and t are i and j respectively, given the received
sequence, Y n1 .
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There is no closed form solution to the optimization problem given in
(2.3) because the calculation of Tij is still an open problem. However, in
[72], a greedy algorithm to calculate C is introduced. The experimental
findings show that the performance gap between the actual results and
the algorithm’s results is small.
2.4.2 Channel Capacity for Insertion & Substitution Channels
One of the main challenges that side/covert channels encounter is inser-
tions and inaccurate acquisition of transmitted information signal. Find-
ing the capacity of channels that suffer from both insertions and substi-
tutions is even challenging for conventional communication systems. To
simplify the capacity definitions for such channels, [16], [15] show that
a memoryless discrete channel with insertions and substitutions can be
decomposed into a cascade of two channels, channel with insertions and
channel with substitutions as shown in Figure 2.5.
Random 
Insertion Channel
Noisy and Jittery 
Channel








Figure 2.5: Cascaded channels equivalent to the binary discrete memory-
less noisy, jittery, synchronization channel with n input symbols.
In [73], it is shown that the capacity of a discrete memoryless synchro-







· I(W n;Y N̄n), (2.5)
where the supremum is taken over all stationary Markov chains Ξ model-
ing the input source, n is the number of input bits, W n and Y N̄n represent
the input and observed sequence respectively. Here, N̄ is the average num-
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ber of received symbols per transmitted symbol.
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CHAPTER 3
CAPACITY OF THE EM COVERT/SIDE-CHANNEL CREATED BY THE
EXECUTION OF INSTRUCTIONS IN A PROCESSOR
3.1 Overview
The goal of this chapter is to answer how much information is “trans-
mitted” by execution of particular sequence of instructions in a processor
[18]. Introducing such a measure would provide quantitative guidance for
designing programs and computer hardware that minimizes inadvertent
(side channel) information leakage, and would also help detect parts of a
program or hardware design that have unusually high leakage (i.e. were
designed to function as covert channel “transmitters”).
To address this problem, we need to establish relationship between
software activity, observed emanations, and side-channel capacity. The
first attempt to quantify which instructions have the greatest potential
to create side-channel vulnerabilities was reported in [51], where a mea-
surement technique is devised to quantify the emanated power that can
be attributed to the difference in execution between a pair of individual
instructions.
In this chapter, we derive a mathematical relationship between elec-
tromagnetic side-channel energy (ESE) of individual instructions and the
measured pairwise side-channel signal power and use this measure to cal-
culate the transition probabilities needed for estimating capacity. Then, we
propose a new method to estimate side/covert channel capacity created by
the execution of instructions in a processor. Finally, we illustrate how the
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proposed method works through evaluation of capacity in several practical
systems.
The organization of the section is as follows: Section 3.2 analytically
quantifies the difference in energy available to an attacker between two
instructions, Section 3.3 describes a new method to quantify covert/side-
channel capacity, Section 3.4 analyzes capacity of several systems, Sec-
tion 3.5 proposes some possible defensive methods for EM based attacks,
and Section 3.6 provides the summary.
3.2 Mathematical Relationship Between ESE of Individual Instruc-
tions and The Measured Pairwise Side-channel Signal Power
Establishing mathematical relationship between ESE of individual instruc-
tions and the measured pairwise side-channel signal power available to an
attacker [51] can not only help programmers and computer hardware de-
signers to anticipate the vulnerability of the system, but can also help us
relate codeword probabilities with energy levels of particular codewords,
i.e., instructions.
Total EM side-channel energy available to the attacker is defined in
(2.1). Note that PA represents the overall emitted power during the execu-
tion of the microbenchmark including many repetition of instructions X1
and X2. However, ESE is defined as the available energy for an attacker
when two instructions are executed only one time by filtering any other
EM signals and noise present in measurements.
Assume x1(t) and x2(t) is the characteristic signals belong to execution






(E[x1(t)− x2(t)])2 dt (3.1)
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where Tx is the maximum of the execution times of the instructions and E
is the expectation operation.
To make our derivations mathematically traceable, we introduce follow-
ing notations and assumptions.
1. The for-loops of the microbenchmark given in Fig. 2.1 generate s1(t)
and s2(t) respectively. Because the emitted signal from each loop
depends on the type of instruction used in the loop, to discard the
ambiguities regarding the inserted instruction and the taken branch,
we denote produced signals as s(Xi)i (t) which is generated by the ex-
ecution of the ith inner-for-loop and Xi represents any instruction
inserted into that loop.
2. s(X1)1 (t) and s
(X2)
2 (t) are voltages sampled at frequency 1/TI to create the
sequences s(X1)1 [n] and s
(X2)
2 [n] of length Ns = Ts/TI.
3. The frequency content of s(X1)1 (t) and s
(X2)
2 (t) above 1/(2TI) is negligible
(i.e. s(X1)1 (t) and s
(X2)
2 (t) have bandwidth 1/(2TI)).
4. s(X1)1 (t) and s
(X2)
2 (t) are voltages measured across a resistance R.




























6. Sampled voltages can be represented as s(X1)1 [l] = µ1[l] + w1[l] and
s
(X2)
2 [l] = µ2[l] + w2[l] where µ1[l] and µ2[l] are the mean voltage values,
w1[l] and w2[l] are the additive noises which are i.i.d. N (0, σ2l ). Here,
σ2l , µ1[l], and µ2[l] are depended on the instruction. For example, if the
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sample is taken during the execution of the first-inner-loop and the
embedded instruction is X1, the sample can be written as
s1[l] = µ1[l] + w1[l] = X
v
1 + w1[l] (3.3)
where w1[l] ∼ N (0, σ2X1) and Xv1 is the average power instruction X1
emits. We assume that additive noise describes all the variation in
the signal and that noise power is dependent on the executed inst-
ruction since the electromagnetic emissions can vary according to
the execution location.






1 −Xv2 )2 . (3.4)
where nX = Tx/TI is the number of samples taken during only the
execution of the instructions.
The micro-benchmark described in Section 2.2 creates an alternation
signal at frequency falt by repeatedly executing instruction X1 ninst times,
followed by ninst executions of instruction X2. We then measure P (falt),
the spectral power at frequency falt. Finally, ESE[X1,X2] can be calculated
from the spectral power P (falt) observed at falt (while running the X1/X2




)2 P (falt) ·N
nX · ninst · falt
+ C(X1, X2), (3.5)
where N is the number of samples taken during only one inner for-loop,
nX is the maximum of the number of samples taken during the execution
of instructions X1 and X2 and C(X1, X2) is a constant term that depends
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on the instruction pair, i.e.,



















The proof of the relationship in (3.5) is shown in Appendix A. Note that
although expectation for PA value to be same when the same instruction is
inserted into the for-loops given in Fig. 3.7, because of the additive noise
given in (3.3), the observed ESE through the execution of the code results
in a non-zero value.
3.3 A New Method for Evaluation of EM Side/Covert Channel Capac-
ity Created by the Execution of Instructions in a Processor
In a covert/side channel, identifying the channel capacity is of some inter-
est to attackers who desire to maximize the rate at which information is
obtained, but it is of paramount interest to defensive actors (programmers
and hardware designers) to gain an insight about how vulnerable a pro-
gram or a computer system is to an attack and quantify how a potential
design change would affect this vulnerability. Thus, in this section, we
propose a new method to quantify the amount of information that can be
obtained through unintended EM emanations of instructions in a compu-
ter system.
3.3.1 Quantifying the Side Channel Leakage
To quantify the leakage capacity through the execution of instruction se-
quences, we consider each instruction as an independent codeword, and
the covert/side channel “transmission” consists of a sequence of code-
words that corresponds to the sequence of instructions actually executed
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by the program. Note that some hardware events can significantly affect
the duration and the emanated signal of specific instructions. We account
for this by treating these as distinct instructions. For example, a load
(read memory) instruction behaves very differently when it finds the de-
sired value in the first-level cache, in the second level cache, or in main
memory, which we view as three separate instructions: LDL1, LDL2, and
LDM, respectively.
Fig. 3.1 illustrates the noisy channel model for a covert/side channel
where the input codewords are instructions, Pi represents the probability
of the ith instruction occurrence and pij is the transition probability that
given ith instruction is used in the code but detected as the jth instruction






















Figure 3.1: Noisy channel model for covert/side channel.
There are several unique properties of this EM side/covert channel that
require new methods for evaluating side/covert channel capacity.
First, all codewords are typically equally probable in traditional com-
munication systems, but this is not true for the channel analyzed in this
section. Since our codewords are processor instructions, we need to note
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that different instructions have different probability of occurrence in a
program. For example, a typical program executes on-chip instruction
(e.g. arithmetic operations) more often than memory accesses. Further-
more, processor designers put extra-efforts to ensure that among memory
accesses the number of LDL1 executions is larger than the number of
LDL2 occurrences and much larger than the number of LDM occurrences.
Hence, it is realistic to expect that our codewords (i.e. instructions) do not
have equal probability of occurrence.
Second, codewords in this channel do not have equal length. For ex-
ample, it takes more energy and time to execute LDM in comparison to the
time to execute ADD instruction.
Finally, this channel is inherently noisy due to variations in activity in
the processor (i.e. different data values for a given instruction) and due to
noise created by other electronic components near the processor.
All this implies that the Shannon-based channel capacity [16, 74, 75]
overestimates the available capacity in the side/covert channel that trans-
mits instructions as codewords. Therefore, we need to compute channel
capacity in a way that considers the distinct instruction lengths, variable
instruction probabilities, and maximum mutual information at the same
time.
If we assume that we have a finite-length sequence where codewords
can have different lengths, the goal is to invoke codewords into the se-
quence such that total information gathered from the sequence is maxi-
mized. Therefore, the length of the input and the entropy of this input are
the issues critical to consider. Hence, we need to find a distribution for
the input set such that total information achievable from the sequence is
maximized, i.e., the information per sample is optimized. To achieve that,
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Pi ≥ 0 for ∀i, j ∈ {1, · · · , K} .
where K is the number of instructions in the input set. Through the opti-
mization process, the variables that maximize the problem are
{Pi | i ∈ {1, · · · , K}} .
These variables are the probabilities or frequencies of each instruction
such that maximum information leakage occurs and we assume that oc-
currences of instructions are independent of each other. Transition prob-
abilities pij are calculated based on ESE measurements as described in
Section 3.3.2. The optimization problem is solved using gradient descent
approach detailed in Appendix D.
Note that the optimization problem given above simplifies to Shannon’s
channel capacity if the length of each instruction is the same and all in-
structions are equally probable.
3.3.2 A Practical Calculation of Transition Probabilities in EM Side/Covert
Channel
In this section, we propose a method for finding transition probabilities
defined in (3.7) using the measured pairwise side-channel signal power.
36
We start the process by obtaining ESE values as illustrated in Table 3.1.
Each entry in this table is the ESE between the X1 instruction (row) and
X2 instruction (column) computed using (3.5). The pairwise side-channel
signal power needed to compute ESE is measured using method described
in Section 2.2. We measure a signal power of each instruction pair in
the table 10 times over multiple days and take the mean to minimize the
impact of changes in radio signal interference, room temperature, and
slight differences in antenna position. For each pair of instructions, X1 and
X2, we run the X1/X2 micro-benchmark and measure the power spectral
density from 2.5 kHz above to 2.5 kHz below the alternation frequency.
Then we integrate over this band to get the total power P (falt) generated
by the difference between X1 and X2. Finally the ESE[X1,X2] is calculated
using (3.5).
The benchmarks were run as single-threaded Windows 7 32-bit user
mode console applications on the Intel Core i7 (L1 Data Cache: 64 KB, 2
way L2 Cache: 1024 KB, 16 way). No other user-mode applications were
active and wireless devices were disabled to minimize interference with the
intentionally generated signals. Aside from this, the system was operating
normally.
As an example, the ESE values for an Intel Core i7 laptop are given in
Table 3.1.
Estimating the Voltage of a Specific Instruction
In this part, we provide the steps to estimate the voltage of an instruc-
tion. Please note that ESE can be viewed as a metric that measures the
Euclidean distance between voltages produced by the execution of the in-
structions. Here, we introduce our approach to obtain these distances. As
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Table 3.1: ESE values (in zJ) for the Core i7 laptop.
LDM STM LDL2 STL2 LDL1 STL1 ADD SUB MUL DIV
LDM 0 128 377 1344 237 246 283 279 247 1392
STM 53 0 944 1389 114 163 153 150 164 1213
LDL2 336 1394 0 24 84 112 149 143 109 736
STL2 1160 1248 21 0 42 56 99 100 114 536
LDL1 463 236 190 76 0 0 0 0 0 169
STL1 464 274 219 97 4 0 0 0 0 135
ADD 509 255 256 136 21 11 0 3 0 107
SUB 487 244 207 145 11 15 5 0 4 131
MUL 487 252 221 143 8 13 3 15 0 116
DIV 1188 812 651 293 82 90 92 93 134 0
the first step, we are required to estimate the voltages generated by the
instructions. However, since ESE is considered as an Euclidean distance
and only provides the voltage differences, i.e. the distances in generated
voltages among instructions, rather than generated actual voltage values
of each instruction, we are required to obtain the distances among the
instructions. In that respect, since voltage is a one-dimensional quantity,
i.e. the EM emanations caused by different instructions differ only in mag-
nitude, we first focus on the locations of these instructions with respect
to each other. Therefore, we are only interested in how instructions are
ordered on a line with respect to the quantity of leakage they produce.
We also need to emphasize that sorting the instructions can be from the
instructions which cause more leakages to the ones which generate less
leakages, or the other way around. Let us first consider an example of ESE
shown in Table 3.1. From the table, we can deduce that
* LDL1, STL1, ADD, MUL, and SUB have similar ESE values and,
therefore, we consider them as one instruction which is called as G6.
* Spacing between DIV and LDM is the largest (e.g., 1392). Therefore,
they must be positioned at the corners, and the rest of the instruc-
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tions lie between these two instructions.
* STM is the closest to LDM since LDM produces the smallest ESE
value with STM among all instructions (e.g., 128).
* The closest instruction to LDL2 is STL2 since it produces the smallest
EM leakage with LDL2.
* G6 generates smaller ESE value with LDM and STM than STL2 and
LDL2. In the same manner, ESE produced by the execution of LDM
and LDL2 is larger than the one produced by LDM and G6. Therefore,
G6 is positioned between STM and LDL2.
Based on the observations above, the order of instructions is provided
in Fig. 3.2 and we denote this ordered sequence as S.
LDM STM G6 LDL2 STL2 DIV
𝑑1 𝑑2 𝑑3 𝑑4 𝑑5
Figure 3.2: An example of instruction ordering based on a measurements
in Table 3.1.
Here we note that the order of instructions does not give any intuition
about the voltage values of instructions but clarifies the distances among
the instructions. We do not give any importance to exact voltage values
of each instruction due to the definition of ESE. To calculate the transi-
tion probabilities, we only need the distances between each instruction.
Therefore, we set the following optimization problem to determine the dis-
tances when our input set includes {DIV, MUL, STM, LDM, LDL2, STL2}
as follows:
39




ESE[LDM, STM]− κd21 = ε1
ESE[LDM,MUL]− κ(d1 + d2)2 = ε2
...
ESE[STL2,DIV]− κd25 = ε15
where d(S) = [d1 d2 d3 d4 d5]T is the distance vector required to be revealed,
ε = [ε1 ε2 · · · ε15]T is the estimation error vector needed to be minimized
and κ = TI/R. We also note that to verify the given order of instructions
is the optimum one, we run Setting II for different orders and checked the
objective value ‖ε‖2 is smallest for the order given in Fig. 3.2 among all of
the orders of the instructions.
Calculation of Transition Probabilities
After obtaining the relative voltage differences, the next step is to deter-
mine the decision boundaries among instructions. Since our inputs lie on
the same axis and only ordering of instructions and distances among them
are important for transition probability calculations, we assume the mean
of the instruction with the leftmost position in the ordered instruction se-
quence is zero. Then, means of the remaining instructions are calculated
based on the obtained distances. Finally, the decision boundaries are
calculated using maximum likelihood estimation between two consecutive
instructions. For example, if instruction X1 and X2 are neighbors, the
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decision boundary is the point such that
N (x|µX1 , σ̄2X1) = N (x|µX2 , σ̄2X2) (3.7)
where N (•) is the normal pdf distribution, µXi = Xvi is the mean (position)
















































Mean Values of Instuctions
Decision Boundaries
Figure 3.3: An illustration of the process for calculation transition proba-
bilities for a given instruction.
Thereafter, this Gaussian distribution is fit to the graph whose mean
equals to the instruction X’s mean, and whose standard deviation is σ̄2X.
Here we note that scaling mean and the variance of the distances and
variances will not change probability distributions, hence we can simplify
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κ[d1 d2 d3 d4 d5]
T .
Finally, the probability of each interval is assigned to each correspond-
ing instruction as a conditional probability. An illustration of the process
is given in Fig. 3.3.
3.4 Experimental Results and Discussions
In the previous section, we have introduced a method to compute side/-
covert channel capacity from noisy measurements of ESE. Here we note
that the proposed algorithm is general and can be applied to any compu-
tational device with any set of instructions. In this section, we give a few
examples explaining how to calculate the leakage capacity in (3.7).
Before presenting experimental results, we first summarize the steps
for the proposed approach in this chapter:
• To measure the ESE, first install the code given in Fig. 2.1 and mea-
sure the power at the frequency falt which will be depended on ninst.
• By exploiting the equation in (3.5), calculate the alternation energy of
every two combinations of instructions.
• Apply Setting II as explained in Section 3.3.2 to estimate the emitted
EM voltages by the execution of any instructions.
• Estimate the noise power w.r.t. an instruction based on (3.8), and
then, calculate the decision boundaries to obtain the cross-transition
probabilities of the proposed side/covert channel as described in Sec-
tion 3.3.2.
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• Obtain the probability distribution of instruction occurrences which
maximizes mutual information rate of the modeled side/covert chan-
nel by exploiting Setting I.
• Use (3.7) to compute capacity.
 
Figure 3.4: Measurement setup.
For the experiments, we use a spectrum analyzer (Agilent MXA N9020A)
and a magnetic loop antenna (AOR LA400) as shown in Figure 3.4. This
antenna does not use a tuning capacitor and is terminated with a 50Ω
load, so it has a flat frequency response between 10 kHz and 1 MHz. Unless
otherwise noted, the measurements used an X1/X2 alternation frequency
of 80 kHz (note that this frequency can be arbitrarily changed) and a mea-
surement distance of 10 cm. A resolution bandwidth of 1 Hz was used to
minimize noise.
3.4.1 Experimental Results of Core I7 Laptop
As the first example, we consider the ESE values in Table 3.1. ESE val-
ues are from a Core i7 laptop with the 10 cm distance and the intended
alternation frequency 80 kHz. We constrain the input set to
{LDM, STM,DIV,MUL,LDL2, STL2},
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using MUL as a representative of the “G6” group of instructions
{LDL1, STL1,ADD, SUB,MUL}.
Table 3.2: Transition probabilities based on ESE measurement in Fig. 3.1
.
LDM STM MUL LDL2 STL2 DIV
LDM 0.53 0.38 0.09 0 0 0
STM 0.49 0.26 0.19 0.04 0.01 0.01
MUL 0 0 0.94 0.06 0 0
LDL2 0 0 0.11 0.85 0.04 0
STL2 0 0 0 0.06 0.5 0.44
DIV 0 0 0 0 0.39 0.61
As the first step, cross-transition probabilities must be obtained. There-
fore, we require to find the distances among the instructions with re-
spect to emitted EM signal powers. The distances are acquired by feed-
ing Setting II with Table 3.1. The order of instruction is as given in Sec-
tion 3.3.2. The resulting distance vector d̂, which contains the interval
lengths between two neighbouring instructions in the magnitude space, is
d̂(S) = [1 18.8 5.9 9.5 1].
The next step is to calculate the decision boundaries and noise devia-
tions for each instruction. Noise powers for each instruction are calculated
based on (3.8) such that σ2(S) = [7.87 13.64 1.47 2.6 3.21 6.38]. Since both
noise deviations and distances in emanated powers are in hand, cross-
transition probabilities can be calculated by following instructions given
in Section 3.3.2. The resulting transition probabilities for the Core i7 lap-
top are provided in Table 3.2. Once transition probabilities are computed,
it is possible to find the maximum channel rate and achievable capac-
ity. The Intel Core i7 processor is very complex, featuring out of order
44
execution and many other microarchitectural optimizations. These opti-
mizations often result in multiple instructions being executed in parallel,
which results in reduced instruction length in our simplified model. There-
fore, we define the length of each instruction as the excess amount of time
caused by appending the same instruction to both for-loops given in Fig.
1 with respective to inserting nothing. For example, if TNOI and TX are the
times, which takes to execute the microbenchmark in Fig. 1 when noth-






Then, the instruction lengths (execution times) are normalized and quan-
tized such that the smallest length is equivalent to one and the lengths of
all instructions are integers – this is reasonable because processor activity
is in terms of clock cycles, with many instructions taking only one cycle to
execute while several instructions take a number of cycles. Therefore, we
consider the length vector for Setting I as L(S) = [13 20 1 1 3 8]T . The ca-
pacity rate is attained as 0.72 Bits/Quantum, where Quantum is defined
as average instruction length per symbol. Although, in the information
theory literature, the corresponding capacity is called Channel Capacity
per Unit Cost [76], we use the term Quantum to indicate that our results
are respect to both the minimum number of clock cycles to execute an
instruction and the clock frequency of the device. The resulting instruc-
tion probabilities are
PS = [0.005 0 0.377 0.354 0.264 0]
T .
The results are reasonable since the lengths of LDM, STM and DIV are
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longer and the deviations of these instructions are high, which increases
uncertainty about the outputs of the instructions. On the other hand, al-
though the entropy of STL2 is large, its probability is the largest because
its uncertainty is provoked due to existence of DIV. Since the optimal prob-
abilities of occurrence of DIV is zero and the length of STL2 is small, the
uncertainty about STL2 is largely eliminated and having a smaller execu-
tion time makes it more favourable.
3.4.2 Experimental Results of Core 2 Laptop
In this section, we will provide the experimental results on an Intel Core 2
Duo laptop with 1.8GHz CPU clock, 333MHz DDR2 memory, 32KB 8 way
L1 Data Cache and 4096 KB 16 way L2 cache. The considered instruction
set is {LDM, LDL2, STL2, LDL1, STL1, ADD, SUB, MUL, DIV}. As the first
step, we perform experiments to calculate the ESE power of instruction
pairs at 10cm and 80kHz. The measured ESE values are given in Table
3.3.
We observe that the ESE pattern observed in the Core I7 laptop also
exists for the ESE values of the Core 2 Duo laptop. For example, all arith-
metical instructions except DIV emit similar leakages whereas DIV behaves
like a completely different functional instruction. Therefore, for the leak-
age capacity calculation, one of these will be selected. Another observation
is that the maximum leakage occurs when STM and DIV are embedded
into the microbenchmark. Moreover, the tableau is almost symmetrical
which supports our earlier observation that the instruction order in the
microbenchmark does not affect the EM leakage.
To be able to calculate the leakage capacity through Setting I, we order
the instructions with respect to their emitted voltage potentials. The sorted
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Table 3.3: ESE Values (in zJ) for the Core 2 Duo Laptop.
STM LDL2 STL2 LDL1 STL1 ADD SUB MUL DIV
STM 0 61 100 19 25 21 21 21 56
LDL2 62 0 1 79 80 84 82 81 101
STL2 101 1 0 101 104 108 105 105 160
LDL1 19 70 103 0 0 0 0 0 2
STL1 26 79 104 0 0 0 0 0 2
ADD 21 84 109 0 0 0 0 0 1
SUB 20 82 107 0 0 0 0 0 1
MUL 21 83 108 0 0 0 0 0 1
DIV 57 99 161 2 2 1 1 1 0
sequence of instructions which minimizes the objective function of Setting
II is obtained as
S = {STL2,LDL2, STM,ADD,DIV}
where ADD is chosen to represent the algorithmic operation set. The dis-
tances between the emitted voltages are d̂(S) = [2.1 7.3 1.45 1.85].
The next step is to obtain the cross-transition probabilities of the pro-
posed model. In that respect, the noise powers conditioned on the execu-
tion locations of instructions are calculated as
σ̄2(S) = [0.23 0.23 17.64 0.23 0.23]
by the equation given in (3.8). Since we have both the noise powers and
distances among the emitted powers resulting from the execution of in-
structions, it is time to calculate the cross translation probabilities of the
model as described in Section 3.3.2. The transition probabilities are given
in Table 3.4. We observe that the transition probability matrix is diago-
nally dominated expect the instruction STM as in the case of the Core I7
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laptop.
Table 3.4: Transition probabilities based on ESE measurement in Table
3.3
.
STL2 LDL2 STM ADD DIV
STL2 0.99 0.01 0 0 0
LDL2 0.01 0.98 0.01 0 0
STM 0.02 0.05 0.49 0.15 0.29
ADD 0 0 0.07 0.9 0.03
DIV 0 0 0 0.03 0.97
For this processor, we obtain the relative instruction times as L(S) =
[3 1 31 1 8] by employing (3.9). We attain the capacity rate as 1.09 Bit-
s/Qauntum with the instruction occurrence probabilities
PS = [0.09 0.44 0 0.47 0].
We can observe again that the probabilities of longer instructions in terms
of execution times are set to zero although these instructions have larger
ESE values. Since execution times of these instructions are longer, the
information, they provide at each quantum interval, is much smaller than
the instruction with shorter execution times.
3.4.3 Experimental Results for Turion X2 Laptop
In this section, we provide the experimental results for AMD Turion X2
processor with 64 KB, 2 way L1 Data Cache and 1024 KB, 16 way L2
Cache. As usual, the first step is to measure the ESE values of instruction
pairs which are given in Table 3.5.
The order which minimizes the objective function of Setting II is same
as for the Core 2 Duo laptop. As the side product of Setting II, the dis-
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Table 3.5: ESE Values (in zJ) for the AMD Turion X2 Laptop.
STM LDL2 STL2 LDL1 STL1 ADD SUB MUL DIV
STM 0 16 26 5 8 5 5 2 18
LDL2 14 0 0 31 33 34 33 34 53
STL2 30 0 0 40 40 42 41 42 70
LDL1 4 32 40 0 0 0 0 0 1
STL1 4 32 40 0 0 0 0 0 0
ADD 6 35 43 0 0 0 0 0 0
SUB 5 34 41 0 0 0 0 0 0
MUL 6 34 42 0 0 0 0 0 0
DIV 25 54 71 1 0 0 0 0 0
tance vector providing the distances between the neighbouring instruc-
tion voltages is d̂(S) = [1.01 3.74 1.97 1.74]. The next step is to calculate
the cross-transition probabilities of instructions. Thus, we calculate noise
powers conditioned on instructions as σ̄2(S) = [0.4 0.34 24.22 0.34 0.34]. By
following the steps given in Section 3.3.2, we calculated the cross transi-
tion probabilities which are given in Table 3.6. The final step is to obtain
the optimal solution for Setting I. Relative instruction execution times are
L(S) = [3 1 30 1 8]. The rate is attained as 0.97 Bits/Quantum with inst-
ruction occurrence probabilities PS = [0 0.498 0 0.502 0]. If we compare the
results with the Core 2 Duo laptop, this time we observe STL2 is set to
zero. The reason can be justified as follows: We observe that the existence
of STL2 and LDL2 creates more uncertainty, therefore, instead of keeping
these two instructions in the codebook, removing one of these instructions
increases the reliability of the communication channel. Since the execu-
tion time of STL2 is longer, forcing its occurrence probability to be zero
enhances the overall rate obtained through Setting I.
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Table 3.6: Transition probabilities based on ESE measurement in Table
3.3
STL2 LDL2 STM ADD DIV
STL2 0.79 0.21 0 0 0
LDL2 0.19 0.79 0.02 0 0
STM 0.19 0.11 0.27 0.14 0.28
ADD 0 0 0.04 0.89 0.07
DIV 0 0 0 0.07 0.93
3.4.4 Experimental Results for NIOS Processor on the DEI FPGA
As our last example, we use the ESE values from [58]. The measurements
are done 10 cm above the NIOS processor on the DE1 FPGA board. As-


















where X is any instruction rather than NOI, we assume that minimum ESE
measurement with an instruction is 0.015 zJ. The main difference between
FPGA and Core i7 measurements is that arithmetic operations and LDL1
are distinguishable in the FPGA case. This time, the order of instructions
is S ={LDM-DIV-LDL1-MUL-ADD-SUB}. As the first step, we find the in-
terval lengths among instructions which is d̂(S) = [2.29 0.39 0.27 3.39 0.91].
Furthermore, noise power is calculated as
σ2(S) = [0.008 0.0075 0.0075 0.0075 0.0075 0.0075].
Then, the transition probabilities for FPGA are calculated and given in Fig.
3.7. For the Setting I, we assume L(S) = [7 5 4 4 1 1]T and obtain 1.14 Bit-
s/Quantum channel capacity rate where the probabilities of instructions
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are assigned as
PS = [0.004 0.018 0.032 0.035 0.455 0.456]
T .
Observe that although the entropy of LDM and DIV is similar to ADD and
SUB, assigned probabilities are much higher for ADD and SUB because
their lengths are much smaller than other instructions, therefore, they
can transmit more information in a second. Likewise, the optimum oc-
currence probabilities also explain which instructions create more vulner-
ability when an alternation created with them. For example, if a script
generates an alternation due to ADD with another instruction, the leakage
caused by this alternation will be huge presumably.
Table 3.7: Transition probabilities based on ESE measurement in [58]
.
LDM DIV LDL1 MUL ADD SUB
LDM 1 0 0 0 0 0
DIV 0 0.99 0.01 0 0 0
LDL1 0 0.01 0.93 0.06 0 0
MUL 0 0 0.06 0.94 0 0
ADD 0 0 0 0 1 0
SUB 0 0 0 0 0 1
Since a modern processor executes several billion instructions per sec-
ond, the computed EM side/covert channel capacity of 1.14 Bits/Quan-
tum implies that the attacker might obtain several gigabytes of informa-
tion per second. Although this is an extremely high information leakage
rate, the rate actually achieved by practically demonstrated side channel
attacks on cryptographic implementations is much lower. This apparent
discrepancy is primarily caused by different assumptions about how the
program is designed and different definitions of what constitutes infor-
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mation. Our capacity derivations are for the worst-case scenario where
the program is specifically designed to leak information, whereas cryp-
tographic implementations are designed to have significant resilience to
side channel attacks. Furthermore, cryptographic attacks only consider
the rate of leakage for encryption keys, whereas our capacity derivations
account for any information about program execution.
3.4.5 Effect of Alternation Time Talt on ESE
In this section, the effect of measurement frequencies on leakage capac-
ity is investigated. The measurements are done at the side of the NIOS
processor on the DE1 FPGA board with 10 cm distance. For each fre-
quency, we follow the procedure given in the beginning of Section 3.4.
Occurrence probabilities of instructions are provided in Table 3.8. Fur-
Table 3.8: Occurrence Probabilities of Instructions From Measurements
Collected at Different Frequencies
LDM DIV LDL1 MUL ADD SUB
40 kHz 0.005 0.019 0.024 0.034 0.459 0.459
50 kHz 0.004 0.017 0.035 0.036 0.454 0.454
70 kHz 0.004 0.018 0.041 0.041 0.447 0.449
80 kHz 0.004 0.018 0.032 0.035 0.455 0.456
thermore, R(S) = [1.12 1.14 1.16 1.14] Bits/Quantum is the vector con-
taining resulting rates of the setups with varying frequencies where S =
[40 kHz, 50 kHz, 70 kHz, 80 kHz]. These results indicate that as long as
the same setup is considered but different values of Talt are used, the
change on the capacity and probability distribution of instructions are
minimal.
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3.4.6 Justification of the Proposed Model
In this part, we compare our results with classical Shannon capacity and
provide the underlying reasons why the proposed methodology is needed.
Table 3.9 provides the capacities for different platforms. Note that Shan-
non capacity presumes that the codewords have the same length which
means the number of channel uses by each codeword is same.
In Table 3.9, PS, SC and USC represent the capacity results obtained
by the proposed framework, by assuming equal codeword length and ex-
ploiting Shannon’s capacity, and by Shannon’s capacity divided by the
average code-length calculated via the occurrence probabilities which are
utilized to obtain Shannon’s capacity. These results clarify why the pro-
posed method is more informative in terms of leakage capacity.
Table 3.9: Capacity comparison with classical Shannon’s capacity
AMD Turion Core 2 Duo Core I7 NIOS
PS (Bits/Quantum) 0.97 1.09 0.72 1.14
SC (Bits/Symbol) 1.46 1.86 1.64 2.46
USC (Bits/Quatum) 0.42 0.48 0.27 0.68
Executed instructions take different amount of time, therefore, the
number of channel uses for each instruction varies which could not be
reflected by the classical Shannon capacity. On the other hand, if we nor-
malize the Shannon’s capacity with the average channel uses, we obtain
the information per channel uses. If we compare the results, which are
USC and the proposed method, we observe that the proposed method in-
creases the effectiveness of the channel per use. Therefore, we can claim
that the proposed method provides better information on the severity of
the leakage.
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3.5 Potential Defense Mechanisms
Our technique can help defensive efforts for both covert and side-channels,
although in somewhat different ways. For covert channels, the assumption
is that the developer of the program is crafting the code so as to maximize
the leakage. Since our technique allows potential leakage to be computed
given the instruction frequencies (how often each type of instruction exe-
cutes in the program), one defensive approach would be to determine the
instruction mix (there are a number of program execution profiling tools
that can do that), compute the potential leakage and use that to drive the
decision about what to do (e.g. subject high-potential-leakage programs
to additional scrutiny, “sandbox” them to limit their access to potentially
sensitive information, etc.).
For side-channels, the assumption is that the developer is interested
in reducing the leakage produced by the code they are developing. Our
technique allows the programmer to quantify the potential leakage of vari-
ous parts of the program (or the program as a whole), identify parts of the
program whose leakage may be higher than tolerable, and then make sure
that these parts of the program do not operate on sensitive data, change
instruction mix in a way that reduces the potential leakage (e.g. reduce
the use of high-ESE instructions, or even use our technique to quantify
the reduction in leakage that would be obtained through each potential
code change), or surgically apply one of the known techniques for reduc-
ing information leakage through side-channels.
In terms of insight that we can offer to programmers and hardware de-
signers, our results indicate that most of the potential information leakage
is a result of using a very small number of instructions that are much
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easier to correctly distinguish. For software designers, this means that
a program’s use of these instructions should not be dependent on sensi-
tive data values. For hardware designers, this means that reduction of a
hardware design’s overall vulnerability to EM side channel attacks largely
depends on addressing the EM side channel signals produced by this very
small subset of the processor’s overall instruction set.
The goal of this chapter is to find out which instructions are the most
promising to be used as codewords in a covert channel or to be checked
for in side-channel. One may assume that instructions that have the
strongest EM signatures (e.g. cache misses) are the best to be used as
codewords for information transmission. However, as our analysis shows,
that is not the case because cache misses also take the longest time to be
executed, hence carrying much smaller Bits/Quantum information. The
future work will be on how to design a code-book that consists of these
codewords and achieves capacity limits derived in this chapter. Some sim-
ple examples of an attack based on the selection of instructions are shown
in [50] and [4], but more systematic approach is needed and is part of our
future work.
3.6 Summary
This section offers an answer to how much information is “transmitted”
by execution of particular sequence of instructions in a processor. We
first propose a new method to estimate the maximum information leakage
through EM signals generated by execution of instructions in the proces-
sor. Then, we derive a mathematical relationship between electromagnetic
side-channel energy (ESE) of individual instructions and the measured
pairwise side-channel signal power. Furthermore, we use this measure to
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calculate the transition probabilities needed for estimating capacity, and
propose a new method to estimate side/covert channel capacity created by
the execution of instructions in a processor. Finally, we illustrate how the
proposed method works on several practical examples. The reason behind
naming the proposed structure as covert/side channel can be claimed as
follows: Covert channels are the channels can be exploited for a hidden
communication. Therefore, by taking advantage of side channels gen-
erated by EM leakage, a covert channel communication system can be
created. However, how to exploit this side channel as a communication
system is still an open question we will address in following chapters.
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CHAPTER 4
ELECTROMAGNETIC SIDE CHANNEL INFORMATION LEAKAGE
CREATED BY EXECUTION OF SERIES OF INSTRUCTIONS IN A
COMPUTER PROCESSOR
4.1 Overview
This chapter introduces a methodology to relate program execution to elec-
tromagnetic side-channel emanations, and estimates side-channel infor-
mation capacity created by execution of series of instructions (e.g. a func-
tion, a procedure, or a program) in a processor. To model dependence
among program instructions in a code, we propose to use Markov Source
model, which includes the dependencies among sequence of instructions
as well as dependencies among instructions as they pass through a pipeline
of the processor.
We know that side channels are not designed to transfer information at
all, and its transmission is often corrupted by insertion, deletion and erro-
neous transfer of bits. While there is a large number of papers discussing
1) bounds on the capacity of channels corrupted with synchronization er-
rors, 2) bounds on the capacity of channels corrupted with synchroniza-
tion and substitution errors, or 3) bounds on the capacity when codewords
have variable length but no errors in the channel, none of them provides
the answer to how much information is “transmitted” by execution of par-
ticular sequence of instructions that do not have equal timing and are
transmitted through erroneous channel. The first attempts to answer this
question were presented in [77, 20], where covert channels are generated,
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and upper and lower leakage capacities were derived. In Chapter 3, a
side-channel leakage capacity is derived for a discrete memoryless chan-
nel where the assumption is that each transmitted quantum of information
(i.e. instruction in the code) is mutually independent but do not have equal
length. Although all these efforts make an important step toward assess-
ing information leakage from side-channels, they fall short of considering
the relationship among sequence of instructions, which is a result of pro-
gram functionality as well as a processor pipeline depth, which impacts
how much signal energy will be emanated.
This chapter addresses these problems by
• Deriving side-channel information capacity created by execution of
series of instructions (e.g. a function, a procedure, or a program) in a
processor,
• Using Markov Source model to model dependence among program
instructions in a code, which includes the dependencies that exist in
instruction sequence since each program code is written systemati-
cally to perform a specific task,
• Deriving a mathematical relationship between the emanated instruc-
tion signal power (ESP) as it passes through processor pipeline and
total emanated signal power while running a program (This is in con-
trast to work in Chapter 3 where all energy emanated through side-
channels is assigned to an instruction, without taking into account
effect of processor pipeline depth, which significantly impacts the em-
anated signal),
• Considering sources for channel inputs are emitted EM signals dur-
ing instruction executions,
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• Providing experimental results to demonstrate that leakages could be
severe and that a dedicated attacker could obtain important informa-
tion.
Moreover, the work in this chapter considers processors as the trans-
mitters of a communication system with multiple antennas. The antennas
correspond to different pipeline stages of any processor. Also, inputs of the
transmitter show dependency based on a Markov model which reflects the
practicality of a program. Therefore, the goal in this chapter is to obtain
the channel capacity of a communication system, or the severity of the
side channels.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 defines the
proposed leakage capacity and introduces the Markov Source model. Sec-
tion 4.3 derives a mathematical relationship between the emanated inst-
ruction power (ESP) as it passes through processor pipeline and total em-
anated signal power while running a program. Section 4.4 provides exper-
imental results and leakage capacities for various devices. Finally, Section
4.5 provides a recipe for the leakage capacity calculation, and Section 4.6
provides the summary of the chapter.
4.2 Modeling Information Leakage from a Computer Program as a
Markov Source Over a Noisy Channel
In this section, we propose a Markov source model whose states are series
of instructions in a pipeline. We assume that channel inputs at each state
are the emanated signal powers produced as combination of different in-
structions in a pipeline, and the channel outputs are the noise corrupted
versions of the emitted signals. The reason for considering such a Markov
model is that individual instructions are not independent from each other
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in the code as well as that ordering of instructions as they pass through
pipeline significantly impacts emitted signal patterns.
4.2.1 Proposed Markov Source Model for Modeling Information Leakage
from a Sequence of Instructions
Here, we describe a Markov source model that characterizes relationship
among sequence of instructions as they pass through pipeline stages in a
processor. Note that a processor pipeline is an assembly line for comput-
ing, and contains groups of activities related to computational tasks, i.e.
fetching, decoding, executing, etc. [78]. We assume that channel inputs
at each state are the emanated signal powers obtained as a combination
of different power levels that instructions experience as passing through a
pipeline, and the channel outputs are the noise corrupted versions of the
emitted signals. To include the effect of pipeline depth, states are assumed
to be all possible instruction combinations because each stage performs
an operation on the instruction in the queue. For example, if a pipeline
has a depth of m, and the cardinality of S is q, the number of states will be
qm.
To illustrate how the proposed Markov Model works, Fig. 4.1 shows an
example of Markov Source Model for the instruction execution when the
pipeline depth is m, and the cardinality of the considered instruction set
is three. In the figure, Pi,j represents the state transition probability from
state i to state j, and circles denote the states of the model. The instruc-
tion set used in the example is {D, S, M}, which corresponds to division,
subtraction, and multiplication, respectively. We utilize trellis diagram to
explain the model explicitly although transitions are time invariant, i.e.
Pi,j does not vary in time. Moreover, the labels of the states are chosen
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DD· · ·DD DD· · ·DD
...
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MD· · ·DD MD· · ·DD
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Figure 4.1: Markov Source Model for the instruction execution when the
pipeline depth is m, and the cardinality of the considered instruction set
is three.
as the combination of letters representing the instructions in the pipeline.
Considering these three instructions, one of the states can be labeled as
“DDISDD” where IS is a sequence of instructions whose length is m − 4.
Interpretation of the state corresponding to the label is that instructions
in the 1th, 2nd, ..., m− 1th and mth stages of the pipeline are D, D, ..., D, and
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D, respectively.
For each state, the number of possible paths is q, i.e. it is equal to
the number of instructions in the set. For example, for the considered
example, there exist only three paths from each state since the instruction
set contains only three elements. For example, the possible states after
“DDISDD” could be “DDDISD”, “MDDISD” or “SDDISD”. Furthermore, we
assume that any instruction can be followed by any other instruction. This
assumption helps the proposed model to be an indecomposable channel,
therefore, the mutual information definition given in (2.3) is applicable to
the proposed scheme.
We need to note that by considering the Markov source model, we can
successfully capture the pipeline effect because it puts constraints on the
state transitions. Moreover, Pi,j explains the frequency of the instruction
order encountered in the program. Therefore, the capacity of the proposed
model provides the worst instruction sequence distribution which leaks
information the most.
4.2.2 Introducing Information Leakage Capacity for the Proposed Markov
Source Model
The capacity definition given in (2.3) is well suited for Markov source mod-
els if the states take the same amount of time. In other words, the defi-
nition is valid for the models where the transitions last equal amount of
time, and the transition time is not dependent on a given state. Unfor-
tunately, applying the same capacity definition to the proposed scheme is
not appropriate because different instructions take different time to ex-
ecute. Therefore, we need a capacity definition which also accounts for
instruction execution times. Hence, we propose a method to quantify the
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information leakage, which considers both execution time of each state
and the mutual information between input and output sequences.
Definition 1. Assuming varying execution time of instructions, maximum













where L(i) is the length of the state executed at the ith transition.
Following the analogy between equations (2.2) and (2.3), we can rear-






































where S is the set containing all existing states, i.e. all instruction com-
binations, and Li is the execution length of the state i. Therefore, our
















The result of this optimization provides the possible information leakage
in bits per smallest number of clock cycles required to execute a state in
S (which we call Bits/Quantum), not bits per second. The reason is that
each instruction takes at least one clock cycle for any device, but clock
frequencies can vary from one device to another. Since the goal is to an-
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alyze the leakage capacity on instruction level, we provide our results in
Bits/Quantum (similar to previous chapter, we use the term Quantum in-
stead of Capacity per Unit Cost [76]). Please note here that even the leakage
capacity of a device is small, the number of bits, a device can transmit in
a second, could be large. Therefore, while examining the vulnerability of
any device against side channel attacks, combining the leakage capacity
with clock frequency leads to the most accurate results.
4.2.3 Reducing the Size of the Markov Source Model
The main problem of the proposed Markov source model is the number of
possible states and transitions. As the depth of the pipeline and the num-
ber of considered instructions increase, the number of states increases
exponentially. This increase causes the iterative algorithm given in [72]
to be more complex. Choosing states as individual instructions will sim-
plify the proposed scheme. For these states, the channel input signal is
assigned as the emanated EM signal while executing the corresponding
instruction through all pipeline stages. With this approach, the number of
states increases linearly, not exponentially, as the number of instructions
increases.
In Fig. 4.2, we provide an example of the state diagram when the inst-
ruction set is {D, M, S}. This model is still indecomposable based on the
assumption that each instruction can follow any other instruction. There-
fore, the capacity definition given in (4.3) can be used to calculate leakage
capacity limits. However, this definition also does not have a closed form
solution, and an empirical algorithm similar to expectation-maximization















Figure 4.2: Simplified version of Markov Source Model for the instruction
execution when the cardinality of the considered instruction set is three.
4.2.4 An Empirical Algorithm to Evaluate the Leakage Capacity
To utilize the ExMa algorithm, we have to adjust the proposed model given
in the previous section to remove the execution time of the instructions
from the optimization problem. To achieve this goal, we propose to split
the instructions into unit length sections, i.e., one clock cycle segments,
and treat each of these segments as an individual state. To protect the
overall framework and instruction sequence, we have to introduce some
constraints for possible state transitions.
Let K ∈ S be a state whose length is LK > 1. For the proposed model, we
divide it into LK different states, where the states are named as Ki where
i ∈ {1, · · · , LK}. Each sub-state is called:
• Initial state if i = 1, i.e. K1,
• Exit state if i = LK, i.e. KLK ,
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• Intra-state if i ∈ {2, · · · , LK − 1}
of an instruction K. However, if the length of the instruction K equals to
one, we keep the instruction set unmodified. Note that the initial and
exit states of K will refer to full set K for the scenario when K takes only
one clock cycle. Let SM and TM be the set of states and state transitions,
respectively, after splitting the states to have a new instruction set whose














where Pij refers the modified state transition probabilities, ui is the sta-
tionary distribution of the new states, and Tij is defined as in (2.4) in the
new model.
Dividing the original states into substates is not enough to protect the
duality between the optimization settings given in (4.3) and (4.5). We also
have to make sure that the state transitions occur in a way that the inst-
ruction sequences for both settings follow the same path. For example,
let LK be equal to 2. To ensure the duality, PK1j must be nonzero only
if j is K2. More formally, to guarantee the duality between the equations
(4.3) and (4.5), we employ constraints on transitions which only allow state
transitions in the following scenarios:
R1. An exit state of any instruction to an initial state of any instruction,
R2. Ki to Ki+1 of instruction K where i ∈ {1, · · · , LK − 1}.
Fig. 4.3 illustrates the proposed framework. This figure is a trans-
formed version of the Markov source model given in Fig. 4.2 based on
the rules imposed by R1 and R2. We assume that D and M take four and
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three times of the execution time of S, respectively. Here, M1 and D1 are
the initial states, M3 and D4 are the exit states of M and D, respectively.
D2 and D3 are the intra-states of DIV, and M2 corresponds the intra-state






















Figure 4.3: Markov Model for the instruction execution as it goes through
sub-states that take equal amount of time.
By applying the transformations introduced above, we have removed
the problem of variable time of execution per instruction. The following
theorem proves the models given in Section 4.2.3 and Section 4.2.4 are
dual, and will lead to the same capacity results.
Theorem 1 (Duality). The optimization settings given in (4.3) and (4.5) are
dual problems if the constraints imposed by R1 and R2 are satisfied.
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Proof. Please see Appendix E.
Figure 4.3 illustrates that although we pose some constraints on the
possible state transitions, the state transition diagram is still indecompos-
able. Therefore, the capacity definition and corresponding iterative algo-
rithms given in [72] can be utilized. However, to apply the algorithm, the
channel inputs have to be known. In the following section, we introduce
a methodology to calculate the channel input power, i.e., emitted signal
power while processing an instruction through the pipeline.
4.3 Estimating Channel Input Power in the Proposed Markov Model
To obtain the channel inputs for the proposed model, in this section,
we derive a mathematical relationship between the emanated instruction
power as it passes through processor pipeline and total emanated signal
power while running a program. This is in contrast to work in [18] where
all energy emanated through side-channel is assigned to an instruction,
without taking into account effect of processor pipeline, which significantly
impacts the emanated signal. Another advantage of this approach to cal-
culate emanated energy per instruction is that capacity can be directly
related to signal to noise ratio (SNR).
4.3.1 Definition for Emanated Signal Power (ESP) of Individual Instructions
as They Pass Through Pipeline
In this section, we define Emanated Signal Power (ESP) which is the chan-
nel input power for the proposed Markov source model.
For activity A1, let assume TA1 is the execution time, TPA1 is the total time
spent in the pipeline except the execution stage, aA1(t) is the characteristic
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signal emanated only when A1 is executed, and aPA1(t) is the signal em-
anated as a consequence of processing the activity throughout the pipeline









where we assume the activity A1 stays in the pipeline for the time interval
(0, TA1 + T
P
A1) only once, R is the resistance of the measuring instrument,
and the execution step is the last step of the pipeline. Here, we need to
emphasize that aA1(t) and a
P
A1(t) are desired signals emanated while pro-
cessing activity A1 through the pipeline only. They do not contain any
components from any other signals and interrupts ideally. We also need
to note that although we assume that the execution of an instruction hap-
pens at the very end of the pipeline, it is only for better illustration of the
equation given in (4.6), and the execution could be done at any stage of
a pipeline. We need to note that ESP provides the mean available power
while executing an instruction, therefore, we assume that the noise term
comprises all variations in the emanated power.
Although ESP is defined in continuous time domain, we have to alter
this equation to cope with discrete time analysis since measurements are
done on digital devices. Let assume sampling frequency of the measuring
instrument is fs = 1/Ts. We also assume that the number of samples taken
during the execution of the instruction A1 is NI = TA1/Ts, and the number
of samples taken, when the instruction A1 is processed in a pipeline except












4.3.2 Estimating ESP From The Total Emanated EM Signal Power Created
by a Program
Measuring ESP is not a trivial task. Execution of any instruction is over-
lapped with execution of other instruction in the code as well as other
activities in the other stages of the pipeline. Therefore, we need a method
to separate signal components that do not belong to the considered inst-
ruction from the desired signals related to a particular instruction. In [51],
a program is designed to calculate the emanated energy difference between
two instructions.
In this section, we modify the work in [51] to evaluate energy emanated
by a single instruction. For ease of explanation, we show the code from [51]
in Fig. 2.1. The code has two inner for-loops such that the first for-loop
repeats the execution of Activity A, and the second for-loop repeats the
execution of Activity B. Work in [51] shows that given the activities in the
inner for-loops are non-identical, a spectral component at the alternation
frequency, falt = 1/Talt, is generated where Talt is the one period of outer
for-loop.
Instead of inserting two different activities into for-loops of the code,
we insert instruction under observation in the first for-loop of the code,
and NOP instruction into the second for-loop of the code. We note here
that NOP instruction keeps the processor idle for one clock cycle. Hence, if
the execution time of the activity in the first for-loop takes more than one
clock cycle, the number of NOPs in the second for-loop has to be chosen
carefully so that both loops take equal amount of time. In other words,
the number of iterations of the first for-loop, n_inst, has to be equal
to number of iterations of the second for-loop n_inst2=ninst. Here, we
assume the emitted signal power at all stages of a pipeline for NOP forms
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the baseline that we use to normalize the power consumption of other
instructions relative to NOP. Therefore, for the mathematical tractability of
the derivations given in Appendix F, we assume that the signal measured
while execution of NOP is a consequence of additive Gaussian white noise.
After running the modified code in [51] and measuring the power at the
alternation frequency, the next step is to derive the relationship between
the total emitted power and ESP. Let s(t) be the emanated signal when the
outer loop iterates for one time. We assume that the frequency content of
s(t) is negligible for the frequencies above fs/2, and lasts for TE seconds.
Therefore, the total number of samples taken during the experiment is
equal to NT = TE/Ts. Let TL be the execution time of any inner for-loop
only for one period. Then, the number of samples taken in a period can
be written as NL = TL/Ts. Therefore, the relationship between NT and NL
becomes NT = 2× ninst ×NL.
Now, let the power measured around this frequency be PA1(falt) while
executing the code under the assumptions stated above. The following
theorem gives the relationship between the total emanated signal power
and the instruction power.
Theorem 2 (ESP). Let PA1(falt) be the normalized emanated power which
is defined as
PA1(falt) = PA1(falt)− PNOP(falt) (4.8)
where PNOP(falt) is the measured emanated power when both for-loops of
the code are employed with NOP. The mathematical relationship between







(NI + PS) · falt · ninst
. (4.9)
Proof. Please see Appendix F.
4.4 Experimental Results and Information Leakage Analysis
Figure 4.4: Measurement setups used in the experiments.
In this section, we provide the experimental results for emanated sig-
nal power of each instruction, and evaluate leakage capacity of various
computer platforms.
The experimental setup is shown in Fig. 4.4. We used a spectrum an-
alyzer (Agilent MXA N9020A), and magnetic loop probe (AAronia H field
probe PBS-H3) for FPGA board and a magnetic loop antenna (AOR LA400)
for other devices. We performed our measurements by setting the alter-
nation frequency, falt, to 80 kHz. We keep the distance as close as pos-
sible to the processor since our goal is to reveal the input powers of the
transmitter, i.e. ESP. The activities used in this section correspond to x86
instructions given in Fig. 2.1.
To obtain the experimental results, the steps we follow are:
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• Run the program given in Fig. 2.1 as described in Section 4.3.2 to
measure the available total signal power at the alternation frequency.
• Calculate ESP of each instruction for all available devices based on
the equation given in (4.9).
• Transform the Markov Chain of instructions, and define the new con-
straints for the new model in terms of allowable paths as in Section
4.2.4.







where |S| is the cardinality of instruction set S.
• For a given SNR, run the algorithm given in [72] to obtain the station-
ary probabilities of each sub-state and corresponding leakage capac-
ities.
• If the stationary probability of instructions is required, solve the fol-
lowing equations
µi = L× ui1, ∀i ∈ S (4.11)
where µi is the stationary probability of ith instruction for the original
case, and ui1 is the initial sub-state of i
th instruction for the trans-







• Define “Quantum” as the ratio between number of required clock cy-
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cles to execute an instruction and minimum number of clock cycles
to execute at least one instruction.
Please note that for some experiments, Quantum is equivalent to a
clock cycle, but for some experiments, it can correspond to a couple of
clock cycles. Additionally, abbreviations used in this section can be listed
as follows:
• CP : Capacity in Bits/Quantum obtained with the proposed scheme.
• C0: Capacity in Bits/Instruction obtained by assuming execution
time of all instruction takes only one clock cycle and using capacity
definition given in (2.2). We also assume that the optimal stationary
distribution for this capacity definition is denoted as µ0.






This capacity definition maps C0 into Bits/Quantum for a fair com-
parison.
• C∞: Capacity in Bits/Quantum obtained by setting SNR =∞ and ex-
ploiting the proposed scheme to obtain the maximum possible leak-
age.
4.4.1 Experimental Results and Leakage Capacity for FPGA
This section presents the experimental results and leakage capacity for
NIOS Processor on DE1 FPGA board. The ESP and corresponding execu-
tion length of each instruction are provided in Table 4.1. Please note that
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length of an instruction means total execution time of each instruction in
terms of Quantum.
Table 4.1: ESP values (in zJ) for DE1 FPGA board.
LDM LDL1 DIV ADD SUB MUL
ESP 139.38 69.98 87.60 0.32 6.10 55.14
Length 7 4 5 1 1 4
In Fig. 4.5, we plot the leakage capacity for FPGA as a function of SNR.
We observe that C0 exceeds CP because C0 considers that each instruction
takes only one clock cycle. However, if we normalize C0 to obtain CN ,
we can observe that applying traditional Shannon theory underestimates
available leakage capacity and that proposed leakage capacity estimation
CP is needed to establish relationship between sequence of instructions as
they pass through pipeline and leakage capacity.

















Figure 4.5: Leakage Capacity for NIOS Processor on the DEI FPGA.
Additionally, we observe that leakage capacity for SNR = 59.96 dB in
[18] is 1.14 Bits/Quantum. Please note that the method in [18] does not
allow for capacity calculation as a function of SNR. On the other hand,
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with the proposed scheme, the estimated leakage capacity is higher and
reaches 1.157 Bits/Quantum when SNR is around 30 dB. This result in-
dicates that considering the pipeline depth and the dependence between
instructions, which are not included in [18], more realistically estimates
leakage capacity. We also note that the leakage capacity is high even for
low SNR regimes allowing for transmission of thousands of bits per second
because the clock frequencies of the current devices are high. Therefore,
software and hardware designers need to consider side-channels and de-
vise countermeasures to decrease side-channel leakages as much as pos-
sible.
4.4.2 Experimental Results and Leakage Capacity for AMD Turion X2
Laptop
This section provides the leakage capacity for a laptop with AMD Turion
X2. It has 64 KB 2 way L1 Cache and 1024 KB 16 way L2 Cache. ESP
values and execution lengths are given in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: ESP values (in zJ) for AMD Turion X2 Laptop.
LDL2 LDM STM STL2 STL1 MUL DIV
ESP 150.08 84.66 64.74 188.17 0.49 0.21 7.26
Length 1 26 30 3 1 1 8
We need to note here that LDL1, ADD, and SUB are not included into
our analysis because ESP values and execution lengths of these instruc-
tions are almost equal to STL1. Therefore, including these instructions
does not affect overall leakage capacity. However, if we consider STL1,
LDL1, ADD, and SUB as a sub-instruction set whose members are almost
identical, STL1 could be thought as a representative of this set.
We observe that the deviation of the execution length of instructions is
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much larger compared to FPGA. The effect of having such a deviation can
be seen from Fig. 4.6 where the gap between C0 and CP is significantly
larger. Additionally, the leakage capacity given in [18] is 0.97 Bits/Quan-
tum when SNR is 23.78 dB, but the new proposed leakage capacity CP
shows that the leakage can be up to 1.36 Bits/Quantum for the same SNR
region. This result indicates that all signals emanated from all stages of
a pipeline carry some information, therefore, ignoring these signals can
cause underestimation of the leakages.


















Figure 4.6: Leakage Capacity for AMD Turion X2 Laptop.
The results also show that the capacity of the laptop is moderately high
even for low SNR regimes. For example, we observe that the leakage ca-
pacity of this system is approximately 1 Bits/Quantum around 0 dB SNR.
Unfortunately, if the attacker is in very close proximity, and has the ideal
decoder to reveal the secret information, CP could raise up to 1.634 Bit-
s/Quantum, which corresponds to 1.634*109 bits/second for a processor
with 1 GHz processor clock and all instructions taking one clock cycle. We
also observe that CP could not achieve the data rate of C∞ in the given
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SNR regime. For CP to achieve maximum rate, it requires about 57 dB
SNR. However, for the consistency among figures, we keep the considered
SNR regime same for each plot.
4.4.3 Experimental Results and Leakage Capacity for Core 2 DUO Laptop
In this section, we provide the results for Core 2 DUO laptop. It has 1.8
GHz CPU clock, 32 KB 8 way L1 and 4096 KB 16 way L2 caches. ESP
values and lengths of instructions are given in Table 4.3. Similar to AMD
laptop, the deviation of the instruction length is large, which causes the
capacity gap between the proposed and Shannon based methods to be
larger.
Table 4.3: ESP values (in zJ) for Core 2 DUO Laptop.
STL2 LDM STM LDL2 LDL1 MUL DIV
ESP 422.16 181.58 79.94 320.48 0.75 0.06 7.02
Length 1 26 31 3 1 1 8
We do not consider the results for STL1, SUB and ADD because the
lengths and ESP values of these instructions are almost same with LDL1.
For this device, we assume that LDL1, STL1, SUB and ADD form a sub-
instruction set, and LDL1 as the representative of this set. We observe
that CP can be up to 1.634 Bits/Quantum if the attacker can find a way
to capture emanated signals with high SNR. Furthermore, at 23.82 dB
SNR, CP is 1.36 Bits/Quantum, again higher then 1.09 Bits/Quantum
capacity predicted in [18]. The difference between these results reveals
the importance of considering both pipeline depth and ordering of instruc-
tions.
We also observe that the required SNR for CP to achieve C∞ must be
at least 56 dB. However, with a moderate gain antenna and proximity to
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Figure 4.7: Leakage Capacity for Core 2 DUO Laptop
the laptop, the attacker can steal sensitive information since the leakage
capacity is 0.5 Bits/Quantum when SNR is around -10dB. Considering the
clock frequency of the computer, the side channel can have a transmission
rate of thousand of bits per second under ideal circumstances.
4.4.4 Experimental Results and Leakage Capacity for Core I7 Laptop
The last example we provide is for Core I7 laptop which has 3.4 GHz CPU
clock with 64 KB 2 way L1 Data and 1024 KB 16 way L2 caches. Table
4.4 provides ESP and execution length of each instruction. The first ob-
servation here is that the deviation of the execution length of instructions
is not as large as the other laptops, which causes the gap between CP and
C0 results to decrease as given in Fig. 4.8.
Table 4.4: ESP values (in aJ) for Core I7 Laptop.
LDL2 LDM STM STL2 SUB STL1 ADD MUL DIV
ESP 1.03 1.38 1.23 0.56 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.54
Length 1 12 15 4 1 1 1 1 8
We observe that LDL1 and SUB have approximately same ESP. There-
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fore, SUB is considered as the representative of the group of these in-
structions. For ideal scenarios, CP can go up to 2.32 Bits/Quantum. To
achieve this rate, the setup must ensure at least 47 dB SNR. In addition,
when SNR is 23.84 dB, the leakage capacity with the model in [18] is 0.72
Bits/Quantum, although it is obtained as 1.65 Bits/Quantum with the
proposed model. Hence, including both pipeline depth and dependencies
between instructions helps better quantification of leakage capacity.















Figure 4.8: Leakage Capacity for Core I7 Laptop
Also, for the low SNR scenarios, CP is high enough, i.e. 0.7 Bits/Quan-
tum around 0 dB. Considering the clock frequency of the laptop, the ca-
pacity values given in Fig. 4.8 could be a messenger to warn any users
about the possible vulnerabilities that computer systems might have.
Another evaluation methodology to assess the severity of side channels
is given in [79]. They define success rate to demonstrate the performance
of an adversary attack. It is possible to establish a connection between
the success rate and the proposed information leakage. This connection is
achieved if the probabilities which lead to maximum information leakages
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are utilized to calculate the success rate. As a simple example, if the goal
of an attack is to reconstruct instructions (although this chapter does not
consider a specific attack, but aims to provide a universal upper bound for
EM side channels), we can define the success rate as







where D is the set of decision boundaries for all instructions, I is the set
containing all considered instructions, diU and diL are the upper and lower
decision boundaries for the ith instruction, f(x|α, σ) is the pdf of white
Gaussian noise distribution with mean α and standard deviation σ, µ[i]
is the stationary probability of ith instruction that is the result of the op-
timization problem given in (7). The decision boundaries are calculated
based on ESP values of neighboring instructions. Therefore, if the target
of an attack is known, it is possible to provide success rate of an attack by
exploiting the parameters which optimize (7).
Welch’s T-test is an evaluation methodology which is heavily exploited
in the security assessment of cryptographic implementations against side
channel attacks [80, 81, 82]. The proposed framework can be also asso-
ciated with T-test assessment methodology if we assume there exists an
attack which can separate emitted signals of different pipeline stages, and
depends on the emitted signal power of individual instructions when the
same instruction is executed successively. If these assumptions hold, the
attacker will receive samples which will be the noise added version of emit-
ted signal power while performing activity i, i.e, yij = ESP(i) + noise, where
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yij denotes the j





2 · · · yiNi
]
(4.15)
where Ni is the number of successive execution of the instruction i. Let
also ∆m,n be the T statistic of instruction m and n, which is given as
∆m,n =






where E(•) is the expectation operation, and var(•) gives the variance of
its input. The T statistic for the instruction m will be significant only if
∆m,n is above a threshold for any n ∈ I. Therefore, the T statistic could
be an empirical methodology, which can provide required repetition of an
instruction for a successful side channel attack.
4.5 Utilizing the Proposed Framework for Security Assessment
The leakage capacity definition given in this section provides the maximum
leakage amount that any EM side/covert channel can achieve on a given
device. This capacity can help designers to predict possible vulnerabili-
ties of their products at the design-stage and provide the opportunity to
design countermeasures, or to redesign their systems to prevent possible
side-channel attacks. Comparing with the evaluation method based on
success rate, which quantifies accurate retrieval rate of an attack’s tar-
get (i.e., secret key bit estimation), leakage capacity defines the maximum
information leakage through side channels without specifying the attack
itself. Therefore, it provides a universal upper bound for EM side channels.
This section provides a recipe to check whether the considered system is
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secure enough against side channel attacks, and explains steps to justify
why they are required. The procedure for the assessment is given in Figure
4.9, and can be explained as follows:
• The first step is to collect emanated EM signal power available to an
attacker while executing an instruction. Considering the clock fre-
quency of modern computer systems, measuring the single instruc-
tion power could be problematic because of synchronization, complex
pipeline structure, etc. To handle these problems, the designed mic-
robenchmark given in Figure 4 is run to obtain both PA1(falt) and
PNOP(falt) where Pi(falt) is the total emanated signal power when inst-
ruction i and NOP are inserted into the first and second inner-for-
loops, respectively.
• The measurements to obtain Pi(falt) are done from near-field because
the goal is to capture all emanated signal as much as possible. This
approach helps to have close empirical results for signal power be-
cause actual emanated instruction power is not available. Then, ESP
of each considered instruction is calculated based on the formula
given in (12).
• Because of the functionality of a program, a script, etc., and the
complex pipeline structure of modern computer systems, instructions
shows dependency to each other. To consider the dependency among
instructions, a Markov Model is created as given in Section II.
• The next step is to calculate the limit for information leakage. To ob-
tain the limit, the algorithm given in [72] will be exploited. For the
algorithm, it is required that the channel inputs from each source
have to last for the same amount of time. However, instructions can
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take different number of clock cycles to execute. Therefore, the Quan-
tum length of each instruction has to be revealed. Please note that
the Quantum length is defined as the ratio between actual execu-
tion time of an instruction and the minimum execution time within
instruction set.
• After having the execution length and utilizing the duality given in
Theorem 1, the next step is to apply the transformation in Section
II-E. This transformation makes sure that each channel input takes
same amount of time so that the algorithm given in [72] can be uti-
lized to calculate the leakage capacity for a targeted SNR regime.
• The result of the algorithm provides the leakage capacity which is
denoted as CP . We use this number later as the baseline to compare
with the leakages of designs to understand the relative resistance of
them against any possible side channel attack.
• To find the leakage of any code, program, design, etc., the number of
transitions from ith to jth instructions is counted. These numbers are
normalized to calculate Pij for the inspected source code.
• Having the state transition probabilities, Pij, our next goal is to reveal
the available mutual information for the test code. Please note that
our goal is to find the mutual information with the given Pij, therefore,
we do not need to update the state transition probabilities. Hence, we
run the algorithm given in [72] only once without updating the state
transition probabilities. The mutual information obtained as a result
of the algorithm is denoted as MC.
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Run the microbenchmark given in Figure 2.1
Measure the emanated EM signal power
Calculate ESP 
(Theorem 2)     
Generate Markov Source Model 
(Section 4.2.4)
Calculate Quantum lengths of instruction 
Calculate Leakage Capacity by exploiting 
the model, ESP and the algorithm in [69]
Store the leakage capacity
Generate instruction sequence for the 
code under test
Calculate transition probabilities of the 
sequence
Run the algorithm in [69] to obtain the
mutual information for the code   .    
Compare        with 
is relatively small enough thanTrue False
The code is resistant to side channel 
attack
Come up with some countermeasures or 
revise the design
Figure 4.9: The methodology to assess information leakage.
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• As the last step, we compare CP with MC. If MC is much smaller then
CP , and very close to zero, the designer can conclude that the source
code is secure. Otherwise, a new design or some countermeasures,
i.e. shielding, etc., has to be considered. Then, the same steps given
in this section have to be followed again until achieving MC  CP .
Please note that the procedure given here does not specify the attack
methodology, but provides the worst case scenario for a victim in terms
of information leakage. It is still an ongoing research to have an attack
that achieve the limits given in this chapter. However, designers can uti-
lize the procedure to prevent any future attacks.
4.6 Summary
This chapter proposed a methodology to relate program execution to EM
side-channel emanations and estimate side-channel information capacity
created by execution of series of instructions (e.g. a function, a procedure,
or a program) in a processor. To model dependence between program in-
structions in a code, we have proposed to use Markov Source model, which
includes the dependencies that exist in instruction sequence since each
program code is written systematically to perform a specific task. The
sources for channel inputs are considered as the emitted EM signals dur-
ing instruction executions. To obtain the channel inputs for the proposed
model, we derive a mathematical relationship between the emanated IP
and total emanated signal power while running a program. Then, we have
derived leakage capacity of EM side channels created by execution of series
of instructions in a processor. Finally, we have provided experimental re-
sults to demonstrate that leakages could be severe enough for a dedicated
attacker to obtain some prominent information.
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CHAPTER 5
COMMUNICATION MODEL AND CAPACITY LIMITS OF COVERT
CHANNELS CREATED BY SOFTWARE ACTIVITIES
5.1 Overview
In this chapter, we model an electromagnetic covert channel as a commu-
nication channel and derive upper and lower capacity bounds [21]. Covert
channels can be used to communicate sensitive data between two pro-
cesses inside a processor - typically a privileged process that has access to
secret data but no/limited access to the outside world and a non-privileged
process with no access to the data but connected to the outside world, or
alternatively, they can be used to “exfiltrate” data from an air-gapped com-
puter which is physically and logically separated from public networks [4,
56]. In both cases, the secret data can be secretly transferred to the out-
side world through a wireless channel which, in turn, breaks the existing
assumptions about the security of sensitive data inside a system.
Covert channels are considered as a serious security threat [2] since
they can circumvent and break existing defense mechanisms (e.g., memory
isolation, partitioning, etc.) for protecting secrets inside a computer. Typi-
cally, wireless communication is a carefully designed process that encom-
passes the coordinated design of transmitter and receiver and usually, the
transmitted and received signals are well-synchronized. In contrast, covert
channels lack these characteristics. Moreover, contrary to most communi-
cation systems, which are designed to avoid symbol loss and/or insertion
with little or no overhead, covert channels are not designed to transfer
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information at all and their transmission is often corrupted by insertion,
deletion, and erroneous transfer of bits. While there is a large number
of papers discussing bounds on the capacity of channels corrupted with
synchronization errors [10], [11], [12], [13], [14] and more recently, papers
discussing bounds on the capacity of channels corrupted with synchroni-
zation and substitution errors [15], [16], none of them provide bounds for
the capacity of the wireless covert channel which can be modeled as a
cascaded insertion-substitution channel that suffers from random pulse
position shifts, and that insertions occur with different probabilities for
zero and one.
Similar to traditional wireless communications, some errors in the covert
channel occur due to variations in the propagation environment. How-
ever, in addition to channel errors, the software activity “transmitter” lacks
precise synchronization, causing jitter that reduces the signal’s effective
bandwidth and increases the noise level. Also, the “transmitter” gets in-
terrupted with other (system) activities, and the transmitted signal may go
through a channel obstructed by metal, plastic, etc. To capture all effects
of the observed behavior, we have modeled the transmitted sequence as a
pulse amplitude modulated (PAM) signal with randomly varying pulse po-
sitions. In summary, the main contributions of the chapter can be listed
as follows:
• Model the transmitted signal as a pulse amplitude modulated signal
with random pulse positions to avoid problems due to variation in the
execution time of computer activities,
• Model the covert channel as an insertion channel to consider other
activities such as interrupts, stalls, etc.,
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• Derive power spectral density and the bit error rate (BER) of the trans-
mitted signal with only substitution errors,
• Derive capacity bounds with random insertion and substitution due
to the noise and jitter errors,
• Provide a receiver design that can correctly detect the computer-
activity-created signals,
• Perform experiments with high clock speed devices at some distance.
The organization of the chapter is as follows: Section 5.3 describes
the transmission model for a covert channel caused by EM emanations
of the processor, Section 5.4 explains reception model and BER for two
case studies, Section 5.5 derives lower and upper bounds of the covert
channel capacity, Section 5.6 presents the experimental results to validate
the proposed framework, and Section 5.7 summarizes the chapter.
5.2 Wireless Transmission via Covert Channels
Even an idle computer system produces RF signals that, after AM demodu-
lation, result in clicking, whining, and other sounds (this can be confirmed
by placing an AM radio receiver close to a computer). To confirm that the
received communication sequence is indeed the transmitted message, we
performed two experiments. First, we modulated our transmitted signal
with the A5 note (880 Hz), and turned this tone on/off to transmit Morse
code for “All your data belong to us” [3]. Second, we placed our micro-
benchmark code around the keyboard driver, which allowed us to transmit
keystrokes wirelessly [83]. In both cases, we were able to correctly receive
and demodulate transmitted signals.
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However, we observed that the timing of the instructions was not per-
fectly synchronized. This issue confirmed that the baseband pulses gen-
erated with on-off keying do not have equal timing, and the created carrier
is spread over several kilohertz in contrast to traditional communications
where the carrier is well concentrated around a single frequency. This lack
of synchronization in the transmitter causes significant jitter and has to
be carefully modeled, as described in the following sections.
5.3 Transmission Model for Software-Activity-Created Signals
In this section, we propose a model for covert channel communication
systems. Before introducing the proposed model, we briefly review the
baseband PAM signal and corresponding notations used in the rest of the
chapter.




xkδ(t− kT ) ∗ p(t), (5.1)
where δ(•) is Dirac delta function, ∗ is the convolution operator, xk =
(xk, xk−1, xk−2, . . .) is the sequence of data symbols that are chosen from
a finite alphabet, and p(t) is a shaping pulse. The power spectral density











is PSD of the stationary sequence xk, and Rx[k] is the autocorrelation
function of sequence xk. Furthermore, if an impulse function is used as
the shaping pulse, the power spectral density can be simply written as
Sxp(f) = Sx(f)/T . 1


























Figure 5.1: Illustration of two timing distributions of symbols for an EM
covert channel, one when memory activity is used and one with on-chip
instructions is used.
The baseband signal shown in (5.1) assumes perfect symbol timing.
However, the transmitted signals created by computer software activities
are exposed to synchronization problems due to variations in symbol tim-
ing. As an example, Fig. 5.1 illustrates how the mean and the variance
of the symbol timing vary with software activities when a covert channel
is created based on emanated EM signals [3]. While the on-chip activities
have a more concentrated distribution with a smaller variation, off-chip
activities such as memory create more variations in symbol timing.
To deal with the pulse width variations and establish a connection us-
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ing conventional communication theories, we assume the pulse width is
fixed, but the center of the pulse changes due to the non-synchronous na-
ture of the channel. Therefore, we propose to model the baseband signal as
a pulse amplitude modulated (PAM) signal with a random pulse position.




xkp(t− kT −Tk), (5.4)
where Tk is a random shift associated with a particular pulse for the trans-
mitted symbol, xk, whose probability density function (pdf) is denoted by
fTk(tk). As illustrated in Fig. 2.4, the pulses are assumed to have a 50%
duty cycle and the neighboring pulses do not overlap. Here, we need to
note that although symbol timing varies as given in Fig. 5.1, our model
contains a pulse function whose width is fixed and whose position is ran-
domized. Also, the position of the pulse is chosen as the mid-point of
the actual pulse width. This can be explained as follows: in traditional
PAM modulation, pulse duty cycles are assumed to be fixed and do not
vary. However, in a covert communication system, duty cycles generated
by software activities can vary from one execution to another. Hence, to
capture the variation in symbol timing in software activities and link the
covert communication with the existing approaches, the transmitted sig-
nal is modeled as a PAM signal with a fixed pulse duty cycle.
To ensure that neighboring pulses do not overlap, the support set of
fTk(tk) is set to {tk ∈ [−T /4, T /4)}. We also assume probability density
functions,
{fTk(•) |∀k ∈ {−∞,∞}} ,
are identical and independent distributions (i.i.d.). As an example, Fig. 5.2
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Figure 5.2: (a) PAM with sequence xk and (b) distribution of pulses per-
turbed randomly in time and modulated in amplitude when the shaping
pulse is a square wave.
illustrates a typical PAM signal with 50% duty cycle and its randomly
shifted version. We can observe that the time difference between neigh-
boring pulses can increase or decrease, which mimics the variations in
software activities and reflects the lack of synchronization.
To simplify (5.4) further, we will assume that p(t) is an impulse function,




xkδ(t− kT −Tk). (5.5)
To evaluate the impact which the jitter introduces to the system due
to the variation in symbol timing, we need to find PSD of baseband PAM
signal with a random pulse position. The following theorem provides PSD
of the signal with a random pulse position:
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Theorem 3. Let Φ(f) be the Fourier transform of φ(τ) and
φ(τ) =
∫
fT(τ + t)fT(t)dt = fT(τ) ∗ fT(−τ), (5.6)
where the subscript k is removed to represent the random position distribu-
tion of the kth pulse since all distributions are assumed to be i.i.d. Then, PSD





T (1− Φ(f)). (5.7)
Proof. Please see Appendix H.
Furthermore, for an arbitrary pulse shape, PSD of PAM signal with a










This result shows that PAM with a random pulse position is equivalent
to passing the PAM signal through a filter with power spectral density Φ(f),
and having a jitter noise whose power is redistributed as a continuous
wideband noise.
The characteristics of the filter and the noise are completely determined
by the probability distribution of the pulse positions. By fitting the mea-
sured samples of symbol duration into different probability distributions,
we have found that the best fit for the pulse position variations is a Gaus-
sian distribution with the mean µ and the standard deviation σ. Although
fitting Gaussian distribution for the pulse positions contradicts our previ-
ous assumption that pulses can be only between −T /4 and T /4, we can
still approximate the pulse positions with a Gaussian random distribu-
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Figure 5.3: Illustration of two distributions of pulse shift for an EM covert
channel, one when memory activity is used and one with on-chip instruc-
tions is used.
tion by assuming that the tail probability beyond −T /4 and T /4 is almost
zero. Moreover, for the tractability of the derivations, we will assume that
the means of these Gaussian distributions are equal. Fig. 5.3 plots the
shift distributions of these pulse positions. We can observe that the pulse
shift distributions are concentrated around zero. Therefore, (5.6) can be
specified further for the memory and non-memory activities.
Given that Gaussian distribution has a Fourier transform
F {f(t)} = e−2πjfµe−2π2σ2f2 , (5.9)
where F {•} takes Fourier transform of its argument and f(t) is any Gaus-
sian distribution with mean µ and standard deviation σ, we then combine
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Finally, inserting (5.10) into (5.7), we calculate PSD of PAM signal with















= Sxt(f) + Snt(f), (5.11)
where Sxt(f) denotes the spectrum of the transmitted sequence and Snt(f)
denotes the noise spectrum due to random pulse position.
5.4 Quantifying the Information Leakage of Covert Channel Software-
Activity-Created Signals
Traditionally, the performance of a communication system is evaluated by
estimating symbol error rate or BER of the system. The error probability







where Q(·) function denotes the tail probability of the standard normal
distribution, Ps is the averaged transmitted power of a symbol, and Pn is
the averaged noise power.
For the proposed scenario, BER represents the severity of the covert
channel. Quantifying the information leakage in terms of BER reveals how
fast we can transmit the information by establishing a reliable communi-
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cation link using the computer systems. To estimate BER, we need PSD
of the signal derived in (5.11). Then, we assume that the transmitted sig-
nal, y(t), defined in (5.5) has been affected by the channel noise, and that
received signal can be written as
r(t) = y(t) + n(t), (5.13)
where n(t) denotes the white Gaussian noise with zero mean and standard
deviation, σn. We also assume that the noise and the transmitted sequence
are independent. By observing that a communication system based on the
covert channels described in Section 5.2 typically occurs at low frequencies
(∼ 1 MHz) where the multi-path effect does not play a significant role, it
is reasonable to assume that the received signal is mostly impacted by
noise and that inter-symbol interference (ISI) has almost negligible effect
on the reliability of the covert communication. Here, we assume that the
noise component contains both additive channel noise and all corruptive
signals due to other activities in the system. Then, utilizing (5.11), the
power spectral density of the received signal can be written as
Sr(f) = Sxt(f) + Snt(f) +N0/2, (5.14)
where N0/2 denotes the power spectral density of the additive white noise.
Obtaining PSD of the transmitted symbols facilitates the calculation
of BER. To utilize (5.12), we need to know the signal and noise powers.
Since our transmitted signal experiences jitter due to the variations in the
symbol position, we start by calculating PSD of the jitter noise and the
signal.
Corollary. Considering the variation in the symbol position, PSD of the
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+ (1− Φ(f))︸ ︷︷ ︸
S̄nt(f)
 (5.15)
where S̄xt(f) and S̄nt(f) are the normalized signal and jitter noise powers.
Proof. Please see Appendix H.1.
Fig. 5.4 illustrates the behavior of the normalized signal and noise
power when T ≈ 15σ. 1
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Figure 5.4: PSD of normalized signal and jitter noise due to random pulse
position when T ≈ 15σ.
Since the noise power due to jitter behaves like a white noise when
Φ(f) ≈ 0, at the receiver front-end, we employ a low-pass filter whose band-
width and magnitude are 1/2T and 1, respectively. The total signal power






































2T erf (πσ/T ) /(πσ/T )
)
, (5.17)
where erf(•) is the error function.
Having the power for both jitter noise and the received signal, we can
estimate BER by using (5.12) assuming we have a channel without synch-
ronization problems. However, this is not the case for a software-activity-
based covert channels because synchronization can hurt the stealthy na-
ture of these covert channels. Fortunately, after filtering the received sig-
nal at the receiver side, the jitter power becomes flat and behaves like an
extra power source for the channel noise. Therefore, the receiver sees the
channel noise with power N̂0/2 = N0/2 +T Pnt. With that approximation, we
can treat our communication system as a synchronized system with extra







The effect of varying jitter noise on BER is given in Fig. 5.5 where SNRi
is defined as
SNRi = Rx[0]/(N0/2). (5.19)
As the power of additive channel noise increases, the effect of the lack
of synchronization on the erroneous transfer of bits becomes negligible.
However, while the channel noise power decreases, the impact of jitter
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noise can be observed explicitly. In Section 5.6, we will demonstrate that
assuming the jitter as an another source for the channel additive noise is a
proper assumption to model the characteristics of BER of a covert channel.1















σ = 0 σ = T /20
σ = T /15 σ = T /12
Figure 5.5: BER for the covert wireless communication system with vary-
ing jitter noise power.
Finally, we investigate how the variation in the symbol position corrupts
the transmitted sequence. The signal to jitter noise power ratio, SNRjitter,

















erf (πσ/T ) /(πσ/T )
. (5.20)
Fig. 5.6 depicts how SNRjitter changes with respect to σ/T . Since we
assume 12σ ≤ T , we limit σ/T to be between 0 and 1/12 (due to the as-
sumption that the distribution of the pulse shift has non-zero probability
in the region [−T /4, T /4) and considering three-sigma rule). As expected,
as the variation in pulse position decreases, the distortion in the transmit-
ted signal, due to jitter noise, decreases.
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Figure 5.6: SNRjitter vs. σ/T .
5.5 Capacity of the Covert Channel Created By a Computer Software
Activity
The conventional method to assess the capacity of a communication sys-
tem over Gaussian channels is to employ Shannon’s capacity definition
[84]. However, in addition to errors due to the Gaussian channel and pulse
position, covert communication channels are exposed to insertion errors
due to random software activities. We assume covert transmission occurs
continuously, and the insertions are due to processor optimization, stalls,
cache misses, queues, etc. These activities in a computer system can stall
the covert channel communication and produce unintended signals. The
receiver interprets these signals as ones or zeros, and these received bits
are considered as the inserted symbols of the covert wireless communica-
tion. To model this covert channel, we assume binary discrete memoryless
channel for the random insertions, as illustrated in Fig. 5.7. The chan-
nel parameters are (pi0, pi1, pe), where pi0 denotes the probability that the
random inserted symbol is 0, pi1 denotes the probability that the random
inserted symbol is 1, and pe denotes the probability of substitution error
during transmission due to channel noise and jitter. To be able to cal-
culate pe, we follow the procedure given in Section 5.4, where we assume
the jitter behaves like another power source for the additive channel noise.
101
This model is a modified version of the channel model used by Davey and
MacKay [11], where we additionally account for the fact that symbols for
zero and one do not have equal probabilities of insertion, and the channel
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Figure 5.7: Binary discrete memoryless noisy, jittery, synchronization
channel.
With the model and the parameters defined above, the following the-
orem provides the upper and lower bounds of the covert channels which
exhibit an OOK structure:
Theorem 4. The covert channel capacity with probabilities (pi0, pi1, pe) and
(pi0 + pi1) < 0.5 is upper bounded by
C ≤ 1−Hb(pe), (5.21)





1− pi0 − pi1
)
, (5.22)
where Hb(•) is the entropy of a binary source.
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Proof. Please see Appendix I.
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e) Lower Bound, pi = 0.005 Lower Bound, pi =0.01
Lower Bound, pi = 0.05 Lower Bound, pi =0.1
Lower Bound, pi = 0.25 Upper Bound
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Figure 5.8: Upper and lower bounds of information rates for deliberate side
channel with several probabilities of insertion for a synchronized channel.
Fig. 5.8 shows achievable information rates for the covert channel with
various insertion probabilities. Here, we plot the upper bound derived in
(5.21) and lower bound in (5.22) for several different insertion probabilities.
We can observe that unless pi0 = pi1 = pi = 0, the existence of insertions
greatly limits the transmission capabilities, and reliable communication is
not possible without channel coding even when SNR is high.
Moreover, Fig. 5.9 compares the lower bound derived in (5.22) with a
prior method [15] for several insertion probabilities. We observe that when
the system is in the proper SNR regime for a reliable communication, the
proposed lower bound is tighter than the one given in [15] for the capacity
of a channel with insertion and substitution. We compare our results with
work in [15] because it is the most similar channel scenario to the covert
channels analyzed in this paper and their lower bound is shown to be
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Lower Bound, pi = 0.1
Lower Bound, pi = 0.25
Lower Bound[15], pi = 0.05 
Lower Bound[15], pi = 0.1 
Lower Bound[15], pi = 0.25
Upper Bound
Figure 5.9: Comparison of the lower bound of information rates for covert
channel with no jitter and AWGN channel with insertions with the lower
bound of information rate derived in [15].
tighter than all previously reported lower bounds for this type of a channel.
We need to note that for Fig. 5.8 and Fig. 5.9, the jitter variance is set to
zero for a fair comparison of the proposed bounds with the previous lower
bound results because they are derived without considering the channels
with jitter. However, assuming no jitter for a covert channel is not proper.
Fig. 5.10 illustrates the relation between achievable information rates and
jitter variance. Here, we assume the insertion probability is pi = 0.05.
We can observe that the achievable information rate increases with SNR
and decreases with jitter variance. While the existence of jitter limits the



































Lower bound, σ = 0 Upper bound, σ = 0
Lower bound, σ = T /15 Upper bound, σ = T /15
Lower bound, σ = T /12 Upper bound, σ = T /12
Figure 5.10: Upper and lower bounds of information rates of the covert
channel with different jitter variances when pi = 0.05.
5.6 Experimental Validation of the Proposed Model
In this section, we first demonstrate the existence of physical/analog covert
channels generated by EM emanations, and then analyze this covert chan-
nel based on the proposed model, and also justify the assumption that the
received signal is a PAM signal with insertions and substitutions for a va-
riety of devices, i.e., FPGA, IoTs, laptops.
Analysis of the Covert Channel
To create a covert channel, we ran a microbenchmark (i.e., a spy appli-
cation to transmit the sensitive data outside of the device) shown in Sec-
tion 5.2 (also described in [17, 18]) on an Altera NIOS-II (soft) processor
using a commercial Terassic DE1 SoC board [85]. This board is equipped
with an Altera/Intel Cyclone-II FPGA chip and a variety of I/O protocols
such as VGA, Serial, etc., and represents a popular class of embedded
systems commonly used in the market. The application was written in






Figure 5.11: The meausrement setup for devices: a) FPGA, b) FPGA, c)
OLinuXino, d) Laptops with distance.
To receive the transmitted EM signals created by the spy application
inside the system, we placed a magnetic probe, PBS-M [85], about 10
cm above the board so that it covers the processor area as shown in Fig.
5.11(a). We intentionally put the probe very close to the board to receive
the EM signal with the highest achievable SNR to avoid the limitations due
to low SNR. In the later sections, we will show how this covert channel per-
forms under more realistic scenarios where the receiver is placed several
meters away from the device.
The EM signals were recorded using a spectrum analyzer (Agilent MXA
N9020A). We set the sampling rate to 10 MHz, and set the spectrum an-
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Figure 5.12: The received baseband signal with period T = 1µs.
alyzer’s center frequency to 50 MHz (i.e., the clock frequency of the FPGA
chip), and the span to 4 MHz (i.e., 2 MHz for each side-band) since the
designed microbenchmark creates periodic activities (i.e., A/B or A/A al-
ternations) at 1 MHz so the device can pick up spikes from this periodic
activity and its multiple harmonics.
The received signal is shown in Fig. 5.12 when the activity A and activity
B of the microbenchmark are chosen as a load from main memory and load
from an L1 cache, respectively. We can observe that the received signal has
a shape of a PAM signal whose pulse width fluctuates due to uncertainties
in the execution times of computer-software activities.
Table 5.1: Comparison of experimental and theoretical results in terms of
BER for NIOS processor on the DE1 FPGA board.
SNR (dB) Experimental BER Theoretical BER
1 6 0.096 0.0829
2 13 0.0013 0.0016
3 14 0.0008 0.0009
4 24 0 0
To compare the theoretical results with the experimental results, we
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perform experiments with different activities and bandwidth. The esti-
mated SNRs and the corresponding experimental and theoretical results
are given in Table 5.1. The activities and the corresponding bandwidth
used for the experiments can be listed as follows: 1) Addition-Multiplication
with 4 MHz bandwidth, 2) Addition-Multiplication with 2 MHz bandwidth,
3) Load from Main Memory-Load from L1 cache with 4 MHz bandwidth,
and 4) Load from Main Memory-Load from L1 cache with 2 MHz band-
width. The sampling frequency for all these experiments is 10 MHz. We
need to note that we only provide these results because we do not control
SNR of the communication, therefore, generation of a plot with various
SNR values is hard and unreliable. These results illustrate that proposed
model is a realistic model for covert channels and can be used as a simu-
lation tool.
The second example illustrates the presence of jitter and why our as-
sumption that the jitter power can be added as an extra power source of
white noise to calculate the BER, i.e., why assumption in (5.18) is valid.
The following discussion considers the jitter distributions given in Fig 5.3.
First, we plot PSD of the information signal and jitter noise. Here, we
study the scenario without memory activity and the baseband transmitted
pulses are sent with period T = 1 µs. The standard deviation of the jitter
noise is calculated as σ = 5.91×10−8. The theoretical PSD of the transmitted
signal and the jitter noise are given in Fig. 5.13(a), and PSD of the filtered
signal at the receiver side is given in Fig. 5.13(b). We observe that the
jitter noise power dominates the transmitted signal for higher frequencies.
Filtering the received signal removes this redundancy and helps to retrieve
the information signal.
As the final step, to verify BER estimation given in (5.18) based on
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Figure 5.13: PSD of a) the transmitted signal and b) its filtered version at
the receiver side for the symbol without memory activity.
PSD of the transmitted signal and jitter noise, we design the following
experiment: We create an impulse train with period T and apply jitter
noise by altering the location of pulses based on the normal distribution
with variance σ2. Then, we disturb the signal further by adding white
noise, whose distribution can be given as N (0, N0/2). The received signal is
filtered with an ideal low pass filter on the receiver side and sampled with
frequency 1/T . Finally, the sampled outputs are thresholded to estimate
the transmitted inputs. The results are shown in Fig. 5.14. Here, we
plot the simulation and theoretical BER results for the cases with and
without memory activity. The results assert that simulated results agree
with theoretically derived BER and verify the intuition that as the jitter
variance increases, BER also increases.
Please note that not only PAM, but also frequency shift keying (FSK)
modulation scheme can be generated with the microbenchmark. However,
the detection of FSK signals can be harder since the variations in execution
time of the microbenchmark will cause scrambling of different frequencies
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Experimental BER without memory activity
Theoretical BER without memory activity
Experimental BER with memory activity
Theoretical BER with memory activity
Figure 5.14: Theoretical and experimental BER for the symbols with and
without memory activity.
and increase in BER. Therefore, more sophisticated receiver designs and
more complex mathematical derivations are needed to achieve the same
performance levels with the PAM case.
Demonstration of the Analog Covert Channel on More Complex Systems
In this section, we provide examples to show the practicality of the EM
covert channel on more complex devices and more realistic distances.
We first study the impact of distance (i.e., the position of the probe/an-
tenna and the receiving signal’s SNR) on the bit-error-rate (BER). To mea-
sure the EM signals, we used a panel antenna [86]. We set the spec-
trum analyzer’s center frequency to 2.3 GHz (i.e., the 46th harmonic of the
FPGA’s clock frequency, 50 MHz). This frequency is chosen to maximize
the antenna’s gain. We placed the board 50 cm and 1 m away from the
board. The setup is shown in Fig. 5.11(b).
Fig. 5.15 shows the signal received from these distances. Please note
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that received signals preserve the square-wave-structure like the signals
in Fig. 5.12. These experiments confirm that the proposed EM covert
channel is not sensitive to the position of the probe, and can be exploited
from longer distances.






































Figure 5.15: The received signal at distance of a) 50 cm, b) 1 m.
To further study the possible range of an EM covert-channel attack
and investigate its possibility on other (more complex) types of devices, we
perform another experiment, this time using an embedded single-board
computer called OlinuXino [87]. This board is equipped with a modern
Cortex A8 ARM core with two levels of caches, 4 MB main memory, and
runs a Debian Linux operating system. OlinuXino represents a popular
class of single-board computers widely used in the market to control a
variety of critical and commercial tasks in factory lines, hospitals, etc.
To receive the EM signals, we leveraged two different antennas: a com-
mercially available horn antenna [88], and a high-gain custom-made disk-
array based antenna [89]. Similar to the FPGA, we use our microbench-
mark (written in C and compiled with Gnu-gcc tool) to establish the covert
channel. We use the same spectrum analyzer for recording the signals with
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Figure 5.16: a) BER vs. distance, b) The received signal power vs. distance
where the noise level of the instrument sensitivity level is about -130dBm.
a center frequency set to 1 GHz (i.e., the clock frequency of the ARM core),
and span of 5 MHz, while setting the microbenchmark to generate alter-
nations at 2 MHz. Please note that Fig. 5.11(c) shows our measurement
setup and demonstrates that communication is conducted in a realistic
indoor environment.
The results for BER and the signal power are given in Fig. 5.16. In Fig.
5.16(a), we plot the BER of measurements when the distance is more than
45 m. For closer distances, the success rate of the measurements is almost
100% (i.e., BER < 10−3). As can be seen from this figure, the success rate
(BER) linearly decreases as the distance increases (as shown by the fitted
line). From the results we note that covert channel can achieve more than
99.9% of success rate if the distance is less than 45 m and the signal level
is at least 8 dB above the noise level of the measuring device (i.e., -130
dBm in this experiment).
Finally, to show that this EM covert channel can be created for complex
computing systems such as laptops, we performed experiments on four
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different laptops with different processors, namely: AMD Turion X2 Ultra,
Intel Core Duo T2600, Intel I7 2620M, and Intel Core 2 Extreme X9650.
In all these measurements, we use the same experimental setup given
in [69] which utilizes a magnetic loop antenna with a radius of 30 cm [90]
as shown in Fig. 5.11(d). The center frequency for the measurements is
set to 1.024 MHz. The results are shown in Table 5.2. In this table, we
Table 5.2: Experimental results for computer systems with distance.
Platform CPU Distance BER
AMD Turion 2.1 GHz 2.5 m 10−3
Intel Core DUO 2.16 GHz 0.81 m 10−3
Intel i7 2.7 GHz 1.75 m 10−3
Intel Core 2 3 GHz 1.17 m 10−3
provide the maximum distances that we achieve a reliable communication
(i.e., BER ≈ 10−3) when the transmission rate for the covert channel is
800 bits per second (bps). We observed that the signal power leaked from
different platforms shows variation (depending on the packaging, board,
etc.), and that affects the range of the covert channel. Compared to the
state-of-the-art [4, 56, 91], our studied covert channel provides up to 5x
higher data-rate and 5x lower bit-error-rate.
5.7 Summary
A covert channel generated by program activities in a computer system is
described and modeled. These covert channels experience jitter errors in
addition to channel errors due to noise. This is a result of the compu-
ter activity “transmitter” which lacks precise synchronization. Also, the
“transmitter” gets interrupted by other (system) activities, and the trans-
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mitted signal goes through a channel obstructed by metal, plastic, etc. To
capture all these effects, we have modeled the transmitted sequence as a
pulse amplitude modulated (PAM) signal with random varying pulse posi-
tion. From the model, we have derived the power spectral density and the
bit error rate of the transmitted signal with insertion and substitution er-
rors. We have also derived capacity bounds of these covert channels with
insertion and substitution errors due to interrupts, noise, and jitter. The




A GENERALIZED APPROACH TO ESTIMATION OF COVERT CHANNEL
INFORMATION LEAKAGE CAPACITY
6.1 Overview
In this chapter, we propose a methodology to estimate the worst-case in-
formation leakage through various covert channels which can be adopted
for both analog and digital covert channels. In that respect, we first model
the communication channel as a deletion-insertion channel to mimic the
possible losses due to software activities. Unlike conventional communi-
cation systems where the noise is assumed to be Additive White Gaussian
Noise (AWGN), covert channels also suffer from changes in signaling time
of transmitted bits. We show that the noise caused by signaling time vari-
ation can be combined with AWGN to explain the overall effective noise on
the covert channel communication system. Secondly, based on the effec-
tive noise, we model the communication channel between the receiver and
the transmitter. Then, we define the channel capacity as the maximum
leakage for a given covert channel. Finally, we provide experimental re-
sults for various covert channels to show that the proposed model is an
effective and a general method to attain the resilience of a given system.
In the communication literature, many papers discuss bounds on the
capacity of channels corrupted by synchronization errors [10, 11, 12,
13, 14]. These papers are followed by capacities of channels corrupted by
synchronization and substitution errors [15], [16]. Applying these capacity
definitions to measure covert channel leakage for the worst-case scenarios
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is not valid since they do not consider the variation in signaling time. A
micro-level investigation on side channel capacities is considered in [18,
19] assuming instructions (which are the lowest level order to computer
processor) are the transmitted symbols between the transmitter (source)
and the receiver (sink). These papers exploit emanated EM signal power
while executing instructions, and model the channel based on the differ-
ences in signal power levels of different instructions. However, these pa-
pers overestimate the covert channel capacities because they do not con-
sider insertions and deletions that are encountered in macro-level (pro-
gram level) scenarios. In that respect, a program-level channel model is
proposed including insertions and deviation in signaling time while trans-
mitting signals [77, 21]. Then, leakage capacity bounds are defined for
only EM covert channels under the assumption that signaling time devia-
tion can be modeled by changing the position of the pulses and by keeping
the pulse width fixed. However, the scope of these papers is limited to EM
based covert channels, ignores the losses due to deletions, fixes the pulse
width while modeling the channel, and provides capacity bounds instead
of exact values.
The proposed model in this chapter is a generalized approach for vari-
ous covert channels and overcomes the issues regarding insertions, dele-
tions, and asynchronous nature of the considered channels. The main
contributions of the chapter can be listed as follows:
• We propose a communication model for covert channels including
insertions and deletions to comply with software activities.
• We experimentally demonstrate that the distribution of signaling time
variation exhibits a normal behavior, therefore, it can be fitted to a
normal distribution with mean µ and standard deviation σ.
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• Effective channel noise is introduced after deriving that the jitter er-
ror (error due to variation in signaling time) can be combined with
additive channel noise. The behavior of the effective channel noise
can change for different symbols.
• Based on the communication model and combined effective channel
noise, we model channel to calculate the worst-case leakage through
a covert channel. With this channel model, exact leakage capacity is
obtained instead of providing capacity bounds.
• The proposed model is generalized for various covert channels, there-
fore, the same framework can be utilized by system designers to as-
sess security of their systems against different types of already exist-
ing covert channels.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: In Section 6.2, we in-
troduce the model for transmitted signal, receiver, and communication
channel, Section 6.3 provides the derivation for effective channel noise
and lekage capacity, Section 6.4 demonstrates how the proposed model
can be utilized for various covert channel analysis, Section 6.5 provides
experimental setup and results, and Section 6.6 is the conclusion.
6.2 Overall Communication Model
In this section, we first describe the proposed model for the transmitter
of a covert channel considering its asynchronous nature and the variation
in signaling time. Then, we analyze the design of a receiver by describing
how a pulse-shape filter, similar to conventional communication systems,
is used for receiving the data. This is followed by deriving effective chan-
nel noise which is a combination of additive and jitter noise caused by
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the variation in signaling time. Finally, we propose the channel model by
considering the effective channel noise, insertions, and deletions.
To obtain the worst-case information leakage that can be achieved by
covert channels, we first need to model the transmitter and emanated sig-
nal. Note that the covert channels considered in this section do not seek
for relevant information in the system. A trusted insider or a Trojan pro-
vides this information to these channels to transmit to an outsider, which
is not an allowed action. In other words, the proposed method builds a
bridge between the trusted insider and adversarial outsider by creating a
covert channel. Also note that this section does not propose a new covert
channel. The goal of the section is to analyze already existing covert chan-
nels and evaluate their severity.
6.2.1 Transmitted Signal and Receiver Model
Transmitted Signal: In conventional communication systems, transmit-
ters and receivers are designed carefully to prevent any synchronization
problems. However, covert channels are not designed to communicate at
all [1]. Considering a connection between covert and conventional commu-
nication systems, the question is whether different modulation schemes
(e.g., pulse amplitude-width modulation, pulse width modulation, and
pulse amplitude modulation) are suitable for covert channels as well. How-
ever, employing such modulation schemes with various width and ampli-
tude choices are not practical for covert channels since the width and
amplitude of the transmitted signals deviate due to other program activi-
ties [65]. To avoid these difficulties arising because of these deviations, the
general practice in covert channel community is to employ a modulation




Figure 6.1: The received signal for a) ideal conventional communication
system, b) covert channel communication system.
the following assumptions and introduce notations for the model of the
transmitted signal:
A1: The Transmitted Signal Assumptions and Notations
– The receiver samples the signal at every T seconds under the
assumption that the transmission time of the covert channel is
T .
– On-Off-Keying (OOK) is considered as the modulation scheme to
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transmit information signal (i.e., the source exploits a specific
side-channel such as cache to transmit bits).
– The targeted duty cycle changes based on the implementation of
the covert channel. In other words, the ratio between the width
of the pulse and the transmission time T can vary for different
channels.
– There is no overlapping among the bits transmitted by the covert
channel transmitter. Therefore, a bit is transmitted only if the
transmission of the previous bit is complete.
– The signal is on for T 0 and T 1 seconds if the transmitted bit is
zero and one, respectively. Please note that T 0 could be also
zero, which represents the transmission period when nothing is
transmitted.
In Fig. 6.1(a), an ideal OOK modulated signal is shown when the trans-
mitted bit sequence is all ones (Although the behavior of any bit sequence
is the same, all-one-bit-sequence is used for better explanation of the pro-
cess). Unfortunately, obtaining such a signal is not possible with an un-
intentional channel. Because of the delays and synchronization problems
in covert channels, the system experiences shifts in transmitted signals
as shown in Fig. 6.1(b). This undesired behavior appears in almost all of
the covert channels, and needs to be modeled to understand and estimate
leakage capacity.
Receiver Model: For the receiver model, we need to combine the knowl-
edge of conventional communication theory and all the practices utilized
in the security community. The common approach in conventional sys-
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tems is to apply a match filter under the assumption that the system is
well-synchronized [84]. Motivated by this approach, we make the following
assumptions and observations:
A2: The Receiver Model Assumptions
– The receiver employs a filter which mimics a match filter to cap-
ture the transmitted information.
– Since the modulation is a result of software-hardware activities,
the transmitted keys encounter problems with changes in duty
cycle and non-synchronization, i.e., delays while transmitting
modulated signal.
Since synchronization problems limit the capability of the match filter for
covert channels, the first step to design the receiver is to relax these synch-
ronization requirements in order to handle shifts in signaling-time. To
capture the transmitted bit sequence, the receiver employs a matched fil-
ter with 100% duty cycle (irrespective of the actual duty cycle of the trans-










where rect(t) is a function with amplitude one, and has only nonzero
values between −0.5 and 0.5. Assuming r(t) is the received signal, we can
write the match filtered sequence after sampling with period T as













where ∗ is the convolution operation and n is the sample index. Under
this receiver implementation, the received signal can be considered as a
signal which only experiences variation in duty cycles. Please observe
that raising time of the received signals can be altered such that the total
area under the signaling period stays the same. Therefore, an equivalent
version of the original signal in Fig. 6.1(b) can be presented as in Fig. 6.2.
The equivalence of these two signal models stems from the fact that the
receiver does not consider the shift within the sampling period, but the
existence of the signal components.
Figure 6.2: The equivalent version of the received signal under the as-
sumption that the receiver employs a matched filter in (6.1).
Let us consider a noiseless environment where the received signals only
experience asynchronous nature of the covert channel. Fig. 6.3 shows the
received signal between (n − 1)T and nT when, without loss of generality,
the transmitted bit is one after modifying the raising time as given above
(the same discussion can be made for bit-zero).
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Figure 6.3: One cycle corrupted received signal that was modified by sig-
naling time variation, and modified such that the raising time is equivalent
to (n− 1)T .


















T 1 + Tx
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(6.3)
where Tx is a random variable for the width variation of the received signal.
For the rest of the section, we refer to Tx as the effective variation. Please
note that Tx can also be negative and the outputs of the match filter can
be smaller or larger than the expected output value.
6.2.2 Channel Model
In this section, we introduce our discrete memoryless channel model for
the covert communication. Having such a model is essential for establish-
ing connection with information theory which allows us to calculate the
channel capacity.
For the channel model, we make the following assumptions:
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A3: Bit-Deletion
The covert channel transmitter continuously sends information bits
unless it encounters interrupts, stalls, etc. Due to other program ac-
tivities that can run in parallel with the covert channel source, the
received signal is masked and can be randomized because of the con-
structive and destructive interference. From the receiver perspective,
the received bit has the highest entropy, hence, this scenario is con-
sidered as the deletion.
A4: Bit-Insertion
When stalls, interrupts, etc., force the source of covert channel to stop
transmitting information, the insertion of random bits occurs. Since
the receiver is not aware of such an interrupt, it keeps interpreting
the sampled symbols as the actually transmitted symbols.
A5: Additive Gaussian White Noise (AWGN)
The transmitted signals are also corrupted by additive white Gaus-
sian noise. We assume that this noise covers all unrelated signals
that are produced by the environment and the system.
Under these assumptions, signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) for the conven-





where Ps is the signal power and σn is the standard deviation of the noise
after sampling. However, the conventional SNR definition does not reflect
the variation in the width of the transmitted signal. Therefore, the first
goal is to combine the channel noise and the noise due to width variation,
which is called jitter noise. First we consider the noiseless scenario given
124










the received sampled symbol can be written as
yn = yo + nx (6.7)








This equation exposes two main intuitions about the characteristics of
covert channels: 1) the mean and standard deviation of the signaling
time variation could be different for different bits, and 2) the distributions
can exhibit differences for each system since they can correspond to non-
identical program activities. Hence, different jitter-noise schemes need to


















Equation 6.7 reveals that even with noiseless scenario assumption, the
covert channel system still encounters noise due to jitter in the system.
Including the additive channel noise (AWGN), the received symbol can be
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written as
yn = yo + nx + no (6.8)
where no ∼ N (0, σ2n) is the channel noise sample. Here, jitter and channel
noise can be combined as a single random variable because both have
Gaussian distribution. Let’s define nc as the effective noise component
which is given as
nc = nx + no.










Moreover, it is also possible that bit-zero signal can also be nonzero for a













where pj ({j ∈ {0, 1}}) represents the probability that bit-j is transmitted
















Therefore, the effective SNR (SNReff ) in these covert channels can be defined
as
SNReff = Ps/Pn. (6.12)
These equations show that covert channels suffer not only from channel
noise but also variations in signaling time. With the modeling assumptions
from Section 6.2, we can observe that signaling time variation behaves like
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an extra source of channel noise. Therefore, for the simplicity of discus-
sion, we assume additive channel noise has two components which are
independent of each other: jitter and additive channel noise.
Having the model for the noise term in the system, the received samples
given in (6.8) can be written as
yn = yo + nc. (6.13)
Therefore, overall channel between the transmitter and receiver can be
modeled as a discrete memoryless channel since the transmitted bits show
no dependency to other bits in the sequence. Another important point is
that if the communication is insertion/deletion-free, the overall channel
can be considered as a binary channel. However, because of other activ-
ities in the computer system, ignoring insertions/deletions in the covert
communication overestimates the possible information leakage through
these systems.
The channel model based on these assumptions is given in Fig. 6.4. To
simplify explanations, we divide the model into two parts Bit-Generation
and Communication Channel. The Bit-Generation shows the probabilities
of different types of signals that exist in the system. In this part, xi rep-
resents the transmitter (the actual source of the covert channel). I rep-
resents the other activities that can cause insertions in the channel. The
probabilities p0 and p1(= 1 − p0) are the probabilities to send bit zero and
one, pd is the deletion probability, pi is the insertion probability, and pc is
equivalent to pi + pd. The second part, Communication Channel, presents
the transition probabilities of different symbols. Here, s0, s1 and s? repre-





















Figure 6.4: Channel Model for the communication system.
symbols corresponding to bits zero and one are denoted by y0 and y1, re-
spectively. We need to note here that based on the assumptions A3 and
A4 given in Section 6.2, whenever a deletion/insertion occurs, the receiver
only guesses whether the received signal corresponds to one or zero.
The transmitter behaves like a ternary source, which generates zero,
one or an insertion(or deletion), however, the receiver always interprets the
received symbols as zero or one since it is unaware of insertion (or deletion)
locations. Another observation is that the timing variation while transmit-
ting bit-zero or bit-one could be different, which leads to differences in Tx
distribution. This means the channel does not exhibit a binary-symmetric
feature even if there are no insertions (or deletions). To incorporate this
asymmetrical feature of the system, the substitution probabilities for bit-
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zero and bit-one are represented as ps0 and ps1, respectively.
6.3 Leakage Capacity
Having a model for the covert channels enables calculation of leakage ca-
pacity because leakage capacity corresponds to channel capacity of the
model. In conventional communication systems, the channel capacity is




I (X;Y ) (6.14)
where X and Y are the random variables for inputs and outputs, and
p(x) is the probability distribution for the inputs. In our scenario, X and
Y represent the symbols sent from the transmitter (a source), and the
received symbols (by an sink), respectively.
To calculate the leakage capacity, the first step is to obtain the tran-
sition probabilities, psi where i ∈ {0, 1}. We know that the threshold is
calculated based on the posterior distribution of the inputs [84], and that
the asymmetric nature of the system affects the threshold while calculat-
ing substitution probability. Combining these information, the threshold
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which represent the effective symbol mean power and the effective noise
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variation when bit-i is transmitted, respectively, f(x|µ, σ2) is the probability
density function (pdf) for Gaussian distribution with mean µ and standard
deviation σ, and zthr is the threshold value to calculate substitution prob-
abilities which preserve the equality in (6.15). Therefore, considering all





p(x is insertion) = pi
p0f0(zthr) = p1f1(zthr)
ps0 = P0(Y > zthr)
ps1 = P1(Y ≤ zthr)
(6.16)
where Pi(•) provides the probability of its event with respect to the pdf
of the corresponding bit, fi(•). The solution to this optimization problem
provides the worst-case information leakage through covert channels.
We need to note here that the insertion (or the deletion) probability
depends on the targeted computer system. Therefore, pi and pd have to
be kept fixed while calculating the leakage capacity. A further analysis
can be done to find the effect of insertion/deletion on the leakage ca-
pacity. We can observe that increase in these probabilities decreases the
channel capacity. This means that systems can be designed more chaotic
(randomly pumping power to the systems, activating some random com-
ponents, etc.) to increase insertion/deletion probability (which can be
thought as a shielding strategy). Hence, having an investigation on the
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effect of deletion/insertion on the channel capacity gives insight into the
required level of this chaotic regime.
6.4 Establishing Connection between the Proposed Model and Covert
Channels
In this section, we explain how the proposed framework can be used to
model various covert channels. By establishing such a connection, we
demonstrate that the model can be utilized to calculate leakage capacity of
these channels, and define a metric measuring the resilience of any system
to covert channel attacks.
6.4.1 Power Based Covert Channels
The connection between covert channels based on Simple Power Analysis
(SPA) and the proposed model can be established explicitly because power
covert channel attacks utilize total power consumption of the system. For
example, they exploit variation in power consumption while executing bits
for signing operation in crypto-systems [30, 92]. The main goal is to mea-
sure the total power, and to estimate whether the signed bit is zero or one,
therefore, the system can be represented by OOK modulation.
To calculate the leakage capacity of power covert channel, we can as-
sume that T is the average time required to sign a bit for a cryptosystem,
or processing one bit of information. However, processing this information
can take different amount of time due to other software activities, opti-
mization, etc. Therefore, it can cause some shifts in time, and variation in
processing time, which can be explained by the proposed model as long as
the distribution of the effective variation is known. Also, due to stalls, in-
terrupts, etc., some of the bits correspond to deletions or insertions. Both
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of these issues are covered by the proposed model, therefore, the power
based covert channel can be analyzed theoretically.
Figure 6.5: Received signal generated by the covert channel in [29]. The
black (solid) curve represents the measured signal and the red (dotted)
curve is for the modeled signal.
An example of the received signal for power analysis is given in Fig. 6.5
when the microbenchmark in [51] is executed to transmit 0 - 1 sequence
repetitively. Because power channels are very noisy channels, we filter
the signal with move-median filter that helps exposing the OOK structure
of the received signal. Since the proposed framework is flexible to model
any OOK signal with any duty cycle, it is possible to define and obtain
the leakage capacity by collecting the statistics about timing variation,
insertions, and deletions.
6.4.2 EM-Based Covert Channels
EM covert channels are a consequence of computer activities and their ef-
fects on EM fields. By measuring the variation in the EM field, it is possible
to steal information from a distance [5, 21, 59, 93]. Requiring no direct ac-
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cess to the system and having larger available frequency band can be listed
as the main advantages of these channels over other covert channels. In
this section, we consider two channel types that exploit the variation in
EM field caused by different units of a modern computer system.
EM-Based Covert Channels Due to Processor Activities
It is already shown that a covert channel can be generated by running a
microbenchmark that causes systematic changes in the surrounding EM
field, and a motivated attacker can monitor these changes to infer the
transmitted bits [3, 21]. An example of the generated signal is given in Fig.
6.6. The main observation is that similar to the power covert channels,
the received signal displays OOK structure, but suffers from variation in
signaling time.
Figure 6.6: Received signal generated by the covert channel in [21]. The
black (solid) curve represents the measured signal and the red (dotted)
curve is for the modeled signal.
Considering the same arguments with power based covert channels, we
can see that the proposed model can explain the leakage in the worst-case
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scenario for a given design. To achieve our goal, the critical step is to ob-
tain the variable values for deletion, insertion, T , and the distribution for
the effective variation. Then, the proposed methodology can be utilized to
assess the resilience of a system against EM-based covert channels.
EM-Covert Channels Based on Power Management Units
These covert channels are generated by exploiting power management
units (PMU) and voltage regulator module (VRM) of modern computers.
PMU is responsible for power alteration to optimize the power consump-
tion of the system. Since the priority of designers is to minimize the con-
sumption of power, not security, they do not put enough effort on the
security aspect of their design. By leveraging such a security flaw, a covert
channel that transmits sensitive information from air-gapped computers
is generated in [5].
Figure 6.7: Received signal generated by the covert channel in [5]. The
black (solid) curve represents the measured signal and the red (dotted)
curve is for the modeled signal.
To transmit information, a microbenchmark is designed causing changes
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in the power state of a system. An example of the demodulated signal for
the covert channel is given in Fig. 6.7. The main observation here is that
the received signals are active for a while even for the off case. However,
this is also included in the proposed model since we do not restrict T 0 to be
zero. Furthermore, this channel suffers from insertions, deletions and sig-
naling time variation as previously considered covert channels. Although
the received signal is not a perfect square signal, the proposed method-
ology can be exploited to calculate the leakage limit assuming distortions
are due to additive channel noise.
6.4.3 Backscattering Covert Channels
This covert channel is created by deliberately exploiting the recently intro-
duced backscattering side-channel. It exploits circuits as a semi-passive
RFID and relies on switching activities on the level of transistor gates (be-
tween low and high states). The switching activities change the impedance
of circuits, hence, the circuit behaves as an RFID tag. For example, by
utilizing this channel, circuits with Trojans are identified because the
backscattered signals show different characteristics due to change in the
impedance of the circuits [94]. Although there is no registered attack, or
a paper investigating attack scenarios based on these channels, we still
consider this channel to obtain its capacity because impedance change
can result in exfiltration of some sensitive information.
An example of the received signal for the backscattering covert channel
is given in Fig. 6.8. The same characteristic features with other covert
channels, i.e., insertions, deletions, timing variation, are observed as well.
Therefore, the proposed methodology can calculate the maximum leakage
(or information transfer) given that the statistics about deletion, insertion,
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Figure 6.8: Received signal generated by the covert channel in [95]. The
black (solid) curve represents the measured signal and the red (dotted)
curve is for the modeled signal.
and timing distribution are known.
6.4.4 Cache-Based Covert Channels
To improve the performance of a computer system by reducing the effective
main memory latencies originating from data accesses, faster hardware
caches are used for storing the frequently used data. Based on the speed of
the caches, they are divided into levels i.e., L1, L2, etc., where the highest
cache level i.e. L1 is the smallest, fastest and closest to the processor,
and subsequent lower levels are placed closer to the main memory with
varying higher latencies. Thus, more recent and/or frequent the data is,
the higher it will placed in the cache levels.
The cache-based covert channel attacks exploit this difference in data
access time to steal sensitive information of a victim. For example, based
on the time differences in recalling cache entries, secret keys of different
cryptosystems are broken [37, 38]. We need to note here that the recall
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time can be used not only for evil purposes. For example, a methodology
is proposed in [96] to profile the memory access that does not cause any
overhead on the system. The method exploits emanated EM signals for
performance analysis, and provides statistical information on the recall
time of the system.
The question here is that how the proposed method can model the cache
based covert channels since the only data collected during these attacks is
the recall time. Let us start with the following observation: These attacks
request recall time at every pre-defined time interval. In our case, this
pre-defined interval is equivalent to T . Moreover, the recall time can be
considered as the output of the receiver after filtering with mc(t). Let TR
be the current recall time of an experiment or attack. If we assume the
transmitted signal, TS(t), is a pulse function whose width and amplitude
are equivalent to the recall time and
√
T with a random shift, we have

































t′ = max((n− 1)T , (n− 1)T + td)
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and td is the time shift. Since the output is equivalent to TR, our model
can represent the cache based covert channels with the assumed trans-
mitter and receiver. Please also observe that the recall time varies at each
operation, and that is represented by the timing distribution in the model.
Another observation is that based on these transmitter and receiver as-
sumptions, the additive channel noise power is equivalent to zero, and all
of the effective noise is represented by the jitter noise. Finally, cache-based
covert channels generally suffer from deletions and insertions, which is
also considered in the proposed model. Therefore, the proposed method-
ology can calculate the leakage capacity of these channels if the required
statistics are available.
6.5 Experimental Setups and Results
In this section, we first provide signaling time distributions for various
covert channels to demonstrate that assuming normal distribution with
a specified mean and standard deviation is a valid assumption, and then
provide the capacity results for these channels.
For the experiments, the devices we consider are an Altera NIOS-II
processor with a commercial Terassic DE1 SoC board [85], an OlinuX-
ino board [87] which has a modern Cortex A8 ARM core with two levels
of caches, 4 MB main memory that is commonly used in factory lines,
etc., and a Dell Precision 7730 laptop [97]. The antennas to collect em-
anated signals can be listed as a high-gain custom-made disk-array based
antenna [89], near EM field probes [98], a power rail probe [99], a horn
antenna [88] and a lab-made near field probe. We record the signals using
a spectrum analyzer (Agilent MXA N9020A) [100].
The first goal of these experiments is to collect data while transmitting
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(a) EM based covert channel [19]. (b) Based on power unit management [5].
(c) Backscatter covert channels [95].
(d) Power covert channels [29]. (e) Cache based covert channels [37, 96].
Figure 6.9: Experimental setups for the measurements.
bits to experimentally obtain the distribution of Tx for both bits. In that re-
spect, we follow the experiments done in [3] for EM, [5] for power unit, [95]
for backscattering, and [37, 96] for cache-based covert channels. For the
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(a) EM based covert channel [19]. (b) Based on power unit management [5].
(c) Backscatter covert channels [95].
(d) Power covert channels [29]. (e) Cache based covert channels [37, 96].
Figure 6.10: Distributions for the signaling time for various covert chan-
nels.
power covert channel, we collect the signal from a capacitor while running
the code given in [69] and following the attack scenario given in [29]. The
setup for all these measurements are given in Fig. 6.9. For more accu-
rate distribution results of Tx, we collect signals closer to the device under
inspection, and then perform an edge detection to obtain the width of the
pulses. Empirical cumulative distribution functions (CDF) of bit-1 for vari-
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Table 6.1: Parameters utilized for the leakage capacities for covert chan-
nels.
Parameter Power Power Unit EM Backscatter Cache
T 50 0.5 3 20 2
T 1 10 0.4 1.5 10 0.15
T 0 0 0.2 0 0 0
µ0 0.12 0.03 0.14 1.02 ≈ 0
µ1 -0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.1
σ0 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.66 ≈ 0
σ1 0.29 0.02 0.02 0.66 0.04
Unit ms ms ms µs µs
ous covert channels are given in Fig. 6.10. Furthermore, in this figure, we
provide CDF of normal distributions that are fitted to these data. As seen
from these figures, the signaling time distributions have a Gaussian char-
acteristic, which means the assumption in Section 6.2 holds. Actually, the
assumption is also supported by Law of Large numbers [101] because of
ubiquitous software activities.
The experimental variables required for the leakage capacity calcula-
tion for the experiments are given in Table 6.1. Here, σ0 and σ1 represent
standard deviations of the signaling time (σx) when bit-0 and bit-1 are
transmitted, respectively. Since the performance of these covert chan-
nels, in terms of bandwidth, noise characteristics, etc., are different from
each other, we choose different transmission time for more reliable results.
For example, in the literature, the reported transmission rates for various
covert channel attacks vary from 5 bit/s to a couple of kbits/s [102, 4, 56,
5].
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(a) EM based covert channel [19]. (b) Based on power unit management [5].
(c) Backscatter covert channels [95].
(d) Power covert channels [29]. (e) Cache based covert channels [37, 96].
Figure 6.11: Bit/Channel Use for various covert channels.
The leakage capacities as the result of the optimization problem given
in Section 6.3 are provided in Fig. 6.11 and Fig. 6.12. In the first figure,
we provide the results in terms of Bit/Channel-Use [15] to show whether
maximum gain from each bit transmission can be achieved at any SNR.
The figures contain behavior of maximum leakage as the sum of deletion
and insertion, pc, changes. For a fair comparison of channel capacity for












(a) EM based covert channel [19]. (b) Based on power unit management [5].
(c) Backscatter covert channels [95].
(d) Power covert channels [29]. (e) Cache based covert channels [37, 96].
Figure 6.12: Bit per second (Bps) for various covert channels.
We observe that the maximum gain is only possible if there is no inser-
tion and deletion, and the communication takes place in high SNR, which
is an unrealistic scenario because of unintentional nature of covert chan-
nels. However, it does not mean that systems are secure enough against
these channels. If the attacker can establish a longer connection, even
transmission with slow data rate could be a disaster. For example, if SNR
is 5 dB, and pc = 0.8, a communication with at least 0.1 Bit/Channel-Use
could be possible for any given covert channel. Considering the attacker
aims to steal some passwords, credit card information, etc., even this rate
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could be severe enough. In the second figure, we provide the results in
terms of Bit-per-second (Bps). The goal of providing this result is to show
that although leakage capacity is small in terms of Bit/Channel-Use, hun-
dreds of information bits can be transmitted in a second through these
channels. For example, when Fig. 6.11(e) is compared with the rest of
covert channels, we can conclude that it is the most inefficient channel
for an attacker. However, Fig. 6.12(e) demonstrates that this channel can
achieve higher data rates than others.
Another interesting observation here is that although all but cache-
based covert channels achieve almost the maximum gain in terms of Bit/
Channel -Use for high SNR, the cache-based covert channel converges to
0.6 Bit/Channel-Use. The reason is higher signaling time deviation when
a cache-miss occurs. This introduces powerful jitter noise to the system,
which could not be removed even the attacker measures the signal when
SNR=∞. This result shows that the signaling time variation causes an
additive noise which decreases the transmission rate further.
Finally, in Fig. 6.13, we provide the same results with Fig. 6.11 for
backscattering and cache-based covert channels to observe the behavior in
a 3-D surface plot. These figures reveal the general behavior of the worst-
case leakage scenario through different covert channels. As said before,
we observe that the characteristic of the cache-based covert channel is
different than other covert channels. Here, as the representative of other
covert channels, we provide the result for backscattering covert channels.
Our observation here is that the decrease in the leakage capacity of cache-
based covert channel is sharper in both pc and SNR directions than the
backscattering channel due to jitter noise. However, both figures illustrate
the possibility of severe information leakages through covert channels.
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(a) Backscatter covert channels [95].
(b) Cache based covert channels [37, 96].
Figure 6.13: Bit/Channel Use while pc and SNR vary.
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Finally, we compare our capacity results with the results given in [21].
In that paper, capacity bounds for the leakage capacity are provided. To
compare our results with these bounds, we need to assume there is no
deletion, the signal deviation for both bits are same with zero mean be-
cause the bounds are obtained when there is no deletion, and the signal-
ing variation has zero mean with fixed standard deviation irrespective of
bits. In Fig. 6.14, we provide the upper and lower bounds in [21], and
the proposed leakage capacity for EM covert channel. We observe that our
leakage capacity lies within the region defined by the bounds, and closer
to the upper bound. We conclude that the decrease in the leakage capacity
is much less than the decrease in the lower bound in [21] as the insertion
probability increases.
Figure 6.14: The proposed leakage capacity and bounds given in [21] while
SNR changes.
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Although all these results demonstrate the possible threat through these
covert channels, the methodology in this chapter can be utilized by de-
signers to make their systems more resilient to covert channels. In the
design-stage, designers can collect the statistics for pc, and estimate signal
power that can be generated by any covert channel attack. Then, SNR vs.
leakage capacity analysis can be done by solving the optimization problem
given in Section 6.3. If the leakage is zero or very close to zero at the tar-
geted SNR, they can conclude their system is secure enough. Otherwise,
they need to modify their design to protect privacy of their customer.
6.6 Summary
As the systems get more mobile, the likelihood that an attacker and a vic-
tim to be in the same place increases. Although there are many defense
mechanisms, attacks based on covert channels can circumvent and break
the existing protection because these channels are a consequence of com-
puting, and not intended for a conventional communication.
In this chapter, we proposed a methodology to estimate the worst-case
information leakage through various covert channels. We showed that the
method can be adopted to both analog and digital covert channels. To
mimic the losses due to software activities, we first modeled the commu-
nication channel as a deletion-insertion channel. Then, we introduced the
jitter noise that is an extra source for additive white noise. This jitter noise
is a result of signaling time variation due to stalls, interrupts, optimiza-
tion, etc., which conventional communication systems do not suffer. We
showed that these noise sources can be combined and called effective ad-
ditive noise. Secondly, based on the effective noise, we modeled the com-
munication channel between the receiver (an attacker) and transmitter (a
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victim). Then, we defined the channel capacity as the maximum leakage
for a given covert channel. Finally, we provide experimental results for
various covert channels to show that the proposed model is an effective
and a general method to attain the resilience of a given system.
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CHAPTER 7
A MICROARCHITECTURE-LEVEL MODELING ELECTROMAGNETIC
SIDE-CHANNEL SIGNALS
7.1 Overview
Side-channel attacks have become a serious security concern for comput-
ing systems, especially for embedded devices, where the device is often
located in, or in close proximity to, a public place, and yet the system
contains sensitive information. To design systems that are highly resilient
to such attacks, an accurate and efficient design-stage quantitative anal-
ysis of side-channel leakage is needed. For many system properties (e.g.,
performance,power, etc.), cycle-accurate simulation can provide such an
efficient-yet-accurate design-stage estimate. Unfortunately, for an impor-
tant class of side-channels, electromagnetic emanations, such a model
does not exist, and there has not even been much quantitative evidence
about what level of modeling detail (e.g., hardware, micro-architecture,
etc.) would be needed for high accuracy. Please remember that EM side-
channel signals are created due to bit-flips at the transistor-level [26, 3].
In principle, all transistors and metal-layer interconnect components con-
tribute to the signal, thus the signal could be modeled using all transistors
and on-chip wires as predictor variables, which should be highly accurate
but is practically infeasible. As a result, the main challenge in model-
building is to select (or discard) potential predictors in a systematic man-
ner, to achieve a trade-off where feasibility (or even efficiency) is achieved
without a major sacrifice in accuracy.
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To achieve a simple yet accurate model, existing methods are mainly fo-
cused on individual instructions and their operands, and they attribute an
“average” behavior to each of the instructions, rather than model its cycle-
by-cycle effect on the processor’s hardware. In effect, these methods model
a simplified one-instruction-at-a-time implementation, essentially ignoring
pipeline effects and other important aspects of the micro-architecture.
In this chapter, we introduce EMSim which is a tool to simulate em-
anated EM signals from devices [23]. For more accurate EM signal simula-
tion, we model micro-architectural components as independent sources
of EM emanations and then further group these units in each pipeline
stage as an individual source. We used pipeline stages as the sources
mainly because we observed that each instruction has different footprint
in each cycle, and the side-channel generated at each cycle is a combina-
tion of these activities in ALL stages. Using this methodology, we model a
multi-input (pipeline stages), single-output (EM signal) system (MISO).
Leveraging this approach, the main contributions of this chapter are to
• Model the signal for individual sources,
• Establish a connection between MISO systems and mixture of signals
due to execution of instructions at pipeline stages.
In that respect, we first describe the experimental methodology for ob-
taining EM signals generated by actual hardware, introduce the single
instruction signal model, provide the MISO model for the signal mixtures,
and finally demonstrate experimental results which show great consis-
tency with the theoretical work.
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7.2 Experimental Methodology for Signal Acquisition
While signals can be collected from an actual off-the-shelf processor, such
a processor would be difficult to model in detail because many of its mi-
croarchtiectural details (of even entire microarchitectrual blocks) are not
publicly available, and unceratinty about how well the model used in EM-
Sim matches the actual microarchitecture would make direct comparison
of real and simulated signals difficult. Therefore, we implement a RISC-
V [103] processor on an FPGA (using Verilog), giving us full knowledge of
the actual microarchitecture of the processor [23]. The designed proces-
sor has five pipeline stages namely: Fetch, Decode, Execute, Memory,
and Writeback.
Using the implemented processor, we then use a magnetic probe and
a signal acquisition device (an oscilloscope) to receive and record the EM
signals (more details on Section 7.5.1).
7.2.1 Signal Acquisition
Capturing the emanated signal is the first step to properly modeling the
signal. Unfortunately, measuring the ideal emanated signal (i.e., not cor-
rupted by additive channel white noise) is not possible if only one-time-
run of any instruction sequence is considered. One option is to collect
many one-time-run signals and take the average. The problem with this
approach is capturing synchronized signals, i.e., the starting points of cap-
tured signals may not correspond to the same processing-time of the given
instruction sequence. To address this problem, we use a novel signal-
processing method called “modulo operation” [67] to create a highly ac-
curate estimate of the ideal emanated signal, i.e., to remove most of the
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noise and distortion that was present in the actual signal due to under-
sampling, synchronization, noise, and other imperfections that are un-
avoidable during practical collection of signals (Please see Appendix G).
The main parameters for the modulo operation are the number of clock
cycles to execute a given sequence, noc, the sampling-rate of the instru-
ment, and the clock frequency of the device. After having these param-
eters, the next step is to collect the emanated signal. For that, a given
sequence is executed several times (1000 times in our measurements).
Each set of measurements consists of a sequence of instructions (called
sequence). The goal is to retrieve the emanated signal for the sequence.
The next step is to utilize the modulo operation to map each received
samples to average these many measurements. Assuming Ts is the total
time to execute the sequence once (i.e., Ts = noc × Tclk), it applies the fol-
lowing operation to the sampling time of each sample to map each sample
to its fundamental period:
∆m = mod(Tm, Ts), (7.1)
where Tclk is the clock time, ∆m is called the modular offset, and Tm is
the sampling time of mth sample. After obtaining the modular offsets for
each sample, the modulo operation takes the mean of the samples that
have same modular offset, to produce the desired signal. Further signal-
processing techniques such as moving average, Gaussian filtering, etc.,




Simulating an analog signal can be considered a signal-processing re-
construction problem where a continuous signal (i.e., EM in this case)
needs to be determined from a sequence of equally-spaced samples with
sampling-rate T , where T is preferably much smaller than Tclk. Such a
signal can be ideally reconstructed using Whittaker-Shannon interpola-
tion formula [104], however, it is well-known that such a method is not
feasible in practice. Instead, a popular method for signal reconstruction
is zero-order hold (ZOH) technique where a continuous signal, y, can be
reconstructed from a sample sequence x[n], assuming one sample per time










To improve the ZOH accuracy, in this chapter we make an observation
that switching activity in a processor is synchronized to its clock and most
of the switching happens right after the positive/negative edge of the clock.
Thus, instead of using a rectangular function (which implies that activity
is evenly spread over a cycle), a decaying function can be used:
f1(t) = e
−θtu(t), (7.3)
where θ is a positive normalization factor that changes the width of the
signal, and u(t) is the unit step function. Substituting rect() in Equ. 7.2 by




x[n]× e−θ(t−nT ) × u(t− nT ). (7.4)
However, we observed that the received signal is also exposed to oscilla-
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tions with decreasing magnitude. To meet the requirements for both oscil-
lations and decreasing amplitude, combining sinusoidal with exponential
can increase the accuracy further:
f(t) = sin(2πt/T0)× e−θt × u(t), (7.5)
where T0 is the periodicity of the sinus function. Again, substituting rect()














Figure 7.1: Reconstructing the original signal using three different ap-
proaches. Using a combination of a sinusoidal and an exponential func-
tion (f(t) in Equ. 7.5) can achieve the best accuracy.
In Figure 7.1, we plot a measured signal and its reconstructions with
these options. We observe that f(t) explains the behavior of the received
signal much better. Thus, by finding x[n] for each cycle and using Equ. 7.6,
the analog side-channel signal can be modeled.
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7.4 EMSim Modeling
7.4.1 Signal Amplitude for Individual Sources
In practice, there are two contributors in creating EM side-channel signals
for each pipeline stage. The first group of contributors, which we call
instruction-dependent activities, are caused by the switching activities of
micro-architectural units (e.g., register-file, ALU, etc.) that are utilized in
that stage (e.g., whether the register-file is being written or not).
The second group, data-dependent activities, are created due to bit-flips
on the data-bus, address-bus, and any other registers that hold operand’s
values. These bit-flips are independent from the instruction-type but are
dependent to the previous state of the bus. In the following, we will de-
scribe how we independently measure each of these two groups.
Instruction-Dependent Activities. To independently measure these groups,
we first minimize the effect of the data-dependent activities by setting all
the operands, addresses, and immediate values to zero. This approach
enables us to measure the baseline signal for each stage which is only
created by the switching activities of the micro-architectural units used in
that stage.
After decoupling the data-related activities from the signal, the second
challenge is to minimize the effects of other stages on the generated EM
signal. Recall that we mentioned ALL pipeline stages contribute to the
overall signal, however, ideally we want to be able to measure the effect
of each stage separately so that we can use them as the basic-blocks to
reconstruct the overall signal. To achieve that, we use NOP instruction

















Figure 7.2: The signal amplitude for an ADD as it progress in the pipeline
(while all other instructions are NOP). The actual signal is shown in light
color (green). Darker color (black) shows the simulated signal when consid-
ering each pipeline stage as a separate source (top), and when considering
the entire processor as a single source (bottom), and the largest differences
between the two are pointed out using red ellipses.
then create NOP → inst → NOP instruction sequence (for all instructions),
while operands for inst are all set to r1 (and r1 = 0). Using this method, no
data/operand-dependent bit-flips are created, but register-file, ALU, etc.
may be used (depending on the instruction type). We then measure the
signal amplitude for all instructions and every pipeline stages. We call this
baseline hardware amplitude or A.
Figure 7.2 shows how the (actual) EM signal (shown in green/light
color) changes as an ADD instruction progresses through the pipeline while
all the other instructions are NOP. Using Equ. 7.6 and NOP→ inst→ NOP
instruction sequence, we used our simulator to generate the signal. Fur-
ther, to show why individual stages should be modeled separately, Fig-
ure 7.2 (bottom) shows the simulated signal when the “average” amplitude
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is used for all stages. As can be seen, failing to model each stage individu-
ally (as used in previous work [105]) can lead to significant inaccuracies in
some stages (note that using max instead of average also leads to similar
inaccuracies).
Data-Dependent Activities. Once the baseline amplitude is measured,
the next step is to find how this amplitude changes as the number of bit-
flips changes due to value/operand used in the instruction and the previ-
ous state of the bus/register. Intuitively, the more bit-flips, the higher the
amplitude should be thus we define activity-factor, α, as a scaling factor
to the baseline activity, A. To find α, we first treat each bit-flip equally,
and assume that each bit-flip has similar effect on the signal amplitude.
We then calculate α as:




where flipsnew is the total number of flips for the current instruction, flipsbase
is the total number of flips when previous instruction is NOP, and flips total is
the maximum possible number of flips for the current instruction. Using
this equation, we then define A′ = α× A, and use it to simulate the signal.
Figure 7.3 (bottom) shows the original signal (shown in light green), and
the simulated signal using this approach (shown in black) for the similar
NOP→ inst→ NOP instruction sequence discussed in the previous section.
As can be seen in the figure (bottom), this “averaging” modeling can not ac-
curately predict the amplitude of the signal which indicates that not all the
bit-flips have the similar impact on the amplitude. Our further investigation
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(low activity)
      ADD 
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Figure 7.3: Effect of the activity factor on the amplitude. The actual signal
shown in green. The simulation is shown in black when activity factor is
modeled using a linear regression model (top) and when an average activity
is used (bottom).
the ALU and memory have the most significant impacts on the signal. We
believe this difference is mainly due to the different physical parameters of
transistors and/or lengths of the connecting wires.
Using this observation, to systematically calculate the activity factors,
we use a linear regression model:
α = δ + T × c+ ε, (7.8)
where T is a vector of transition bits across all the existing registers in
the targeted pipeline stage, δ and ε are the vector of scalar intercept and
error terms respectively, and c is the vector of activity factors to be pre-
dicted by the model. As mentioned before, α is the scaling factor for the
baseline amplitude, A, thus α = Ameas/Asimul. Note that to find T , a de-
tailed micro-architecture model is needed to track all the bit-flips for every
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gate in the processor (except cache/memory). However, to significantly
reduce the complexity and simulation time, the size of T can be reduced
using the step-wise regression method [106] where, iteratively, the size
of the fitted model (i.e., α and T in our case) is reduced using standard
statistical metrics such as F-tests [106]. In other words, since not all the
bit-flips have statistically significant impact on the emanated signal, the
non-contributing factors can/should be removed from the model. In our
processor, using this method we managed to reduce the size of T by more
than 65%.
Figure 7.3 (top) shows the simulated signals when the linear regression
(LR) model is used for activity factors. Compared to the averaging method
(bottom), using LR has significantly improved the simulation accuracy.
7.4.2 Multi-Input Modeling
Once the signal amplitude for individual sources are calculated, the next
step is to combine the signals generated by these individual sources to cre-
ate the simulated EM signal. In principle, the generated EM signal is the
superposition of individual waves thus depending on each source’s phase,
the superposition of each pair can be either constructive or destructive.
Using this fact, the overall signal can be approximated as a linear combi-
nation of these individual sources where the coefficients may vary between
±1, depending on the phases.
Due to the complex nature of the generated EM signals, accurately mod-
eling each and every source mathematically is significantly time-consuming
and often infeasible in practice. To tackle this problem and find coeffi-
cients for each source, a model-fitting approach can be used. We use a



















Figure 7.4: An example of how individual sources (pipeline stages) are
combined to form the final signal. Top: how the actual EM signal looks like
when the instructions are executed in isolation (NOP, inst, NOP). Bot-
tom: The actual EM signal when the instruction sequence is NOP, ADD,
SHIFT, NOP (i.e., a combination of multiple instruction in the pipeline).
we use:
X = δs + (αA)×M + εs, (7.9)
where αA is the vector of individual sources amplitudes (α is the activity
factor and A is the baseline amplitude), δ and ε are the intercept and error
vectors, M is the predicted coefficients, and X is the final amplitude which
will be used in (7.6) to simulate the signal.
Figure 7.4 shows an example of how two individual sources are com-
bined in each cycle to form the final signal. Figure 7.4 (top) shows ADD and
SHIFT instructions when they are executed in isolation (i.e., NOP, inst,
NOP), and Figure 7.4 (bottom) shows how the final signal looks like when
the executed sequence is NOP, ADD, SHIFT, NOP. Specifically, cycle 6 is
when the ADD instruction is in WB stage and SHIFT is in MEM, and the re-
sulting signal is a linear combination of these two sources. Note that to
find M , we need to measure all the possible combinations of the entire
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instructions in the ISA, however, as we will show in Section 5, the num-
ber of required measurements can be significantly reduced using standard
clustering algorithms.
7.5 Evaluations
We divide our evaluations into two main parts. First to show the cor-
rectness, accuracy, and robustness of our simulator, we present our ex-
perimental evaluations on how well the simulated signal matched with
the original side-channel signal generated by the target hardware for ALL
possible combinations of the instructions. We then explore the impact of
variations such as manufacturing, environmental, etc. on the accuracy of
EMSim.
The second part of our evaluations (presented in Section 7.6.2) is fo-
cused on the EMSim use-cases and its application in different domains
such as security, debugging, etc.
7.5.1 Evaluating Model Accuracy
Setup. We implemented a RISC-V based processor on a Terrasic DE0-
CV board with an Altera Cyclone-V FPGA [107] with 50 MHz clock-rate.
To record side-channel signals, we used a Keysight digital oscilloscope
(DSOS804A), with 1 GHz bandwidth and 10 GSa/s rate. We further stud-
ied the effect of changing the sampling-rate on the accuracy and found that
similar accuracy can be achieved with much lower sampling-rate (about
200 MSa/s in our measurements). As a result, similar results can be
achieved using a less expensive device (e.g., TBS1032B Tektronix Digital
Oscilloscope [108] costs around $300) and/or a high sampling-rate device
can be used for modeling devices with faster clock-rates. To receive EM
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Cluster Type Inst. No. Inst.
1 ALU ADD,XOR,JAL, ... 13
2 Shift SLLI,SRT, SRA, ... 10
3 MUL/DIV MUL, DIV, REM, ... 8
4 Load LB, LW, LH, ... 5
5 Store SB, SH, SW 3
6 Cache LB, LW, LH, ... 5
7 Branch BEQ, BLT, BGE, ... 6
Table 7.1: RISC-V (R32IM) instruction-set and their cluster used in this
chapter.
signals, we used a magnetic probe [98], placed 5 cm above the FPGA.
Model Building. In Section 7.3, we discussed that in order to fit a model,
ALL possible combinations of instructions should be measured (i.e., about
three hundred million combinations in RISC-V ISA). Clearly such a re-
quirement makes the model building extremely time-consuming in prac-
tice. However, intuitively, we expect instructions with similar behaviors
(e.g., ALU-type, memory-type, etc.) have similar side-channel signals since
they share identical hardware activities. Using this intuition, we used the
hierarchical agglomerative algorithm [109] with the cross-correlation as the
distance metric to cluster instructions with similar EM pattern into a same
cluster. We found that RISC-V ISA can be clustered into 7 categories (when
the operands are similar) where a single instruction in each category can
be a representative of all instructions in that category.
These categories are shown in Table 7.1. Using this table, we then
used only a representative instruction of the cluster for model building
which, in turn, reduce the model building complexity significantly. In
our setup, the number of measurements was reduced from 300 million to
only 16 thousands. Note that while the clustering algorithm did not use
the micro-architecture model as a prior knowledge, the clusters confirmed
that instructions with similar micro-architecture activities should be clus-
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tered in a same group.
Metric. To measure how well the simulated signals “match” with the real
signals, we leverage normalized cross-correlation as our metric. To com-
pute that, we first normalize both signals, real and simulated, to have
similar average. We then divide each signal to individual clock cycles, and
then compare each cycle (between the simulated and the real signals) us-
ing cross-correlation as the distance metric. We then define accuracy as
the average of this cross-correlation across all cycles for all measurements
(i.e., we were able to match the waveform in this degree across all possi-
ble instruction sequences). Note that we specifically used this approach
to show how well the time-domain signal matches with the original signal
instead of relying on a specific leakage metric such as Hamming weight.
However, to show the usefulness and versatility of our tool, those results
will be shown in the next section.
Benchmark. To prove that our approach provides accurate simulated sig-
nals for ALL possible instruction combinations thus can be applicable
to ANY complex program that uses the mixture of the implemented ISA
(R32IM), we created a microbenchmark using all possible combinations
of the representative instructions shown in Table 7.1. Particularly, for a
5-stage pipeline and 7 distinct clusters, there are 75 = 16807 possible com-
binations that can appear together (in the pipeline) in a cycle. We created
a program to generate all these combinations with random operands. We
then manually modified branch instructions and assigned the target ad-
dress and branch condition to create loops with random instruction and
iteration sizes. To limit the execution time, we then randomly put these










Figure 7.5: A comparison between the signal generated by a real hardware
(top) and the simulated signal (bottom) in EMSim.
each group which were executed one after another similar to a real pro-
gram). To cover all the combinations, 17 of such groups were needed (no
two groups were similar). We then executed these randomly-generated
groups on the processor normally, and recorded the real and simulated
signals. To further prove the validity and correctness of our simulator, we
also randomly created another 17 groups, this time from all instructions
in the ISA and not just the representatives.
Results. Using these 34 groups/applications described above, we then
compared the simulated signals with the actual ones using the our metric
defined earlier. Each group/application takes about 9000 cycles to finish
on average. The execution-time varied depending on the instructions used
and microarchitectural events.
Figure 7.5 shows the simulated and actual EM-side-channel signals
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for one of the groups tested in our evaluation (for clarity, only the first
50 cycles are shown in the figure). As can be seen from the figure, the
simulated signal matches the real signal with high accuracy. We found
that, on average, EMSim has about 94.1% accuracy in simulating side-
channel signals across all possible instruction combinations.
7.5.2 Effects of Distance
Transferring the ideas from communication theory literature, to find the
effect of the distance (i.e., the position of the probe and its distance to the
center of borad) on each source, a parameter, called loss-coefficient or β,
can be considered as the channel coefficient of a flat-fading channel. Here,
we need to note that, regardless of the position of the probe, the baseline
amplitude, A, can not be measured solely because we do not have any
control on the power distribution of the board for each instruction at each
pipeline stage. Hence, the resulting signal power is always a combination
of the actual signal amplitude and the corresponding loss coefficient (i.e.,
Aβ). However, to deal with this problem, we choose the probe’s location
at the center of the processor as the base point, and define β0 as the loss
coefficient at this point. Further denoting A0 is the actual emanated signal
amplitude, we assume the amplitude of the signal can be written as A =
A0β0 with respect to the base point. Therefore, with these assumptions, β
is assumed to be one for all the measurements done in this section.
To further investigate the effect of β on the amplitude, we measured the
signal (with the same input trace) at a different location, and compared the
results with the base case. Figure 7.6 illustrates the effect of the antenna
location on the loss coefficient factor β. Here, the training signals for the
reconstruction are obtained from the base measurement, and the figure
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Figure 7.6: Effect of distance on the signal amplitude. For both figures,
the plots with darker color correspond to reconstructed signal, and the
other ones correspond to the original signal.
at the bottom is obtained by neglecting the effect of β (i.e., β = 1) during
the simulation. The figure at the top is generated by solving the same
linear regression model given in Equ. 7.9, this time by substituting A by
Aβ, where β is not constrained to one any more (while A is the signal
obtained in the base case). We can conclude that considering the effect
of β is crucial to explain the changes due to antenna location since better
correlation and root mean square results are obtained with the adjusted β.
Note that, adjusting the β is only required during the model building (i.e.,
during measurements if the position of the probe changes), however, the
user of the tool does not require to change/adjust β for his/her leakage
estimation and can use the base case or numerous cases (depending on
the availability) to obtain an “average” leakage estimation, or “worst” case
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for β = 1.
7.6 Practical Use-cases for EMSim
This section describes several example use cases for EMSim ’s ability to
accurately simulate side-channel signals.
7.6.1 Side-Channel Leakage Estimation
An important step for defending against side-channel attacks (SCA) is esti-
mating how much (sensitive) information can be possibly leaked (through
a specific or set of side-channels) during the execution of an application.
To estimate this leakage, different metrics can be used. Particularly, for
EM side-channels one of the state-of-the-art methods is Signal Available
to Attacker (SAVAT) [51] methodology.
Due to the lack of simulation tools, to properly calculate these met-
rics, several actual measurements should be performed. Unfortunately,
these measurements often require sophisticated equipment and experts
with various skills which, in turn, makes them expensive and difficult in
practice. Using our approach, however, we show that EMSim is capa-
ble of generating highly-accurate simulated signals which can be used to
calculate these metrics precisely which eliminates the need for an actual
measurement infrastructure.
The following describes how EMSim can be used to obtain SAVAT val-
ues. It is important to mention that unlike prior work [105, 110, 111, 112],
EMSim is NOT limited to a specific metric or analysis, and it can be used for
ANY analysis based on the EM signal.
Signal Available to Attacker (SAVAT). This metric measures the side-
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LDM LDC NOP ADD MUL DIV
R S R S R S R S R S R S
LDM 0.02 0 3.71 3.91 5.34 5.32 5.24 5.20 5 5.02 4.98 4.98
LDC 3.72 3.91 0.04 0 0.81 0.85 0.74 0.74 0.21 0.24 0.21 0.23
NOP 5.35 5.32 0.8 0.86 0.01 0 0.08 0.1 0.67 0.69 0.66 0.69
ADD 5.24 5.20 0.74 0.75 0.07 0.1 0.03 0 0.98 1.05 1.03 1.1
MUL 4.98 5.01 0.22 0.21 0.66 0.68 0.94 1 0.03 0 0.04 0.01
DIV 4.97 4.99 0.21 0.21 0.65 0.68 1.05 1.13 0.03 0.01 0.02 0
Table 7.2: Signal Available to Attacker metric [51] for Real measurements
(R) and Simulations (S).
channel signal created by a specific single-instruction difference in pro-
gram execution, i.e., the amount of signal made available to an attacker
who wishes to decide whether the program has executed instruction/event
A or instruction/event B.
To measure this metric, Callan et al. [51] developed a microbenchmark
which creates a controlled alternation between A and B instructions many
times. Such alternation creates a periodic signal with period tp = tA + tB,
where for the half of the period A is executing and for the other half B.
Such a periodic activity can then be observed in the frequency domain as
a spike at fp = 1/tp. The key insight is that the corresponding energy of
the spike (i.e., area under the curve) indicates how different A and B are
from each other (in terms of side-channel signals) hence reveals how much
signal would be available to an attacker when the difference between two
samples is whether A was executed or B.
To compute SAVAT in both real measurements and simulated signals,
we implemented the microbenchmark proposed by Callan et al. [51], and
used the setup explained in §7.5.1 to collect the signals. Table 7.2 shows
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SAVAT values in our processor for 6 pairs of instructions. As can be seen,
the values retrieved from simulations are highly matched with the values
computed using the real measurements. SAVAT can then be utilized to
reveal the information leakage capacity of the system [19].
7.6.2 Application to Debugging/Profiling
While so far we have shown how EMSim can be utilized to accurately model
EM side-channel signals and thus can be used for leakage estimation dur-
ing developing secure software, in this section, we present another poten-
tially useful use-case of EMSim and show how hardware designers and
computer architects can also leverage this framework during hardware
development.
Given that EMSim can accurately model the system for each pipeline
stage and each micro-architecture event, it can potentially be used as a
debugging tool in the chip-design flow such as a debugging tool for finding
design bugs in post-place-and-route stage and/or for finding manufactur-
ing bugs/defects in post-fabrication. In contrary with signal modeling, in
this scenario, the signals simulated by the simulator can be assumed as
the “ground-truth” or “expected” signal where the signals emanated by the
hardware have to be matched to these reference models. A deviation from
the reference model obtained by the simulations indicates that there is an
unwanted change/error in the hardware.
The main advantage of this approach compared to existing standard
testing methods is that the proposed approach is zero-overhead and does
not require any testing infrastructure on the system which, in turn, saves
a significant amount of area and reduces complexity.













Figure 7.7: A case-study to show how EMSim can be used for debugging.
The measured signal (top) does not match with the reference model ob-
tained by the simulation model (bottom) which indicates that there is a
potential error/issue in the hardware.
a scenario where there is a bug in designing a multiplier in the Execution
stage. The multiplier is designed such that it calculates the result of mul-
tiplying two 16-bits operands in three cycles where the majority of the
activity (i.e., writing the output register, etc.) takes place in the last (third)
cycle. However, as seen from the figure, the amplitude of the measured
signal (top) in the third cycle of the execution (shown in a red circle) is
significantly lower than that of in the simulation (bottom). Further in-
vestigation reveals that instead of properly multiplying two 16-bits data,
the designed multiplier only uses the lower half (i.e., 8-bit data) of each
operand and ignores the upper half of those inputs hence results in a sig-
nificantly lower activity factor and thus much smaller signal strength.
It is important to mention that this method, fundamentally, relies on
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the signal detection granularity (i.e., how fine-grained changes can be de-
tected), thus it may not be useful in cases where the change in the signal
is smaller than the algorithm’s detection granularity.
7.7 Summary
This chapter presented EMSim, an approach that enables simulation of the
EM side-channel signals cycle-by-cycle using a detailed micro-architectural
model of the device. Our evaluation of EMSim finds that its simulation-
derived signals closely matches signals measured from real hardware. To
gain further insight, we also experimentally identified how the accuracy of
the simulated signals degrades when key micro-architectural features and
other hardware behaviors are omitted from the simulation model.
We envision a variety of uses for EMSim. For hardware, software, and
compiler developers, it allows EM leakage to be quantified without having
to build actual hardware and/or actually measure signals. More impor-
tantly, it allows simulated signals to be broken down and attributed to
specific parts of the hardware and software. Furthermore, when hardware
prototypes are available, significant discrepancies between the signal gen-
erated by EMSim and actual EM emanations can be used to identify where
the actual design differs from the simulated microachitecture, which can
be used to debug the hardware and/or to refine the simulation model to
more closely match the hardware.
We believe that EMSim can be extended to more complex processors by
using a similar multi-input-single-output methodology, where each pipeline
stage acts as a single source. For out-of-order processors, we expect higher
baseline hardware amplitude for each stage as the hardware of each stage
becomes more complex. We also expect different values for activity fac-
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tors and coefficients for individual stages. Further, since an OoO proces-
sor has more shared units, to accurately model the signal, these shared
units should be carefully simulated and their signals added to each cy-
cle. Nonetheless, since the root cause of creating side-channel signals
are bit-flips at the gate-level, we do not expect any fundamental modeling
difference between in-order and OoO designs.
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CHAPTER 8
RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS AND FUTURE WORK
8.1 Research Contributions
This research investigated the severity of side/covert channels. We have
demonstrated that covert/side channels can transmit thousands of bits
per second. Considering the latest improvements that make computer
systems more mobile, attacks based on these unintended channels become
more threatening. The techniques proposed in this thesis provide a good
solution for identifying vulnerable parts of devices and a tool for designers
to test the resiliency of their systems. Hence, the assessment techniques
can be utilized to circumvent information leakage to unauthorized parties.
The research contributions of this work are:
1. We derived a mathematical relationship between electromagnetic side
channel energy (ESE) of individual instructions and the measured
pairwise side channel signal power [17, 18]. Assuming that only ex-
ecution of an instruction is the source of emanated EM signals and
instructions are ordered independently, we proposed a DMC channel
model to quantify the leakage capacity. For the transition probabil-
ities needed for estimating capacity, we utilized ESE measure. We
modified Shannon’s channel capacity theorem to address instead of
deal with the variation in execution time of instruction. After propos-
ing the model and the leakage capacity as the channel capacity of the
model, we provided an assessment technique to analyze the vulner-
ability of a system. Finally, we illustrated how the proposed method
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works by showing capacity of several practical systems.
2. A side channel information capacity created by execution of series of
instructions (e.g. a function, a procedure, or a program) in a pro-
cessor was proposed [19, 113]. Considering the structure of proces-
sor pipeline and that each program code is written systematically to
perform a specific task, we proposed Markov Source model, which
includes the dependencies that exist in instruction sequence. Emit-
ted EM signals during instruction executions were considered as the
sources for channel inputs and the states of the model were assumed
to be instructions. We derived a mathematical relationship between
the emanated instruction signal power (ESP) as it passes through
processor pipeline and total emanated signal power while running a
program to obtain the channel inputs for the proposed model. Fi-
nally, we provided experimental results to demonstrate that leakages
could be severe and that a dedicated attacker could obtain important
information.
3. An EM based covert channel was introduced as a communication
channel [20, 21, 77]. These channels are not designed to transmit
information. They are exposed errors created by 1) the transmission
environment (the transmitted signal propagates through a channel
hindered by metal and plastic), 2) varying execution time of computer
activities, and 3) insertions from other computer activities such as in-
terrupts. Considering these effects, we proposed to model the covert
channel as an insertion channel where the transmitted sequence is
a pulse amplitude modulated signal with random pulse position. We
derived capacity bounds of this covert channel with random inser-
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tion and substitution due to noise and jitter errors by utilizing the
proposed channel model. We also proposed the receiver design that
can correctly detect and demodulate computer-activity created sig-
nals. Finally, the theoretical derivations were compared to empirical
results and show agreement.
4. A generalized channel model for various covert channels was pro-
posed, which considers insertions, deletions, and asynchronous na-
ture of covert channels [22]. We defined effective channel noise af-
ter deriving that the jitter error (error due to variation in signaling
time) can be combined with additive channel noise. The derivation
requires that the signaling time distribution has a normal behavior.
In that respect, we experimentally demonstrated that the signaling
time is normally distributed with mean µ and standard deviation σ.
Based on the communication model and combined effective channel
noise, we calculated the worst-case leakage through various covert
channels. With this channel model, exact leakage capacity was ob-
tained instead of providing loose capacity bounds. We also proposed
an assessment technique for various covert channel attacks. Finally,
we provided experimental results which demonstrated the severity of
these channels and importance of including covert channel leakages
into design considerations.
5. EMSim, a simulation tool that enables estimation of the electromag-
netic side channel signals cycle-by-cycle was introduced considering
micro-architectural model of the device [23, 67]. To obtain such a
tool, the shape of the signals during execution of an instruction at
any pipeline stage was experimentally obtained, and a mathematical
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signal model that explains the mean behavior of emanated signals
was proposed. Since the collected signals were a mixture of signals
that were emitted from all pipeline stages, we proposed the chan-
nel between the processor and the antenna as a MISO channel. We
compared the simulated signals against actual EM signals emanated
from real hardware, which matched very closely. Finally, we provided
some experiments illustrating how the simulation tool can be used to
analyze system at design-stage.
8.2 Future Research Directions
Although this thesis provides leakage capacity bounds, it does not provide
any method or communication scheme that can achieve these bounds. The
main problem with side channel analysis arises especially when systems
get more complex and faster as the clock frequencies of the sophisticated
systems increase. For a proper analysis of these channels, measuring de-
vices must have lower noise levels and higher sampling rates. However,
the measuring devices with these capabilities either do not exist or are
very expensive. Therefore, new techniques have to be developed such that
the side channel analysis that can achieve capacity bounds will be possi-
ble even with much simpler measuring devices as software-defined radios
(SDR). For example, tracking executed instruction order could be an ap-
plication. As the new methods can achieve leakage capacities with less
expensive measuring devices, these channels can be the main candidate
for profiling system against malware. However, from the perspective of an
attacker, this method means a perfect opportunity to steal secret informa-
tion. Therefore, a method leads to be introduced for real-time monitoring
of instruction-level signals to analyze whether having such a leakage jeop-
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ardizes the sensitive information within the system.
Another direction related to side channels is the source separation
problem. When the measurement is done from a distance, the collected
signal contains components that are leaked from not only processor but
also other components, i.e. memory, power unit, etc. Because of destruc-
tive/constructive effect of these signals on each other, developing a source
separation algorithm can help improving insights about the system since
each source will be processed individually. This approach can be also
leveraged in profiling systems with no-overhead. Having such an informa-
tive tool, a system can be monitored to control whether it is working as it
is supposed to.
Finally, a methodology that generalizes the information obtained from
one device to estimate the behavior of others is required. The current
approaches are generally ad-hoc and specific to devices that are studied.
Hence, the same measurements have to be performed for each device to
analyze their resilience to side channels, to train a system for monitor-
ing the program activities, etc. This is because computer systems gen-
erally have different clock frequencies and operating systems, therefore,
emanated signals can show differences in terms of spectral components.
Therefore, developing a systematic mapping algorithm to estimate the be-
havior of side channel signals of a device from the signals that belong to
another type of a device can reduce training time or data collection time
extensively. Moreover, with this method, a design-stage analysis can be
done since the signal mapping will provide information about side channel
signal characteristic of a design.
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APPENDIX A
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ESE AND MEASURED SPECTRAL
POWER OF A MICROBENCHMARK
In this section, we show that ESE [X1,X2] defined in (3.1) is related to the
alternation power P (falt) as in (3.5) where s
(Xm)
m [n] denotes the sampled sig-
nal when instruction Xm is inserted into the mth loop given in Fig. 2.1. The
assumptions given in Section 3.2 will be considered through derivations.
We start by noting that the signals generated by the ESE benchmarks
can be represented as a specific mixture of two periodic signals with period
N . For n = 0, ..., N − 1, the first signal obtained from the first iteration of
the first inner loop is denoted as
ŝ
(X1)
1 = [o1[0], o1[1], · · · , o1[nO − 1], x1[0], x1[1], · · · , x1[nX − 1]]















1 [n] is periodic which leads that we also assume the additive noise are






o2[0], o2[1], · · · , o2[nO − 1], x2[0], x2[1], · · · , x2[nX − 1]
]
.
We denote the sampled voltage at the time points where instruction X1 is
active as x1[i] and the sampled voltage at the time points where instruction
X2 is active as x2[i] where i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , nX − 1}. Similarly om[n] represents
the other instructions in the benchmark necessary to make the benchmark
practical (e.g. to create a loop around instruction X1 or instruction X2) for
the mth loop.
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First, we derive the ESE between two instructions from the measure-




































1 [k]− ŝ(X2)2 [k]
)2]
(A.1)














2 [i] and om[i] = O
v + w
(O)
m [i] where w
(X1)
1 [i] ∼ N (0, σ2X1),
w
(X2)
2 [i] ∼ N (0, σ2X2), w
(O)












































1 [k]− w(O)2 [k]
)2
(A.2)
Assuming the number of samples taken during executions of instructions
are large enough, sum operations given in (A.2) can be considered as the
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1 −Xv2 )2 + nXσ2X1 + nXσ2X2 + 2nOσ2O
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. (A.3)






























































Although, we derive ESE power of two instructions in time domain,
measuring ESE of two sequences can be cumbersome because the num-
ber of samples required can be huge. In that perspective, we derive the
equation given in 3.5 which clarifies the relation between the ESE power
of two instructions and the power at falt.
To relate s(X1)1 [n] and s
(X2)
2 [n] to our benchmarks, we define a square wave
p[n] with a 50% duty cycle as
p[0 ≤ n < Nninst] = 1 (A.7)
p[Nninst ≤ n < 2Nninst] = 0, (A.8)
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where p[n], s(X1)1 [n] and s
(X2)
2 [n] are periodic with period 2Nninst, since we
assume the additive noise is also periodic. Then, we can take the discrete














1 [n] + (1− p[n])s(X2)2 [n], (A.9)
which represents the signal created by the sequence of instructions exe-
cuted by the microbenchmarks.
We start the derivation of relationship between ESE and measured
spectral power by observing that the DFS of v[n] defined in (A.9) can be
written as
V [k] = P [k] ∗ S(X1)1 [k] + (1− P [k]) ∗ S(X2)2 [k]
= S
(X2)








where ∗ denotes periodic convolution, defined as in Appendix C.
Now we consider V [1], the 2nd Fourier coefficient (the first harmonic) of
the v[n] sequence:
















Using the equation (C.3) from Appendix C, we can observe that S(X1)1 [k]






























1 [2ninst]− S(X2)2 [2ninst]
)
2Nninst
+ . . .
(A.13)
Here we note that next few higher order odd harmonics can be similarly
expanded while the even harmonics are zero. Additionally, we note that
P [k] is the kth coefficient of the discrete Fourier series for a square wave

































and noting that sin(x)/x→ 1 as x→ 0 (i.e. large ninst). Since ninst is typically
> 100, this approximation is valid. For ninst > 100, |P [1]| > 100|P [1− ninst]|, so
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the higher order terms in (A.13) can be neglected, giving
|V [1]| ≈ |P [1]|
2Nninst
·
∣∣∣S(X1)1 [0]− S(X2)2 [0]∣∣∣
⇒ π |V [1]| ≈
∣∣∣S(X1)1 [0]− S(X2)2 [0]∣∣∣ . (A.16)
The next step is to calculate the difference between S(X1)1 [0] and S
(X2)
2 [0].
Here we note that , we decompose s(X1)1 [n] = ô1[n] + i
(X1)
1 [n] where the first
N samples of ô1[n] = [o1[0], o1[1], ..., o1[nO − 1], 0, · · · , 0] and the first N sam-
ples of i(X1)1 [n] = [0, ..., 0, x1[0], x1[1], · · · , x1[nX − 1]]. We can decompose s(X2)2 [n]
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where the last equality follows the assumption that noise is also circular.















i where i ∈ {1, 2}. Therefore,
S
(X2)



















1 [l]− w(X2)2 [l]
)]
. (A.19)
Assuming nO and nX are large enough and additive noises are indepen-
dent, we have





















As the next step, we need to relate (A.20) to the power observed with
the spectrum analyzer. The power observed with the spectrum analyzer is






































As mentioned before, since working on time domain is cumbersome, our
main goal is to measure ESE in frequency domain. Therefore, using (A.23),


















P (falt) ·N · π2
2 · ninst
(A.27)
⇒ 2 · faltTIDab
R
=






P (falt) ·N · π2
2 · falt
(A.29)




where (A.28) follows the equality given in (A.23). Relating the equation in
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To simplify the notation, we define



















which can be considered as the noise term added to ESE of (X1, X2) instruc-












)2 P (falt) ·N
nX · ninst · falt
+ C(X1, X2) (A.34)
which concludes the proof.
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APPENDIX B
EXECUTION LOCATION BASED NOISE POWER ESTIMATION
In this section, we provide a method to estimate the additive noise power
corresponding to the execution location of any instruction. Note that when




















































Therefore, to obtain the noise power related to any instruction can be




























































The discrete Fourier series pair of a periodic signal x[n] with period M can












Multiplying two sequences x1[n] and x2[n] in time domain is equivalent
to their periodic convolution in the frequency domain and can be written
as [104]
x1[n]x2[n]





X1[l]X2[k − l]. (C.2)
The discrete Fourier series of a periodic signal x[n] taken over a period





















































km for k = Ll
0 for k 6= Ll
(C.3)
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GRADIENT DESCENT APPROACH FOR CAPACITY CALCULATION
In this section, we provide the gradient descent algorithm to solve the
optimization problem in (3.7). We also derive a closed form solution to
attain the probability of each instruction. First, we take the derivative of






































where Lm is the length of mth instruction, and
















































Pkpkj + 1. (D.4)
Since transition probabilities are calculated based on ESE measure-
ments as explained in Appendix 3.3.2, we can calculate entropy for each
instruction beforehand. Let Hm = −
∑
j
pmj log pmj be the entropy for the mth






























= −(Hm +Gm) Ψ + ΩLm
Ψ2
. (D.6)
Fig. D.1 delivers the insights about the algorithm to achieve the optimal
solution. In the algorithm, IK in line 12 stands for the identity matrix with
size K and sum(•) in line 13 returns the sum of its vector argument.
Another goal of the section is to derive a closed-form solution to the de-
fined problem in (3.7). We exploit the result in (D.2) and set the derivative
equals to zero. Let us write the overall optimization problem in Lagrangian
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1 //Initialization of the state probabilities
2 P(0) = 1K\K;
3 //-- K is the number of instruction
4 //-- 1K is the vector with full of zeros
5 //and whose length is K.
6 converge = false;
7 while(!converge){
8 ∇P ← Calculate the gradient at time k
9 P(k+1) = P(k+1) + µ∇Pf(P(k))
10 // µ is the step size






13 P(k+1) = P(k+1) / sum (P(k+1));
14 if [(|f(P(k+1))− f(P(k))|) /|f(P(k))|] < ε{
15 converge = true;
16 }
17 }
Figure D.1: Gradient descent approach to achieve optimal solution
form such that





where µ and λ are the dual variables. For the rest of the derivations, we
will assume that each instruction occurs with nonzero probability so that,





⇒ (Hm +Gm) Ψ + ΩLm
Ψ2
− λ = 0 (D.9)
⇒ (Hm +Gm) +RLm
Ψ
= λ (D.10)
where R = maxP f(P) which represents the value for the optimum solu-
tion. The reason for the insertion of R instead of the ratio Ψ/Ω is simply
because calculations are done in derivative space and the optimization set-
ting ensures convexity. Observe that left hand side of (D.10) simple equals
to partial derivative of f(P). Hence, for the optimal solution, the partial
derivative of the objective function with respect to each instruction proba-
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bility must equal to each other. By keeping that in mind and plugging the
exact definition of Gm, we have
(Hm +Gm) +RLm = λΨ (D.11)












Pkpkj = −(Hm +R · Lm − λΨ + 1) (D.14)
If we define the equality
∑
m
hmipmj = δij where δ is the Kronocker delta
function such that δij = δ[i− j], introduce the notation σm = (Hm +R · Lm −































Finally, let us define
∑
i

































(Hm +R · Lm − λΨ + 1)hmi) (D.22)
Hence, we can extract the instruction probabilities if we have the op-
timal rate R. Since our purpose is to obtain the maximum rate and the
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point which maximizes this rate, we can scan for a value of R in the range
between 0 to log2K and λ such that it satisfies the conventional probability
distribution constraints i.e.
∑
Pi = 1. Our search is limited by log2K for
the rate since the lengths of each instruction are at least unity, but unlim-
ited for λ. Fortunately, proposed algorithm given in Fig. D.1 provides the
rate, λ and the corresponding point, therefore, we do not need to perform




ESTABLISHING THE DUALITY BETWEEN (4.3) AND (4.5)
Transforming the optimization problem given in (4.3) to the problem given
in (4.5) helps to utilize the ExMa algorithm presented in [72]. However, the
necessary step for that is to show that the duality holds between (4.3) and
(4.5).
Let YnM1 be the adjusted version of Y n1 for the transformation of the
proposed model in Section 4.2.3 to the model in Section 4.2.4 where nM
is the number of states after dividing each n state properly. We assume
the leakage occurs at the exit state, and the rest of the states do not emit
any signal for instructions which take more than one clock cycle. Actually,
most accurate approach is to split the available leakage power to all sub-
states. However, we note that for any intra/initial state, we can write Tij
as
Tij = g (Tij) (E.1)






































where (a) follows that there exists only one path from state i, where i is an
intra/initial state, to any other state independent of any given sequence,
and (b) follows that the transition probability for the Markov chain provides
sufficient information to describe any transition probability from one state
to another at any given time. Therefore, assigning an arbitrary power val-
ues for these states do not affect the transition probability at time t given
the output sequence. For the tractability of the mathematical derivations,
we assume these states produce no signal at all. Moreover, for these states,







logPij = 0 = Tij (E.5)





Therefore, given an instruction with an execution time larger than one,
the intra/initial states of this instruction do not contribute to the equation
given in (4.5) in terms of Tij. As the second step, we have to check the con-
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tribution of these intra/initial states to the definition of leakage capacity.




Pij logPij = 0





Pij (Tij − logPij) = 0
which means total contribution is zero if the considered state is an in-
tra/initial state of an instruction whose execution time takes more than
one clock cycle.
Now, let’s check the values obtained from the exit states. Here, our
analysis is based on the assumption that the leakage occurs at exit states.















where i is the exit state of instruction k and j is the initial state of inst-
ruction l. The reason to redefine Tij is to satisfy the duality between the
problems because it is obvious that Tkl = Tij after redefining Tij. Moreover,
the transition probabilities for an exit state to an initial state are kept ex-
actly the same with the corresponding instruction to instruction transition
probabilities, i.e. PDIV,SUB = PD4,SUB, PMUL,SUB = PM3,SUB, etc. (Here, transi-
tions are based on Fig. 4.2 and Fig. 4.3), to preserve the duality.






















Note that the number of states in the original Markov Model is the same
as the number of exit states in the transformed Markov Model.
Since the transformed Markov Model is also an indecomposable model,
it has a stationary distribution which can be written as
u = uP
where u is the state probabilities, and P is the matrix containing the
state transition probabilities. To derive mathematical results, we utilize
the classical probability constraints. For that, let ui be the stationary dis-
tribution of kth sub-state of instruction M , and uMk be its mapped version.










k, ∀i, k ∈ {1, · · · , Lj} and j ∈ S,






LiuiLi = 1 (E.8)
where E (SM) is the set containing exit states of instructions. Let us rewrite
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where (E.10) follows the equality given in (E.7), and E (TM) represents the






















































































where (E.15) follows the equality given in (E.7). Since (E.16) is exactly
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MATHEMATICAL DERIVATION OF ESP
In this section, we show how ESP is related to the alternation power at the
corresponding frequency. For measurement and derivation purposes of
ESP, the code given in Fig. 2.1 is used. Here, we assume that the sampled
sequence of s(t) is s[m], and each sample can be written as s[m] = i[m]+w[m]
where i[m] is the emanated signal sample and w[m] is additive independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) white noise with zero mean and variance
σ2w. We assume that the noise term contains all disruptive signal powers
and their variations.
Let sL11 [m] be the sequence corresponding to only one period of the first
for-loop signal, and the length of sL11 [m] is NL. We can decompose s
L1
1 [m]
into three different sequences. Assuming the depth of the pipeline is PS,
these sequences are:
* The samples of the considered instruction including all pipeline stages:
aA1 [m] =
[
0, · · · , 0, a1A1 , a2A1 , · · · , a
p
A1 , aA1 [0], · · · , aA1 [NI − 1], a
p+1




where aiA1 is the i
th sample of the emitted signal when A1 is in a
pipeline stage rather than execution.
* The samples of other activities rather than A1 to make the micro-
benchmark practical including the pipeline effect:
oL1 [m] = [o[0], o[1], · · · , o[NL − 2], o[NL − 1]] .
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Here, we need to note that the samples taken for the first iteration
of the inner for-loop will be different than the other iterations even
for the ideal case due to pipeline depth. Although it looks like the
periodicity is not valid for oL1 [m], we can able to ignore it thanks to
the assumption that ninst is large.
* Finally, the last sequence compromises all other components which
are assumed to be Gaussian and given as
wL1 [m] = [w[0], w[1], · · · , w[NL − 1]] .
Combining all these sequences, we have
sL11 [m] = aA1 [m] + oL1 [m] + wL1 [m].
Following the same decomposition for the second for-loop signal, called
sL22 [n], we have
* oL2 [m] = [o[0], o[1], · · · , o[NL − 2], o[NL − 1]],
* wL2 [m] = [w[0], w[1], · · · , w[NL − 1]],
which leads to
sL22 [m] = oL2 [m] + wL2 [m].
Here, we assume that NOP consumes very little energy as it passes through
the stages of a pipeline, which means it produces a signal whose power is
close to zero. Observe here that since both loops are almost identical ex-
cept the part where A1 is inserted, we assume that oL1 [m] and oL2 [m] are
identical to each other, therefore, we refer both sequences as o[m]. Let p[m]
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be a square wave with 50% duty cycle and period of 2NLninst samples, and
s[m] be the one period signal of the outer for-loop. Let also aA1 [m] and o[m]
be generated by concatenating aA1 [m] and oL1 [m] by 2 · ninst times, respec-
tively. Furthermore, we can simply assume that the noise components are
i.i.d. for both for-loops. Therefore, we have
s[m] = p[m]aA1 [m] + o[m] + w[m].




P [1− γ]AA1 [γ]
2NLninst
+ O[1] + W[1]. (F.1)
We know that O[k] and AA1 [k] have nonzero frequency components only if
k = 2 · ninst · l, ∀l ∈ {0, · · · , NL− 1}, and |P [1]|  |P [1− 2ninst]|. Therefore, (F.1)
can be approximately written as
S[1] ≈ P [1]
2NLninst
AA1 [0] + W[1]. (F.2)
If we take the magnitude square of both sides, we have
|S[1]|2 =
∣∣∣∣ P [1]2NLninstAA1 [0] + W[1]
∣∣∣∣2
=
∣∣∣∣ P [1]2NLninstAA1 [0]
∣∣∣∣2 + |W[1]|2 − <e {P [1]AA1 [0]W∗[1]}NL · ninst (F.3)
where (·)∗ is conjugation and <e {·} takes the real part of its argument.
Assuming ∣∣∣∣ P [1]2NLninstAA1 [0]
∣∣∣∣ <e {P [1]AA1 [0]W∗[1]} ,
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the first harmonic of s[m] can be simplified further as
|S[1]|2 ≈
∣∣∣∣ P [1]2NLninstAA1 [0]
∣∣∣∣2 + |W[1]|2 . (F.4)
To proceed further, we need to have the expression for AA1 [0]. Utilizing










where (a) follows the fact that aA1 [m] is periodic with NL samples. Since,
at each period, only NI + PS of aA1 [m] have nonzero values, and assuming
NI + PS is large enough, (F.5) can be written as
AA1 [0] = 2(NI + PS)ninstE [aA1 [m]]
= 2(NI + PS)ninstµA1 (F.6)
















≈ Ts(NI + PS)
R
µ2A1 (F.7)
where σA1 is the standard deviation of the samples while an instruction
signal is executed, and (F.7) follows the assumption that the variation in
measured signal during the execution of an instruction is much smaller






The final step is to show how ESP[A1] and the alternation power P(falt)
are related to each other. The relation between the first harmonic of the






2 ·NL · ninst
)2
. (F.9)
Let PA1(falt) be the measured alternation power when A1 is inserted into
first for-loop, and the second loop is kept empty. On the other hand, let
P0(falt) be the measured power when both for-loops are kept empty (Here,
we need to remark that keeping the loops empty means inserting NOP as
many as the total number of clock cycles required to execute A1). Finally,
let PA1(falt) be the normalized alternation power for the instruction A1
which is defined as
PA1(falt) = PA1(falt)− P0(falt).
The critical observation is that the term related to A1 in (F.4) is zero
when both for loops are kept empty. Assume SA1 [1] and S0[1] denote the
first harmonics of the signal when 1) A1 is inserted, and 2) both loops are
kept empty, respectively. Considering this setup, we can write




where we utilize the approximation that π|P [1]| ≈ 2NLninst. Exploiting the
definition of normalized alternation power, and employing the equations
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given in (F.8), (F.9), and (F.10), we can write






















To emphasize the relation between the power at the alternation fre-
quency and ESP, we can write
falt · ninst =
1
2 ·NL · Ts
. (F.12)
























(NI + PS) · falt · ninst
(F.14)






Monitoring computer system activities on the instruction level provides
more resilience to malware attacks because these attacks can be analyzed
better by observing the changes on the instruction level. Assuming the
source code is available, many training signals can be collected to track
the instruction sequence to detect whether a malware is injected or the
system works properly. Most of the previous work on side channel inst-
ruction tracking has been concentrated on building side-channel-based
disassembler [116, 117, 118]. As much as their work is a specific reverse
engineering application and they take a different approach, our works are
similar in the sense that we both try to extract the executed instruction
of a device through side-channel analysis. Eisenbath et. al. [116] use a
microcontroller with the simplest form of pipelining (two stages: prefetch
and execute) and the clock frequency of the target device is as low as 1
MHZ. Park et. al. [117] works on a device whose operating clock frequency
is 16 MHz, but the pipeline has again only two stages. Unlike the former
papers which utilize the power side channel, Strobel et al. [118] uses EM
side-channel; the operating frequency of the microcontroller used in their
study is 4 MHz and the pipeline has only two stages. They also modify
the target device by decapculating the IC to locate the probe closer to the
die of the microcontroller [118]. Another similar application of instruction
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tracking is Msnga et al.[62]’s instruction-level side channel profiling ap-
proach, where they use a microcontroller with 4 MHz clock frequency and
two pipeline stages. The previous work demonstrates the feasibility of inst-
ruction tracking either through power or EM side channels for the specific
target devices. However, the target devices that are used in previous work
do not represent the modern computers due to the following reasons:
• The operating clock frequency of the target devices are very low.
• Target devices employ the simplest form of pipelining architecture
whereas the modern computers have much more advanced pipelining
architectures with more than several pipeline stages.
Therefore, training signals have to be collected with high sampling rate to
ensure that the significant features of these signals do not vanish. Since
the clock frequencies of the current computer systems are extremely high,
we need to have a commercial device with high sampling rate, i.e. 10 GHz,
which either costs remarkably high, or does not exist. To eliminate the
deficiencies regarding the insufficient sampling rate, we propose a method
to increase the sampling rate with the moderate commercial devices for
training symbols. In that respect, we first generate some random inst-
ruction sequences which exist in the inspected source code. Then, these
sequences are executed in a for-loop, and emanated electromagnetic (EM)
signals from the processor are collected by a commercially available device
with moderate sampling rate, i.e. sampling rate is much smaller than the
clock frequency. Lastly, we apply a mapping of the gathered samples by
utilizing modulo of their timings with respect to execution time of overall
instruction sequence. As the final step, we provide some experimental re-
sults to illustrate that we successfully track the instruction sequence by
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applying the proposed approach.
G.2 A Method for Generating Training Sequences for Single Instruc-
tion Tracking
In order to track instructions through emanated EM signals, it is neces-
sary to have EM signatures for each instruction that can be used for com-
parison. Earlier work demonstrates several ways of generating signatures
such as applying dimensionality reduction methods to the recorded signal
and using machine learning classification techniques [116, 62, 118], and
recording the signature of the instruction for several times and simply av-
eraging them [119]. In this chapter, modulo operation technique that is
explained in detail in Section G.3 is adapted for generating the EM signa-
tures.
As mentioned earlier, two of the main challenges of our work can be
expressed as the inadequate sampling rate and not having a model that
describes the pipeline effect on the emanated EM signal. In order to ad-
dress the latter issue, it’s been established to use sequences of instructions
instead of single instructions. When an instruction is executed, pipeline is
filled with neighboring instructions that are just before or after that inst-
ruction, and those neighboring instructions are included in the instruction
sequence. As much as the individual contributions from the neighboring
instructions that appear in different stages of pipeline are not known, us-
ing the whole sequence as signature allows us to include their aggregate
effect.
Regarding inadequate sampling rate, modulo operation becomes a very
useful technique. Assuming we have a signal that is composed of samples
from a periodic signal, modulo operation can be used to upsample that
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signal (reader can refer to Section G.3 for detailed analysis of modulo oper-
ation). One should note that, when the instruction sequence is executed,
the emanated EM signal occurs only once and hence it is not a periodic
signal. However, since we have access to the device during training phase,
we can artificially mimic the required periodicity condition by executing
the same sequence consecutively. It should also be noted that the repeti-
tion of the instruction sequence is only used in the training phase and not
in the testing phase, where instruction sequence is executed only once.
Considering the requirements above, we can summarize the setups
used for training and testing phases as follows.
• Training Setup: This setup is used to generate EM signatures. There-
fore, the instruction sequence is executed for N consecutive times by
utilizing a for loop. The pseudo code for this setup can be seen in
Figure G.1. The empty for-loops before and after the execution of the
instruction sequence are used as markers to detect the beginning and
ending of the instruction sequence.
• Testing Setup: This setup is used for testing the generated EM signa-
tures. Unlike Training Setup, the instruction sequence is executed
only once. Therefore, it is not possible to apply modulo operation in
this case. This means that the sampling frequency of the captured
EM signal in this setup is not as high as the resulting EM signatures.
The pseudo code for this setup can be seen in Figure G.2. The empty
for-loops before and after the execution of the instruction sequence
are similarly used as markers to detect the beginning and ending of
the instruction sequence.




















Figure G.2: Pseudocode for
Testing Setup.
Figure G.3: Pseudocodes for Training and Testing setups used for gener-
ating EM signatures and testing the generated signatures
does not only increase the sampling rate, but also the resulting EM sig-
nature is, in a way, an averaged version of N executions of the same inst-
ruction sequence. This characteristic of the operation is especially useful
when the noise level is very high. The averaging nature of the modulo oper-
ation can be used to filter out the noise, and the underlying EM emanation
that has been formerly overshadowed by the noise can be recognized and
extracted as signature. One should also note that, repeating the inst-
ruction sequence consecutively results in a different pipeline effect. As
opposed to the single execution case, Training Setup helps to decrease
the contribution coming from the previous and subsequent instructions.
By using sequences of instructions instead of single instructions, we
are inevitably increasing the total possible number of EM signatures that
needs to be generated. On the other hand, the longer the sequence, the
better the pipeline effect is included in the generated EM signature. This
situation indicates the trade off between the total number of EM signatures
and the ability to address the pipeline effect.
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G.3 Modulo Operation to Increase Effective Signal Sampling Rate
The technique that we propose in this section, modulo operation, is a very
simple but effective method that enables generating well-conditioned EM
signatures. In this section, first, we explain the theory behind the tech-
nique, then illustrate the result of the technique through simple examples
and finally discuss the required conditions for this operation to be appli-
cable.
Theoretical Perspective: Let’s assume that y(t) is a long periodic signal
with period T , and Ts is the sampling period of the measuring instrument,
which (without loss of generality) can be formulated as
Ts = kT + ∆m. (G.1)
Here, k is a fixed non-negative integer, T is the period of the target signal
y(t) and ∆m (that will be referred as modular offset) is defined as:
∆m = mod(Ts, T ). (G.2)
It should be noted any Ts can be expressed with the formulation given
in (G.1). Now, let ys[n] be a discrete time sequence which is constructed by
sampling y(t) with the sampling period Ts as
ys[n] = y(nTs), for ∀n where n ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., N − 1}. (G.3)
Since Ts is known, sampling times, tn’s, for each sample n are also
known:
tn = nTs, for ∀n where n ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., N − 1}. (G.4)
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Let tmodn be the time indicating where the n
th sample corresponds in the
fundamental period of y(t) and it can be found as
tmodn = mod (tn, T ) = mod (n (kT + ∆m) , T )
= mod (n∆m, T ) , for ∀n where n ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., N − 1}. (G.5)
It should be noted that 0 ≤ tmodn < T . In a way, the value of the nth sample
(ys[n]) can be wrapped around and used to fill in the value for tmodn . After
repeating this process for all samples and sorting tmodn ’s accordingly, we
can obtain several samples in y(t)’s fundamental period [0, T ]. Determining
the exact number of the new samples in y(t)’s fundamental period [0, T ] is
more subtle.
Number of Samples: As we repeat calculating tmodn for increasing n’s, every
sample fills in a distinct point within [0, T ] until tmodn becomes zero again
(other than n = 0 for which tmodn is always zero). Let M denote the smallest
nonzero sample index n for which tmodn = 0. For any sample with index
number M or greater than M , it is not possible to fill in a distinct point
within [0, T ] because the value at tmodn is already filled by a previous sample.
In other words, any subsequent sample whose sample index n ≥ M does
not increase the total number of sample points within the fundamental
period. Then, determining the exact number of new samples transforms
into finding M , the nonzero sample index for which tmodn = 0. In order to
find that, we should focus on the definition that is given in (G.5): tmodn =
mod (n∆m, T ). One should realize that tmodn = 0 for n = 0, but we are looking
for the sampling index n > 0. Then, it is not very difficult to see that
mod (n∆m, T ) becomes zero when n∆m is the same as the least common
multiple of ∆m and T .
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Let lcm(x, y) correspond to an operator whose result is the least common
multiple of its operands x and y. It should be noted that we are using a
looser least common multiple operator for which the result and operands
x and y do not necessarily have to be integers, i.e., lcm(0.01, 0.02) = 0.02.
Hence, the total number of samples in one period of y(t) is equal to M

















If the total number of samples, N , is at least as much as M , we can
make sure that we have at least one sample that represents the value of
the signal at t = 0, T ns , 2T
n
s , ..., (T − T ns ). Therefore, when this condition is
satisfied, new sampling time of the signal becomes T ns . Consequently, it








Detailed Explanation: In order to illustrate what modulo operation does,
consider the following signal:
y(t) = sin (2πt). (G.8)
We consider two different cases of Ts: Ts1 = 2.01 and Ts2 = 2.53. Since
the period of y(t) is 1, the modular offsets are ∆m1 = 0.01 and ∆m2 = 0.53,
respectively. After sampling y(t) with sampling periods Ts1 and Ts2, we
obtain the following discrete time signals:
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(a) y(t) (solid curve) and ys[n] (markers) for
Ts1 = 2.01.











(b) y(t) (solid curve) and ys[n] (markers) for
Ts1 = 2.01.
Figure G.4: The solid curves represent the continuous target signal y(t) =
sin (2πt), whereas the markers represent ys[n] (samples obtained from y(t)
with sampling rates Ts1 = 2.01 (a) and Ts2 = 2.53 (b) ). One should note
that this is a case where the signal is heavily undersampled that causes
aliasing.
ys1 [n] = y(nTs1) = sin (2πnTs1) and ys2 [n] = y(nTs2) = sin (2πnTs2), for ∀n
(G.9)
where n ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., N − 1}.
The solid curves in Figure G.4 illustrate y(t), whereas the markers
in Figure G.4(a) and G.4(b) represent ys1 [n] and ys2 [n], respectively. One
should note that for both cases Ts > T and we have less than 1 sample for
each period of y(t). This situation presents a scenario where the sampling
rate is very low with respect to the frequency of the signal under investiga-
tion. In classical signal processing terms, sampling frequency is much less
than the Nyquist rate and consequently, aliasing occurs. Due to aliasing,
ys1 [n] and ys2 [n] are completely different from each other even though they
are obtained from the same signal. Without any further assumption, ys1 [n]
and ys2 [n] cannot be used to recover the target signal y(t).
In Figure G.5, time axis is extended to [0, 1000] s, and one can note that
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(a) ys[n] for Ts1 = 2.01.











(b) ys[n] for Ts2 = 2.53.
Figure G.5: Time axis is extended to [0, 1000] s for Figure G.4, and the
markers start to resemble y(t) in (a) but not in (b)
the waveform that is generated by the markers in Figure G.5(a) resembles
the sinusoidal target signal y(t) on a different timing scale. However, Figure
G.5(b) does not resemble y(t) at all. Aliasing in Figure G.5(b) is, therefore,
very obvious, but one should also realize that aliasing occurs in Figure
G.5(a) as well. Although the shape of the markers resemble the target
signal, the period of the signal generated by markers is completely different
than the period of the target signal.











(a) Samples sorted (tmodn ) for Ts1 = 2.01.











(b) Samples sorted by (tmodn ) for Ts2 = 2.53.
Figure G.6: When samples are sorted by their modular sampling timing
(tmodn ), the reconstructed signal fully resembles y(t) in its fundamental pe-
riod for both (a) and (b).
The results obtained after applying the modulo operation are presented
in Figure G.6 and it can be easily noted that the reconstructed signals from
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both ys1 [n] and ys1 [n] are identical to y(t) for t ∈ [0, T ]. These figures expose
the strength of the proposed approach to increase the sampling rate. We
have first showed that ys1 [n] and ys2 [n] are samples obtained from the same
target signal y(t), but they are completely different signals due to aliasing.
However, applying the modulo operation helped us to recover the under-
lying target signal in both of the cases. Therefore, beyond increasing the
sampling rate, modulo operation is especially useful to deal with aliasing.
This example represents how modulo operation can be used to recon-
struct a periodic signal in its fundamental period with higher effective
sampling rate. One should note that we assume a few conditions that
are required for modulo operation to be useful:
• The target signal is a periodic signal and its period is known or easily
estimated.
• Modular offset (∆m = mod(T, Ts)) is nonzero, in other words, the sam-
pling period Ts is not an integer multiple of the period of the target
signal.
For any signal that satisfies the forementioned conditions, modulo oper-
ation can be applied. We now show that the signal obtained by using
Training Setup in Section G.2 indeed satisfied those conditions:
• Same instruction sequence is executed several times consecutively
by using a for loop, and therefore, the signal becomes periodic during
the execution of the for loop. Also, because the total number of exe-
cutions of the instruction sequence is determined by us (thus, known
to us), the period of the instruction sequence (the time it takes for
the instruction sequence to be executed only once) can be estimated
through dividing the total execution time by the number of iterations.
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With this specific setup, the periodicity condition can be satisfied and
the period can be easily estimated.
• Sampling period, Ts, is determined by the sampling equipment. Usu-
ally, it is very unlikely to have Ts be an integer multiple of T , but
even if this occurs, sampling time of the equipment can be slightly
adjusted in a way to avoid Ts from being an integer multiple of T .
The discussion above shows that Training Setup used in our experi-
ments satisfies the required conditions for applying modulo operation. It is
worth re-emphasizing that this setup is used for generating the EM signa-
tures (where we have much more degree of freedom in modifying the source
code), but it is not repeated for the actual instruction tracking stage Test-
ing Setup, because, the instructions are executed only once in the actual
tracking stage.
Finally, it may be worthwhile to note that modulo operation is not in-
creasing the real-time sampling rate. Instead, modulo operation uses the
samples that are recorded from several repetitions of a periodic signal and
creates a new signal whose time scope is limited to one period of the signal,
but the new signal contains samples that are spaced much closer to each
other in time.
G.4 Experimental Results and Discussion
G.4.1 Experimental Results on Target Device 1 (FPGA)
The first target device that is used in our experiments is Altera DE1 Cy-
clone II, a high-density, low cost FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array).
For implementing our code on the device, we use Altera’s embedded pro-
cessor Nios II that employs a relatively advanced pipeline architecture with
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6 pipeline stages (Fetch, Decode, Execute, Memory, Align and Writeback)
and operates at 50 MHz clock frequency. The considered instructions are
given in Table 2.1.
In this section, we consider 20 instruction sequences that are listed
in Appendix G.6. As it can be noted, the instructions include the basic
arithmetic operations such as ADD, SUB, MUL, DIV, as well as load (LDM)
and store (STM) instructions. We would like to point out that the number
of sequences that are used in the experiment is not enough to conclude
instruction tracking at single instruction level. However, recognition of the
presented sequences with reasonably high success rate supports the ap-
plicability of our proposed method. After having high success rate with the
provided instruction sequences, instruction level tracking can be achieved
by a rigorous sequence selection and experimentation.
Figure G.7: Measurement Setup: Magnetic near field probe is located on
top of the processor of the FPGA
Earlier work has shown that EM emanations occur at different frequen-
cies [3]. In our study, we are particularly interested in the EM emanations
around the clock frequency of our target device. We measure the emanated
EM signals with a near field magnetic probe (AAronia PBS H3) that is lo-
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cated above the processor of the target device as shown in Figure G.7.
For recording the measured data, we use a spectrum analyzer (Keysight
N9020A MXA). Main reason behind using this device is the built-in fea-
tures of the device to downconvert the recorded signal and the visualize
the signal around the clock frequency. However, any other less expensive
device with similar sampling rate features can be used to repeat the same
experiments.
To give the reader more insight on how the emanated EM signals and
the result of modulo operation look like, Figure G.8 displays the recorded
signal for a specific instruction sequence (DIV-DIV-SUB-DIV-ADD-MUL-SUB-MUL-
ADD-DIV). The top and bottom plots in Figure G.9 represent the modulo op-
eration result and the single execution of the same instruction sequence,
respectively. One should note that the plot on the top is a much more
smooth plot due to higher resulting sampling rate and the averaging na-
ture of modulo operation. In fact, for this specific instruction sequence, the
sampling rate is increased by a factor of 125. In order to compare those
two signals, we use Pearson correlation coefficient [120]. Clearly, these
two discrete time signals have different number of samples. Therefore, the
modulo operation result is resampled at the same time instances of the sin-
gle execution signal. Resampled modulo operation result and the original
single execution result are plotted on top of each other in Figure G.10 and
the resulting correlation coefficient is 0.96. Promisingly, when the same
modulo operation result is correlated with single execution of other instruc-
tion sequences, the correlation coefficient is less than 0.9 for all different
sequences.
Table G.1 presents the correlation matrix between the EM signatures
that are obtained with modulo operation and the single execution of the
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Figure G.8: Recorded signal for the given sequence in Training Setup
before modulo operation.
Figure G.9: The plot on the top presents the result of the modulo operation
obtained by using Training Setup, plot on the bottom presents the single
execution of the same instruction sequence obtained by Testing Setup.
instruction sequences. It can be easily noted that the dominant terms
in the matrix are the diagonal terms, which supports the claim that the
generated EM signatures by modulo operation can be used to detect the
corresponding instruction sequences. One should also note that, similar
instruction sequences (such as instruction sequence 10 and 11, which
differ only in one instruction) have higher cross correlation coefficients,
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Figure G.10: Resampled modulo operation result (solid curve) vs. single
execution of the same instruction sequence (dashed curve).
Table G.1: Correlation between the EM signatures and their one-time-run
versions for Altera DE1 Cyclone II. The columns denote the EM signatures
and the rows denote the one-time-run versions. The diagonal entries dom-
inate the other terms, therefore, the generated EM signatures can identify
the executed sequences and corresponding instructions (The values given
in the table is correlation coefficient × 100).
Generated EM signatures














1B 91 54 73 15 23 11 21 19 28 43 21 23 7 54 18 37 27 24 14 2
2B 12 95 50 16 57 43 50 21 39 56 58 6 65 58 50 57 10 46 9 18
3B 61 67 93 6 55 42 50 2 18 62 66 28 52 68 24 55 8 46 5 16
4B 19 6 20 94 46 61 42 73 62 10 29 73 50 14 44 4 67 27 78 66
5B 9 53 18 52 97 79 80 75 72 30 49 39 55 32 53 50 55 62 61 67
6B 11 31 2 66 80 91 87 85 75 16 50 67 61 16 59 43 70 72 68 79
7B 2 43 20 32 70 80 92 64 73 24 54 48 50 38 61 55 55 72 54 76
8B 27 8 34 41 30 47 38 97 66 19 26 83 42 21 56 2 76 24 77 66
9B 41 3 31 57 44 62 57 80 98 19 37 82 62 19 76 0 90 34 68 69
10B 22 57 53 20 55 40 44 11 20 96 88 22 70 76 33 83 3 47 4 11
11B 20 49 33 44 57 53 50 50 62 65 93 26 82 58 58 70 46 51 47 47
12B 12 41 48 42 10 18 7 80 52 47 7 94 10 50 47 33 68 14 75 66
13B 20 41 20 59 61 60 57 69 80 36 80 45 98 40 62 39 75 58 61 57
14B 33 65 72 11 65 44 46 8 31 76 83 30 81 95 29 62 7 49 7 10
15B 39 20 25 34 33 46 47 64 80 3 45 66 54 4 96 17 70 25 56 55
16B 13 53 41 26 53 57 66 25 36 82 78 1 60 60 48 96 12 66 17 36
17B 32 25 41 57 28 51 36 78 85 38 15 82 42 32 64 21 95 20 74 56
18B 12 42 27 49 61 81 91 49 58 38 48 32 54 38 45 63 45 97 31 53
19B 23 11 20 46 40 42 25 77 59 23 19 66 32 16 51 9 70 4 92 70
20B 8 6 17 40 46 55 59 72 66 13 23 71 34 8 57 14 58 25 77 94
but none of the cross correlation coefficients are above 0.9. Therefore, the
corresponding threshold for these instruction sequences can be set as 0.9.
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As mentioned earlier, in order to reach single instruction level tracking,
we should include all possible instruction sequences. In this chapter, we
have included only 20 instruction sequences as a preliminary result in
order to demonstrate the applicability of our proposed modulo operation
technique.
G.4.2 Experimental Results on Target Device 2 (ARM Board)
In order to demonstrate that modulo operation technique can be applied to
devices with very high clock frequencies, we include another target device
that has higher clock frequency. The second target device that is used in
our experiments is A13-OLinuXino board, a single-board computer with
Cortex A8 ARM processor. The operating frequency of the device is 1 GHz
and the pipeline architecture is very complex with 13 pipeline stages.
For this device, we consider 7 instruction sequences that are listed in
Appendix G.7. Similar to Section G.4.1, the instructions include the basic
arithmetic operations such as ADD,SUB,MUL, as well as load (LDR) and
store (STR) instructions. The instructions that considered are for this
device are given in Table 2.1.
We measure the emanated EM signals with the same near field magnetic
probe (AAronia PBS H3) that is located above the processor of the target
device. For recording the measured data, we use a different spectrum
analyzer (Keysight N9030B PXA), which enables us to sample the signal
with 400 MHz span. Note that this is still not providing enough samples
per clock cycle, because the operating clock frequency is much higher, i.e.
1 GHz.
Here, we would like to point out a modification in the Testing Setup.
When we use the Testing Setup that is explained in Section G.2, we realize
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that the the training signals do not resemble the testing signals due to
the different pipeline effects that training and testing signals go through.
One should note that, this is not the case in Section G.4.1, because the
pipeline architecture of FPGA is not as complex as this board. In order to
circumvent this problem, we modify the Testing Setup by repeating the
instruction sequence within the for loop, but only crop one period of it.
This enables us to make sure that the testing signal has the same pipeline
effect as the training signal.
Figure G.11 displays the signal recorded by using Training Setup be-
fore modulo operation for a specific instruction sequence (Sequence 1 in
Table G.4). This signal is used as the input to the modulo operation. .


















Figure G.11: Recorded Training Setup of Sequence 1 from Table G.4.
The top and bottom plots in Figure G.12 represent the modulo operation
result and the single execution of the same instruction sequence, respec-
tively. Similar to previous section, when we correlate the modulo operation
result for this instruction sequence with other testing signals obtained
from different instruction sequences, the correlation is much less than
0.9. Figure G.13 illustrates one example of this.
Table G.2 illustrates the correlation matrix of training and testing sig-
224
































Figure G.12: The plot on the top presents the result of the modulo oper-
ation, plot on the bottom presents the single execution of the same inst-
ruction sequence obtained by modified Testing Setup, where the signal
is preceded and followed by the same instruction sequence. Instruction
Sequence used for this figure is Sequence 1 from Table G.4.
nals obtained from experiments on A13-OLinuXino board. It is not very
difficult to realize that the diagonal terms are dominant, and the other
terms are much less than 0.8. This indicates that we can detect the inst-
ruction sequences that are used in this experiment by using the training
signals obtained by modulo operation. Therefore, we can conclude that
modulo operation is applicable for devices with high clock frequencies as
much as 1 GHz.
G.5 Summary
Earlier work have illustrated the usage of EM emanations for instruction
tracking on processors with simple pipeline architectures and low operat-
ing frequencies. In this chapter, we show how EM emanations can be used
to track instructions on a more advanced device (an FPGA) with a proces-
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Figure G.13: The plot on the top presents the result of the modulo oper-
ation obtained by using modified Training Setup (concatenating different
instances of Testing Setup) for Sequence 1 from Table G.4, plot on the bot-
tom presents the single execution of the a different instruction sequence
(Sequence 3 from Table G.4) obtained by Testing Setup. The correlation
of those signals are very low as expected.
sor that has a more complex pipeline structure and higher operating clock
frequency.
In order to track the instructions, we generate reference signals (called
as EM signatures) to be compared with the emanated signals. The complex
structure of the target device has motivated us to develop a new technique
and modified experiment setups to generate EM signatures. Firstly, in
order to incorporate the pipeline effect, EM signatures are generated for
sequences of instructions rather than single instructions. Furthermore,
we propose and implement a technique called modulo operation, which
addresses the issues introduced by low sampling rate and the pipeline
effect. Results show that modulo operation is successful not only to obtain
an EM signature with higher sampling rate, but also to eliminate possible
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Table G.2: Correlation between the EM signatures and their one-time-run
versions for A13-OLinuXino board. The columns denote the EM signatures
and the rows denote the one-time-run versions. The diagonal entries dom-
inate the other terms, therefore, the generated EM signatures can identify
the executed sequences and corresponding instructions (The values given
in the table is correlation coefficient × 100).
Generated EM signatures













s 1B 98 43 48 29 60 35 40
2B 34 98 72 47 42 59 44
3B 37 72 98 33 37 62 46
4B 31 55 32 95 30 62 25
5B 58 41 47 31 96 43 71
6B 37 61 59 67 47 89 51
7B 45 66 66 32 59 53 92
measurement noise. Results demonstrate that a specific EM signature is
highly correlated with the single execution of the same sequence and much
less correlated with all other sequences. This confirms the applicability of
EM signals that are generated by using modulo operation.
As much as the EM signatures for instruction sequences used in our
experiment can be used to detect the corresponding sequences, achieving
instruction tracking at instruction level necessitates generating EM sig-
natures for all possible sequences. To this end, our experimental results
show that using modulo operation for generating EM signatures for all pos-
sible sequences is a feasible approach to obtain high success rate.
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G.6 Sequences Used for Target Device 1
In this section, we provide the instruction sequences investigated in Table
G.1 (instruction sequences used on FPGA):























G.7 Sequences Used for Target Device 2
In this section, we provide the instruction sequences investigated in Table
G.2 (instruction sequences used on ARM Board):








































PSD OF PAM SIGNAL WITH RANDOM PULSE POSITION
The PAM signal with random pulse position y(t) is given by y(t) =
∑
k xkδ(t−
kT −Tk). y(t) is an impulse train whose amplitude is modulated by the se-
quence xk and the impulse positions are randomly shifted by Tk. Further-
more, the autocorrelation function and the power spectral density of xk are
denoted as Rx[k] and Sx(f) =
∑
k Rx[k]e
−j2πfkT , respectively. Here, we note
that the signals xp(t) and y(t) in (5.1) and (5.5) are cyclostationary random
processes if the amplitude modulating sequence xk and the random pulse
position variation Tk are stationary [121]. For a cyclostationary random
processes of period T , the average autocorrelation function between 0 and







where Ry(t, τ) = E
[
y(t), y(t − τ)
]
and E[·] denotes the expectation. Here,






xixjδ(t− iT −Ti)δ(t− τ − jT −Tj)
]
. (H.2)
It can be shown that Ry(t, τ) is also periodic in time with a period T .
Therefore, y(t) is a cyclostationary random process. Using (H.1), we can
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where (H.3) follows the assumption that xk and Tk are independent. Let





































Since xk is a stationary sequence, we can deduce E[xixj] = Rx[i− j]. Ex-
ploiting that {Tk, ∀k ∈ (−∞,∞)} are statistically identical and independent
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δ(−τ −mT + T0 −Tm)
]
. (H.5)
Considering that the pulse positions Tk are independent and identically



















δ(−τ −mT + T0 −Tm)
]
T . (H.6)
To proceed further, let us introduce zm(τ) = E
[





















fT(τ +mT + tm)fT(tm)dtm
= fT(−τ +mT ) ∗ fT(τ)
= δ(τ −mT ) ∗ fT(−τ) ∗ fT(τ)
= δ(τ −mT ) ∗ φ(τ) (H.7)
where (a) follows all distributions {Ti|∀i ∈ {−∞,∞}} are i.i.d., (b) is due to
support set assumption of distribution functions and ∗ denotes convolu-















The PSD Sy(f) of the signal yp(t) is obtained by taking the Fourier trans-
form of the above result. Using these results, we can write the spectrum





T (1− Φ(f)), (H.9)
where Φ(f) is the Fourier transform of φ(τ).
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H.1 PSD of “on-off” Keying (OOK) With Random Pulse Position
The power spectrum of the PAM with random pulse position has already
been derived in (5.11). In this section, we specify the equation in (5.11)
for OOK modulation case. As the first step, we need to calculate Sx(f) to
investigate the effect of random pulse position on the spectral power of the
signal. We assume the amplitude of a symbol is A when the symbol is








Rx[0] if m = 0,
Rx[0]/2 otherwise.





Rx[m]δ(τ −mT ). (H.10)
To obtain the power spectral density of the signal, Fourier transform of









































δ(f − n/T )
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+ (1− Φ(f)︸ ︷︷ ︸
S̄nt(f)
 . (H.12)
Here, we need to note that since we assume that the random shift posi-







that has a Gaussian distribution, we consider




COVERT CHANNEL CAPACITY DERIVATIONS
In this section, we provide the derivations for channel capacity bounds of
the covert channel communications. The capacity of a discrete memoryless
synchronization channel is given in (2.5). Here, N̄ is the average number
of received symbols per transmitted symbol. The number of insertions
between consecutive input symbols are geometrically distributed and the
average number of insertions per input symbol is
(pi0 + pi1)(1− pi0 − pi1) + 2(pi0 + pi1)2(1− pi0 − pi1)
+3(pi0 + pi1)
3(1− pi0 − pi1) + . . .
=
pi0 + pi1
1− pi0 − pi1
. (I.1)
Hence, the average number of output symbols per input symbols is
N̄ =
1
1− pi0 − pi1
. (I.2)
In [16], [15], it is shown that channels with insertions and substitu-
tions can be decomposed into a cascade of two channels, channel with in-
sertions and channel with substitutions as shown in Fig. 2.5. Since both
inputs and outputs of the covert channel are assumed to be equiprobable,
it follows that








where n is the number of input bits, pi = pi0 + pi1, and H(·) denotes the
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between the input sequence and output of the second






























, we are required to obtain an





































































































































































where Ci(pi) is the channel capacity of insertion channel with insertion
probability pi and (I.6) follows the assumption that the noisy substitu-
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tion channel is a discrete memoryless channel (DMC), and the output are
statistically independent and identical because of the random insertions
[123]. To obtain a lower bound for the insertion channel, we exploit the
relation between deletion and insertion channels, and previous results for
the capacity lower bound of deletion channels. In [16], the relation be-
tween deletion and insertion channels is given as
Cd(pi) = (1− pi)Ci(pi) (I.8)
where Cd(pi) is the information rate of a deletion channel with equiprobable
iid inputs whose deletion probability equals to insertion probability of the
insertion channel. Morover, in [124], the capacity lower bound for the
deletion channel is given as
Cd(pi) ≥ 1−Hb(pi) (I.9)
where Cd(pi) represents the actual channel capacity of the deletion channel
with deletion probability pi and Hb(•) denotes the binary entropy.
The equation given in (I.9) is valid for any deletion channel. Therefore,






If we combine (I.7) and (I.10), we have
















where the last equation follows the assumption that the noisy channel is
binary symmetric channel with substitution probability pe. By definition,
mutual information could not be less than zero, therefore, the lower bound








To prove the upper bound for the covert-channel capacity, we consider
a channel where the receiver is provided with the positions of all insertions
caused by the covert channel and the sequence Zn = {z0, z1 · · · , zn} with
zk =

0 if the kth bit is inserted bit,
1 otherwise
(I.13)
which provides further information whether a bit is an information bit or
an inserted bit. Therefore,
I(W n;Y N̄n) ≤ I(W n;Y N̄n) + I(W n;ZN̄n|Y N̄n)
= I(W n;Y N̄n, ZN̄n)
= I(W n; Ŷ n) (I.14)
= n(1−Hb(pe)) (I.15)
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where Ŷ is the sequence obtained by removing the inserted bits. The equa-
tion given in (I.14) can be explained as follows: Knowing where the synch-
ronization errors are located, the receiver can discard the inserted sym-
bols. The capacity of this channel, therefore, is as large as the capacity of
the channel with no synchronization errors. Finally, combining again (2.5)














· I(W n; Ŷ n)
= 1−Hb(pe) (I.16)
which concludes the proof.
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